Showing posts with label protests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label protests. Show all posts

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Brazil Outlook 2014: Positive Opportunity for Foreign Direct Investment

As we enter 2014, there are a few givens regarding Brazil’s outlook for the new year. Partying across the nation will ramp up leading into Carnaval. The country will go crazy hosting the World Cup in June & July. The construction and remodeling of numerous soccer stadiums will be completed just barely in time, provoking much negative commentary from FIFA and other “soccer countries.” The renovations of infrastructure will not be fully completed. Airline ticket prices, hotel rates, restaurant costs and a plethora of other service areas will gouge every Dollar, Euro, Yen, etc. out of the multitude of tourists attending both events. There will be increased protests leading up to and during the international competition provoking much uneasiness among travelers and investors.

In my post from 15 August 2013 (“Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment”),1 I looked at economic data from the first two quarters of the year and suggested a positive investment environment moving forward into 2014.  Last month (21 Jan 2014), Frederico Rosas and Carla Jiménez reported in the Spanish newspaper El País that Brazil remains one of the ten countries most attractive for foreign direct investment based on year-end economic indicators. They emphasized that Brazil’s situation remains strong in spite of the perhaps exaggerated pessimism surrounding the Brazilian economy due to concerns about a fall in its investment ranking.2 On June 6, 2013, Standard & Poor’s revised its risk analysis for Brazil from “stable” to “negative” indicating: “Slow GDP growth and continued expansionary fiscal policy (including off-budget measures) risk weakening Brazil's financial profile and could, absent corrective measures, result in weaker fiscal performance and an increase in the government's debt burden.”3  The company’s press release indicated:
The credit ratings on Brazil reflect its well-established political institutions, diversified economy, manageable levels of net external debt, and political commitment to policies that maintain economic stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebastian Briozzo. "The ratings also incorporate its relatively large government debt and refinancing needs." Moreover, they reflect the country's substantial demand for investment to improve its physical infrastructure, as well as structural impediments that contribute to low overall investment as a share of GDP (just above 18% in 2012) and constrain GDP growth potential.4

Nevertheless, Standard & Poor’s analysis affirmed Brazil’s investment ratings based on counterparty risk, political risk, monetary stability, and the country’s overall debt burden:
Local Currency: A-
Foreign Currency: BBB
Transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessments: A-


This affirmation probably reflects Brazil’s relatively steady albeit low GDP growth rates and its fairly stable inflation over the past two years, among other factors. Moreover, during the last two years, the exchange rate for the US dollar has remained strong, ranging from 1.8676-to-1 in January 2012, to 2.2118 in December 2013.


Table 1: Brazilian quarterly GDP growth, core inflation & US$ exchange rate, 2012-2013. Data source: Banco Central do Brasil, and http://www.tradingeconomics.com based on reports from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).


In their mapping of global risk, Marsh consultants in conjunction with Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics ranked Brazil as “medium”; among the BRICS group, the Marsh-Maplecroft study ranked only South Africa at the same level. It ranked China and India as “high” risk, and Russia as “extreme.” Their website explains: “The Political Risk (Dynamic) Index assesses risks that have the potential to undergo change and in particular to deteriorate rapidly. It is comprised of 30 political risk indices under the four themes of governance framework, political violence, business and macroeconomic risk and societal forced regime change risk.”5 The completeness of this analysis underscores the potential for positive returns in the Brazilian economic sphere. In spite of the still present fall-out from the Mensalão and other political scandals, Brazil’s national political arena remains relatively stable with President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings climbing slightly to 41% towards the end of 2013, after plummeting during the protests mid-year, according to Datafolha.6 There is no significant political violence or threat of popular uprisings that could threaten national security, and the economy remains relatively strong. While the Brazilian stock market BOVESPA is performing poorly, the US dollar’s consistently firm buying power favors foreign direct investment in the country.





Thursday, August 15, 2013

Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment

During the first two quarters of 2013, increasing, persistent social unrest in Brazil has negatively impacted retail sales as indicated by data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the official organ for economic statistical data (Table 1). 
Table 1. Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/
According to the Jornal do Brasil, the Central Bank’s Index of Economic Activity (IBC-Br) grew 1.13% in June compared to May.1 However, overall the second quarter closed with a grow rate of 0.89% as compared to the previous period. This is a slowing trend in relation to the last quarter of 2012, which registered a growth rate of 1.1%. The IBC-Br index is considered a prime indicator of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has steadily declined since reaching a high of 9.3% YOY in March 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp-growth-annual

Not surprisingly, the US dollar has strengthened over the same period, with a noticeable acceleration in June. By the end of the second quarter, the dollar reached R$ 2.25 (Table 3), with the trend continuing into August. By 15 Aug 2013, the dollar surpassed R$2.35, marking the greatest gain since March 2009.  The increased buying power of the dollar could benefit foreign direct investments in the Brazilian economy in areas that present the potential for stable growth, such as agriculture which grew 17 percent in the first quarter of 2013, supported by a strong harvest of soy (+23%), corn (+9.1%), tobacco (+5.7%) and rice (+5.1%).2

Table 3. Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/port/ptaxnpesq.asp?id=txcotacao

It is important to note that the social and political instability in Brazil does not necessarily indicate a troubled economy in the long term. As Evodio Kaltenecker correctly points out, this is not a parallel to the Arab spring, but rather the manifestation of a series of unresolved issues: “Lack of trust in government institutions, high levels of corruption, low quality of state-provided services, high living & transportation costs, increase of inflation, runaway costs of 2014 World Cup.”3 These underlying frustrations have brought individuals out into the streets in a rather amorphous mass lacking any over-arching organization or leadership. The cost of public transportation was a flash-point, and the recent Confederations Cup hosted by Brazil fueled criticism of the massive spending of public funds on World Cup preparation,4 but the demands call for reformation rather than revolution. These stem from what James Hunter deems moral and practical dissatisfaction.5 The former reflects the outrage fired by such things as the “Mensalão” corruption trials that seemed to allow most of the guilty parties to escape punishment. The latter stems from such things as disproportionately high prices, high taxes, and faulty services including health care, education and transportation.

While the Brazilian unrest coupled with the slowing economic growth certainly will taint foreign direct investment over the short term, the current situation should not significantly destabilize Brazil’s economy assuming the government avoids exacerbating the circumstances. So far, President Dilma Rousseff has responded to the protests in an innocuous if confusing manner by calling for a plebiscite not demanded by protesters, pushing to repeal the hike in municipal bus fees that set off much of the agitation, and promoting a polemic program to recruit foreign physicians to work in under-served communities.  The 2014 World Cup will likely stir further contention, but in true “panen et circenses” fashion it will also generate significant revenue as well as popular excitement and goodwill, especially if Brazil wins the competition.