On April 6, 2014, Costa Ricans elected Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) candidate Luis Guillermo Solís to be their new president, upsetting the order of a de facto two-party system that has dominated presidential politics for half a century. Founded in 1951 by José Figueres Ferrer after the conclusion of the civil war, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) has held the presidency for 38 out of the last 66 years, alternating with the Partido de Unidad Socialcristiana (PUSC) and its predecessors. Both of these parties are relatively centrist, especially as compared to the more extreme politics of other countries in the region, most notably Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Indeed, the political and social stability of Costa Rica constitutes the basis for the sustained economic advancement during the decades of regional turmoil. The lack of wide-spread violence and armed conflict over the past 30 to 40 years makes Costa Rica and Belize unique among a swath of countries ranging from Mexico through Central America, and south into Columbia, Venezuela, and Peru.
While externally and comparatively Costa Rican political platforms seem to differ only slightly – similar to the view many Latin Americans have of the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. – internally key individuals represent opposing positions on issues such as regional and hemispheric commercial cooperation and integration, especially alignment with U.S.-led initiatives. Oscar Arias has been the most dominant single political figure in Costa Rican politics since the mid-1980s. His first term as president (1986-1990) coincided with the various Central American wars that were both internal, partisan conflicts and proxy battles for the Cold War superpowers. Arias mediated the peace accords for the region’s civil wars, including between the Nicaraguan Contras and the Sandinistas, a feat that garnished him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. He remained the de facto leader of the PLN in the years ensuing his presidency. During this period, his personal influence came to define the party's identity, similar to the manner in which the traditional Latin American caudillos dominated political allegiance in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Arias's influence culminated in a constitutional amendment that opened the door to his re-election to the presidency in 2006. The conclusion of his second term in 2010 saw what some viewed as a virtual third term for Arias with the election of his Vice President Laura Chinchilla, Costa Rica’s first female head of state.
Opponents to the “arismo” tilt of the PLN suggest that the long years in power have led to corruption and diminished transparency in the government. As a reaction to this apparent consolidation of influence and straying from the original platform of the PLN, various prominent political figures broke away from the party and formed the PAC, including Ottón Solís Fallas, Margarita Penón Góngora, and Alberto Cañas Escalante. The party’s surprisingly strong showing in the 2002 elections championing an anti-corruption platform led to disgruntled politicians from the PUSC and other parties also joining the PAC for the 2006 elections. The period from 2002 until the present has witnessed steady growth for the PAC in terms of congressional and municipal elections and percentages of votes in presidential elections. While to some extent the election of Solís to the presidency builds solidly upon the foundation constructed by the PAC over twelve years, it is nevertheless extremely noteworthy of his own political stature that Solís was able to break the bipartisan lock on the country’s highest office.
One can argue that the initial strength of the PAC as a political party stems from the established positions of its founding members within the PLN. This extends to the most recent elections: President-elect Luis Guillermo Solís was himself the Chief of Staff for the first Oscar Arias administration. At the same time, the PAC’s current platform reflects a notable shift away from the regional economic integration that was one of the cornerstones of the PLN’s policy in the 1990s and early 2000s, until regional and international economies contracted after the “Great Recession” in the U.S. and the corresponding ripple effect across international economies, especially in Europe. Solís is in no way hostile towards the United States; indeed, he studied at Tulane and the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and was a visiting scholar and researcher at Florida International University in Miami. Nevertheless, he has a more moderated view of U.S. involvement in the region than many of his former PLN colleagues. This is not to say that he opposes strong economic and diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other market-driven economies. Bloomberg/Businessweek noted that the in-coming president took steps to reassure investors and the public as to the direction of his policy by selecting an economic team comprised of such established figures as economist and Vice President-elect Helio Fallas to be Finance Minister, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica Director Olivier Castro as central bank president, and Welmer Ramos as economy minister. These appointments are an attempt to counteract the continued loss of investor confidence during the presidency of Laura Chinchilla, in spite of improvements in unemployment during her administration. As Bloomberg/Businessweek reports:
Moody’s Investors Service lowered its outlook on Costa Rica to negative from neutral in September, citing a rising debt burden and widening budget deficit. Moody’s rates the country Baa3, putting it in the same category as Turkey and Iceland.1
On a more positive note, on February 28, 2014, Standard and Poor’s affirmed Costa Rica’s sovereign credit rating as BB/B. They analysis emphasized the country’s overall stability and tradition of peaceful governmental transition. They point out the rising burden of debt and are cautious regarding the new administration’s ability to manage the economy with requisite agility given the fractured nature of the congress. This in itself reflects the same elements that helped Solís consolidate his candidacy and attain the presidency, especially the discontent with the PLN-led government since 2006. As a result, the PLN lost six congressional seats, now holding 18 out of 57; the PAC has 13, the Frente Amplio has nine, and the PUSC has eight. Solís will need to develop coalitions in the congress to enact his policies. For this, he will undoubtedly call upon his personal ability to connect with the individual lawmakers.
