Judiciary vs. Executive: Bureaucratic Legacy from the Boate Kiss Fire

The administrative offices for the state of Rio Grande do Sul were shut down yesterday (Tuesday, 07/09/13) by judicial decree issued by Justice Hilbert Maximiliano Akihito Obara (5ª Vara da Fazenda Pública do Foro Central). The interdiction of the Fernando Ferrari Administrative Center, in the capital city of Porto Alegre, resulted from a review of public safety documents required for occupation of and public access to the building. All such structures are required to maintain a current “Plan for Protection and Prevention Against Fires” (PPCI). In the aftermath of the horrific blaze at the Kiss nightclub that massacred 242 young patrons (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/05/boate-kiss-and-brazilian-public-policy.html), the governments of Brazil as a whole and of Rio Grande do Sul in particular have taken great pains to demonstrate their dedication to fire prevention and safety in public venues.

The reaction from the state house, Palácio Piratini, was to ignore the interdiction and open for business as usual today (Wednesday, 07/10/13). After all, how can the State conduct its business if its primary administrative offices are closed? How can the very PPCI documents required by Justice Obara be processed if the Judiciary effectively shut down the Executive branch’s daily operations? The Executive’s decision to ignore the court order and open the doors of the Administrative Center spurred major labor unions to organize a protest against allegedly unsafe working conditions in the building since the documents were not up to date. This led to confrontations between the union representatives and government workers who reported to duty only to find the doors blocked by union personnel. Tensions escalated when ordinary citizens began to arrive to conduct their business, including receipt of state-supported medications for needy individuals. Eventually the State rolled out the riot police, and the protesters declared that their planned time period was completed. Right when conditions appeared to be heading toward normalcy, a substantial group of university students arrived to co-opt the protest for purposes of the large-scale manifestations that have been disrupting the country in recent months (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/06/brazilian-protests-and-confederations.html). However, at the end of the day, Justice Obara’s decision was overturned by the State’s higher court, Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul (TJ-RS). This court ruled that content of the fire safety documents was complete, and that the State’s primary administrative office was in compliance.

This apparent antagonism between the Judiciary and the Executive branches of the Rio Grande do Sul government demonstrates the extent to which the tragedy has brought to light the failures in public safety and policy. All levels of government are scrambling to cover their political assets. All of this takes place against a backdrop of continuing, heterogeneous social unrest. The posturing and bickering of branches of the government would be comical if they did not have such an impact on the functioning of the State.

“Boate Kiss” and Brazilian Public Policy

In the classic Hollywood film “Casablanca,” the character Vichy Captain Louis Renault (played by Claude Rains) is given a directive from his Nazi overseers to find an excuse to shut down "Rick's Café Américain" run by Humphrey Bogart’s character Rick Blaine. Captain Renault announces, “I am shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.” Immediately after this announcement, Rick’s croupier hands Renault a stack of money: “Your winnings, sir.” As this scene demonstrates, the character of Captain Renault is designed to epitomize hypocrisy and bureaucracy as a condemnation of the collaboratist Vichy régime.

In the early morning hours of January 27, 2013, a fire broke out in the nightclub “Kiss” in the southern Brazilian town of Santa Maria. The death toll was 242, with another 116 injured, many of them seriously. Almost every victim was in their late teens or early twenties. The deaths resulted from horribly inadequate infrastructure, including a single entry/exit point, no emergency exits and barred windows that condemned many of the youth to a charred death in the restrooms as they tried to flee the inferno. The tragedy affected every family in this town of 262,000 inhabitants, and traumatized the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Repercussions rippled throughout the country. It was the third largest number of deaths in a nightclub in world history, and was eerily similar to the 2003 fire in the Station nightclub in Rhode Island in which 100 people died, and the República Cromañón nightclub fire in Buenos Aires that killed 194 people in 2004. In all three cases, indoor pyrotechnics, over-crowding, and inadequate evacuation escalated the loss.

In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, local and state governments quickly raised the alarm about public safety in bars, nightclubs, and similar venues. Government officials were shocked, shocked to find that the vast majority of these establishments were functioning without conforming to fire and public safety codes. In the state capital of Porto Alegre, approximately 46 out of 50 registered night spots were shut down in the weeks after the fire due to noncompliance with the codes governing the operation of public establishments. In Santa Maria it was discovered that Fire officials knew of the noncompliance at “Kiss” yet for some reason the venue not only remained open but was allowed to regularly host musical acts that included indoor pyrotechnics. The venue’s official capacity was 691 persons, yet normally – and on the night of the tragedy – between 1,000 and 1,500 people were admitted.

While there was clear negligence on the part of the establishment’s owners, the greater breakdown was on the part of Brazil’s de facto public policy that accepts legal infractions as regular practice. Public officials in Santa Maria were aware of the overcrowding; some officials’ own children frequented the trendy club, and some died. Fire officials were aware of the bolted emergency exits, barred windows, and restricted main entry. From July 31, 2009, until the night of the fire, the nightclub operated continually under improper conditions, yet public officials never fully enforced regulations. The club was even ordered shut down, but the order was never carried out. Instead, the establishment was fined four times. The amount of the fines obviously was all but meaningless in face of the huge profits, another element in the inadequacy of public policy. For such measures to be effective, the value must be significant enough to deter infraction and not simply a small part of the cost of doing business. Similarly, there must be real enforcement of regulations, especially in areas of public safety.

Today marks the four-month anniversary of the tragedy. In this time, many actions have been taken at the local, state and national levels. Major reviews of operating licenses have revealed similar defects throughout the country; in the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, only 5% of the 209 registered nightclubs conformed to fire safety codes. Commissions, investigations, and hearings have emerged across Brazil. Yet all of this will be meaningless unless followed by an actual change in how the people and the government perceive and act on issues of public safety. Conditions at the “Boate Kiss” were no secret, yet for three and a half years government officials allowed the nightclub to operate as a deathtrap.