Showing posts with label World Cup. Show all posts
Showing posts with label World Cup. Show all posts

Saturday, July 19, 2014

Kirchner’s Disconnect

The day after losing to Germany by one goal with only seven minutes left to play in the second overtime period in the final of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, Argentina’s selección returned home greeted by throngs of enthusiastic supporters and were heralded by Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as “veritable lions” on the pitch who demonstrated “dignity, pride, and capability.”1 However, standing between head coach Alejandro Sabella and one of the greatest players the game of soccer has ever seen, Lionel Messi, Fernández de Kircher admitted that she is not a fan of the sport and that she did not watch a single match, not even the final. Sarah Marsh of Reuters reports that this series of gaffes reinforces speculation that the Argentine president is disconnected from the national culture.2 While much of the media continues to obsess over the World Cup – 48 hours after it ended, El Clarín’s main page was almost exclusively devoted to the international competition,3 La Nación featured a photo of the team’s return,4 and the Diario Popular covered its entire front page with a giant image of the arrival5 – the President rambled in seemingly unprepared remarks, apparently trying to make up for being so disinterested in the national passion. To make matters worse, several of the president’s comments, such as a reference to a player who was escorted from the pitch in the final due to a blow to the head, made it clear that Fernández de Kirchner had been briefed on the key points of the match. This makes her slight of the team all the more remarkable and, for some, bewildering.



Notes:





Monday, July 7, 2014

2014 FIFA World Cup: The Demise of National Identity on the Pitch

Soccer – futebol, fútbol – is unquestionably a significant part of Latin American culture, with the notable exception of some Caribbean nations.  It is almost impossible to imagine modern Mexican, Brazilian, or Argentinian cultural identity without soccer, and nothing brings this to the forefront more than the FIFA World Cup, the phenomenon that develops into a nationalistic frenzy every four years. By the time Brazil won the first of its five (to date) World Cup titles in 1958, it had become clear that game as played by the various national teams had evolved into distinct styles easily contrasting the methodical Swedish journeyman play from Brazilian showmanship, for example.

Many scholars have debated how realistic such an assertion could be, given that FIFA’s Laws of the Games apply equally to all competitions. These students of the game claimed that international football was an English invention and had not substantively changed from its origins. Everybody played the same game by the same rules. Scholars with an opposing view pointed out the differences in tactics and ball control styles that were relatively consistent within countries’ national squads but varied greatly from one nation to the next. While large regional distinctions were evident – e.g. the northern European approach in contrast with the Latin approach – even within a given geographical area, teams could be identified by their style of play: Brazilians favored complicated footwork and individualism, Argentinians played with closer marking and more physical contact, Uruguayans used tightly structured defense and counter-attacks.

As recently as the 2006 World Cup, I argued in favor of the national identities of soccer. I based my assertions not only on the actual way in which teams played but also on the approaches to the game most highly favored in the national media and general populace. In Brazil, looking at the teams that put together three World Cup titles in the course of four tournaments (1958, 1962, 1970), a popular distinction was evident in the way Brazilians viewed Pelé (Édson Arantes do Nascimento) and Garrincha (Manuel Francisco dos Santos). The two were teammates in three World Cups: 1958, 1962, and 1966. While Brazilians recognize Pelé as “the greatest footballer ever” (most career professional goals, only person to win three World Cup titles, etc.), they tended to embrace Garrincha’s flashy, playful style and off-the-pitch partying more than Pelé’s professional athleticism. Observing the teams fielded by Brazil in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, and 1994, the least favorite leading into the World Cup was the less arty and more defensive ’94 squad. Brazilian futebol, it was said, should be the epitome of the “jogo bonito,” the beautiful, stylized way of playing. Prior to the ’94 finals, many Brazilians felt that the more pedestrian group led by team captain Dunga (Carlos Caetano Bledorn Verri) would fail miserably. Instead, they capture the title in the final against Italy, and blazed the trail for Brazilian teams that went to the World Cup final in 1998 (lost to France) and 2002 (beat Germany). Four years later in 2006, the Brazilian superstars seemed to approach the tournament as one giant Nike commercial featuring their amazing ball control talent and trick passes. While they did advance as far as the quarter finals, their game-winning abilities were precarious throughout the tournament, their focus apparently more on style than points. Still, they embodied the jogo bonito of Brazilian soccer and, until their elimination, were much more heartily received than the ’94 squad.

By 2010, things had changed. The best players from around the world were now playing with and against each other in Europe. English, German, Italian, and Spanish leagues surged with foreign players from Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Americas. No longer isolated geographically between World Cups and occasional friendlies or qualifiers, these players now shared their day-to-day experiences and learned from one another. During the 2010 competition, nowhere was this more evident than in the Argentina x Germany match. Traditionally, German success on the pitch relied upon overwhelming athleticism. In the 1974 Cup, the amazing Dutch carousel – the “Clock-Work Orange” as they were called popularly – dominated opponents through their innovative “total football.” In the finals, however, the sheer physicality of the West German athletes ended the Netherlands’ dream. The German style of play depended to a great extent on being bigger, stronger and faster than their opponents. They could boot the ball downfield and out run the other team, leading to strong, accurate shots on goal. In the 2010 face-off with Argentina, the South American squad expected to dissect the Germans relying greatly on Lionel Messi’s incredible dribbling and passing abilities. Messi had spent the years leading up to 2010 demonstrating on Barcelona just how to cut apart opposing defenses in precisely such a manner, and garnishing for himself the title of greatest soccer player in the world. The Germans who defeated the Argentinians were a surprise. They exhibited ball control and passing techniques similar to the traditional Latin American style of play. They still dominated the long ball and fast break, but now had the flashy footwork and intricate passing supposedly of another cultural identity.

This week, the 2014 FIFA World Cup enters the semi-final stage. Few observers of the game would be surprised to know that Brazil, Germany, Argentina, and the Netherlands are the final four participants, three multiple champions and the historically best team never to have won. What has been surprising are the upsets during the group stage and the teams that qualified for the round of 16. Some European powerhouses went home early, while “lesser” teams from African and the Americas demonstrated a level of play equal and even superior to the favorites. Going nose to nose with the soccer strongholds, the second stage included such teams as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, USA and Uruguay, as well as Nigeria, Algeria, and Greece. Even more surprising, Colombia and Costa Rica both progressed to the quarter finals. The two teams had won their groups, Costa Rica besting three previous World Cup champions: Italy, Uruguay and England.


What is most significant about this is not merely how less traditional teams have surfaced to such a high level of competition, but rather what it means in terms of national styles of play. The leading players of the world have been blending their styles in European leagues in growing numbers over the past 15 years or so. For example, of the 23 players that Mexico took to this year’s World Cup, in their final game against the Netherlands six (if you count Ochoa who just finished his contract with AC Ajaccio) of the starting 11 and all three substitutes play in Europe. In contrast, on the team that Mexico took to the ’94 Cup, only star forwards Hugo Sánchez and Luis García played in Europe. Another way to look at the question of nation-specific styles of play is in the current embodiment of Argentine soccer, Lionel Messi. He developed his skills since youth playing for Barcelona in Spain, starting in their farm system at age 13. While his unquestionably natural ability factors immensely in his success on the pitch, the coaching and environment in which he has honed his craft are Spanish. When Messi first gained international media attention, some observers suggested that his manner of play was that of a Spaniard rather than an Argentinian. Now in 2014, such comments have lost meaning. Messi is Messi. He plays for Barcelona regularly, and represents his country, Argentina, in the World Cup. In the same manner, Robin van Persie plays for Manchester United and represents the Netherlands in the quadriannual competition. At the highest level of the sport, no one plays “Argentinian soccer” or “Brazilian soccer” or “Chilean soccer.” They just play soccer.

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Brazil Outlook 2014: Positive Opportunity for Foreign Direct Investment

As we enter 2014, there are a few givens regarding Brazil’s outlook for the new year. Partying across the nation will ramp up leading into Carnaval. The country will go crazy hosting the World Cup in June & July. The construction and remodeling of numerous soccer stadiums will be completed just barely in time, provoking much negative commentary from FIFA and other “soccer countries.” The renovations of infrastructure will not be fully completed. Airline ticket prices, hotel rates, restaurant costs and a plethora of other service areas will gouge every Dollar, Euro, Yen, etc. out of the multitude of tourists attending both events. There will be increased protests leading up to and during the international competition provoking much uneasiness among travelers and investors.

In my post from 15 August 2013 (“Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment”),1 I looked at economic data from the first two quarters of the year and suggested a positive investment environment moving forward into 2014.  Last month (21 Jan 2014), Frederico Rosas and Carla Jiménez reported in the Spanish newspaper El País that Brazil remains one of the ten countries most attractive for foreign direct investment based on year-end economic indicators. They emphasized that Brazil’s situation remains strong in spite of the perhaps exaggerated pessimism surrounding the Brazilian economy due to concerns about a fall in its investment ranking.2 On June 6, 2013, Standard & Poor’s revised its risk analysis for Brazil from “stable” to “negative” indicating: “Slow GDP growth and continued expansionary fiscal policy (including off-budget measures) risk weakening Brazil's financial profile and could, absent corrective measures, result in weaker fiscal performance and an increase in the government's debt burden.”3  The company’s press release indicated:
The credit ratings on Brazil reflect its well-established political institutions, diversified economy, manageable levels of net external debt, and political commitment to policies that maintain economic stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebastian Briozzo. "The ratings also incorporate its relatively large government debt and refinancing needs." Moreover, they reflect the country's substantial demand for investment to improve its physical infrastructure, as well as structural impediments that contribute to low overall investment as a share of GDP (just above 18% in 2012) and constrain GDP growth potential.4

Nevertheless, Standard & Poor’s analysis affirmed Brazil’s investment ratings based on counterparty risk, political risk, monetary stability, and the country’s overall debt burden:
Local Currency: A-
Foreign Currency: BBB
Transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessments: A-


This affirmation probably reflects Brazil’s relatively steady albeit low GDP growth rates and its fairly stable inflation over the past two years, among other factors. Moreover, during the last two years, the exchange rate for the US dollar has remained strong, ranging from 1.8676-to-1 in January 2012, to 2.2118 in December 2013.


Table 1: Brazilian quarterly GDP growth, core inflation & US$ exchange rate, 2012-2013. Data source: Banco Central do Brasil, and http://www.tradingeconomics.com based on reports from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).


In their mapping of global risk, Marsh consultants in conjunction with Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics ranked Brazil as “medium”; among the BRICS group, the Marsh-Maplecroft study ranked only South Africa at the same level. It ranked China and India as “high” risk, and Russia as “extreme.” Their website explains: “The Political Risk (Dynamic) Index assesses risks that have the potential to undergo change and in particular to deteriorate rapidly. It is comprised of 30 political risk indices under the four themes of governance framework, political violence, business and macroeconomic risk and societal forced regime change risk.”5 The completeness of this analysis underscores the potential for positive returns in the Brazilian economic sphere. In spite of the still present fall-out from the Mensalão and other political scandals, Brazil’s national political arena remains relatively stable with President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings climbing slightly to 41% towards the end of 2013, after plummeting during the protests mid-year, according to Datafolha.6 There is no significant political violence or threat of popular uprisings that could threaten national security, and the economy remains relatively strong. While the Brazilian stock market BOVESPA is performing poorly, the US dollar’s consistently firm buying power favors foreign direct investment in the country.





Thursday, August 15, 2013

Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment

During the first two quarters of 2013, increasing, persistent social unrest in Brazil has negatively impacted retail sales as indicated by data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the official organ for economic statistical data (Table 1). 
Table 1. Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/
According to the Jornal do Brasil, the Central Bank’s Index of Economic Activity (IBC-Br) grew 1.13% in June compared to May.1 However, overall the second quarter closed with a grow rate of 0.89% as compared to the previous period. This is a slowing trend in relation to the last quarter of 2012, which registered a growth rate of 1.1%. The IBC-Br index is considered a prime indicator of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has steadily declined since reaching a high of 9.3% YOY in March 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp-growth-annual

Not surprisingly, the US dollar has strengthened over the same period, with a noticeable acceleration in June. By the end of the second quarter, the dollar reached R$ 2.25 (Table 3), with the trend continuing into August. By 15 Aug 2013, the dollar surpassed R$2.35, marking the greatest gain since March 2009.  The increased buying power of the dollar could benefit foreign direct investments in the Brazilian economy in areas that present the potential for stable growth, such as agriculture which grew 17 percent in the first quarter of 2013, supported by a strong harvest of soy (+23%), corn (+9.1%), tobacco (+5.7%) and rice (+5.1%).2

Table 3. Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/port/ptaxnpesq.asp?id=txcotacao

It is important to note that the social and political instability in Brazil does not necessarily indicate a troubled economy in the long term. As Evodio Kaltenecker correctly points out, this is not a parallel to the Arab spring, but rather the manifestation of a series of unresolved issues: “Lack of trust in government institutions, high levels of corruption, low quality of state-provided services, high living & transportation costs, increase of inflation, runaway costs of 2014 World Cup.”3 These underlying frustrations have brought individuals out into the streets in a rather amorphous mass lacking any over-arching organization or leadership. The cost of public transportation was a flash-point, and the recent Confederations Cup hosted by Brazil fueled criticism of the massive spending of public funds on World Cup preparation,4 but the demands call for reformation rather than revolution. These stem from what James Hunter deems moral and practical dissatisfaction.5 The former reflects the outrage fired by such things as the “Mensalão” corruption trials that seemed to allow most of the guilty parties to escape punishment. The latter stems from such things as disproportionately high prices, high taxes, and faulty services including health care, education and transportation.

While the Brazilian unrest coupled with the slowing economic growth certainly will taint foreign direct investment over the short term, the current situation should not significantly destabilize Brazil’s economy assuming the government avoids exacerbating the circumstances. So far, President Dilma Rousseff has responded to the protests in an innocuous if confusing manner by calling for a plebiscite not demanded by protesters, pushing to repeal the hike in municipal bus fees that set off much of the agitation, and promoting a polemic program to recruit foreign physicians to work in under-served communities.  The 2014 World Cup will likely stir further contention, but in true “panen et circenses” fashion it will also generate significant revenue as well as popular excitement and goodwill, especially if Brazil wins the competition.








Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Violence in the Stadiums

Under the subtitle “The End of Civility,” yesterday’s (07/30/13) edition of the Brazilian newspaper Zero Hora1 featured an article about a recent decision to eliminate the divided stadium sections for rival teams’ fans. Traditionally, when the cross-town adversaries Grêmio Foot-Ball Porto Alegrense and Sport Club Internacional (frequently referred to as simply Grêmio and Inter) face off, officials segregate fans into clearly demarcated and fenced-off sectors of whichever stadium they are using. This segregation, which extends to entries and exits, is designed to avoid physical confrontations between rival fans. Similar measures exist at numerous professional sporting venues around the country. At first glance, the desegregation may appear to be a positive development towards a more amicable coexistence among all those in the stands. However, the case is exactly the opposite: local police have acknowledged their inability to guarantee the safety of the opposing team fans in and around the stadium for Sunday’s “Gre-Nal” between the two teams.

Violence in sports venues obviously is not limited to Brazilian soccer matches. The most notorious disaster in the soccer world took place during the Liverpool vs. Juventus match for the 1985 European Cup final at Heysel Stadiumin in Brussels. Thirty nine people died and over 600 were injured which led to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) imposing a five-year ban on English teams participating in any of the three European competitions.2 Even with other sports in “fan friendly” venues, violence can erupt as it did on baseball’s opening day 2011 for San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow who just now in 2013 returned home after two years in treatment for massive injuries leading to brain damage sustained in a beating by locals at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles.3 Dodger Stadium had long been known as a family-friendly, sportsmanlike venue, and in the aftermath of the senseless beating police and stadium security presence has intensified visibly. Nevertheless, the persistent violence at Brazilian professional soccer stadiums is a growing concern, especially when the police “throw in the towel” (to mix sports metaphors).

The Zero Hora article cites Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda, professor of the School of Social Science at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, one of the most prestigious institutions in Brazil. He points out that while the police have become the sole arbiters of public safety, the violence associated with soccer matches is a much more complex phenomenon that includes other societal factors. Many of the contributing elements parallel the rise of gang violence and begin far from the stadiums and the matches. The incidents that are occurring within the walls of the stadiums demonstrate a breakdown of extramural civil society, ranging from impoverished home life through precarious education, and extending into the relationship between the general populace and governmental authority. In a “civilized” community, it is absurd that the violence inside a sporting location should be so great that police and stadium security cannot readily control it, given that it is not a one-time aberration but rather a constant.


There is no question that the vast majority of fans attending soccer games in Brazil are not participants in the turmoil. Almost everyone comes for the pleasure of watching a match and supporting their team. The few, however, who do engage in the attacks can be savage toward rival fans, and even toward other organized groups of fans for their own teams. It is imperative that Brazilian authorities find the means to restore peace to the soccer pitches prior to next year’s World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.




Thursday, June 20, 2013

Brazilian Protests and the Confederations Cup

Above the fold on the front page of today’s (06/19/13) hardcopy New York Times a large photograph shows a Brazilian police officer dousing a protestor’s face in pepper spray from barely over a foot away [permalink to the online Times article below]. The unarmed and seemingly unthreatening protester is cringing and raising her hand in a vain attempt to cover her face as the officer in riot gear soaks her in enough spray to drip down her neck. This is the kind of image that undoubtedly interferes with the sleep of President Dilma Rousseff, herself a former urban guerrilla who decades ago most likely would have been on the receiving end of such governmental shows of strength. Tens of thousands of similar episodes took place across the country today, mostly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but also in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and especially national capital Brasília, along with many other major cities. According to the newspaper Jornal do Brasil, in Rio alone, more than 100,000 people took to the streets to protest rising bus fares and the lack of investment in urban infrastructure and education. The flash point for these protests that have been growing over the last few months was the increase in the cost of municipal transportation in various major cities, notable Florianópolis (capital of Santa Catarina state) were rioters have been setting fire to local buses all year, sometimes (albeit rarely) with people still on board. The deeper problems, however, relate to the country’s massive investment in the 2014 World Cup and the lingering irritation with a huge corruption scandal that unfolded during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, predecessor and political godfather to current president Rousseff.

Currently Brazil is hosting the Confederations Cup, a shake-down for next year’s World Cup which serves to both ramp up enthusiasm for the quadriannual sporting event and also to test infrastructure preparations in terms of transportation, lodging, security, and most importantly the stadiums themselves.  Even though the country already boasted major league soccer stadiums in every large city – and cities such as Rio, São Paulo and Porto Alegre each had several – all of the venues required significant retrofitting, and in some cases entirely new stadiums are being built. The hundreds of millions of dollars flowing from public coffers to cover these costs promise to provide significant returns as visitors flood the country in July of next year, and for Rio again in 2016 for the Olympics.  While the accepted wisdom may be that the investment will pay for itself in the short term and provide long-term benefits for the populace, the rash of ever more violent conflicts around the country demonstrate that the government sorely underestimated the level of resentment over corruption, exacerbated by a slowing economy and a renewed specter of inflation. According to the newspaper Zero Hora, a new poll released by the National Confederation of Industry together with the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Confederação Nacional da Indústria-CNI, and Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística-Ibope), President Rousseff’s approval rating fell another 8% since March. Moreover, the percentage of people who consider her administration bad or terrible grew from 7% to 13% in the same period. The irony of Rousseff’s position is not lost on the people of Brazil, especially among those who traditionally were the strongest supporters of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT). In the 1960s and into the 1970s, Rousseff was part of Marxist urban guerrilla groups that engaged in armed conflict in opposition to the oppressive military regime. Now as president she is ultimately responsible for the policing of the present day activists and protesters, in essence the one commanding the force that pepper sprayed the unarmed woman in the Times photo. Moreover, Rousseff’s rise to the presidency was a direct result of the corruption scandal under Lula’s watch which toppled his Chief of Staff José Dirceu. Until that happened, Dirceu was Lula’s political heir apparent, and Rousseff not only filled his cabinet position but also assumed the role as Lula’s chosen successor. To date, none of the politicians found guilty in connection with the "Mensalão" corruption scandal has served time in prison.

In soccer, the Brazilian national team needs a strong showing in the Confederations Cup to boost public morale and player confidence. Indeed, anything short of total victory will be viewed as a significant disappointment. Politically, Rousseff needs a quick win to control the protesters not only to ensure the success of this Cup and the next, but also to bolster her own agenda. Her harshest critics are openly questioning if Rousseff will be able to govern effectively if/when the popular manifestations die down. When introduced by FIFA president Sepp Blatter to officially open the Confederations Cup on Saturday, Rousseff was soundly booed by the tens of thousands filling Maracanã Stadium. The Times article compares what is happening in Brazil to what has happened in Turkey and other Arab countries where seemingly local protests quickly exploded into large-scale national uprisings. While the comparison seems far-fetched, given that even the most violent of these Brazilian protests do not include armies of citizens aiming guns at government troops, the parallels are worth considering. The article does emphasize the difference of Rousseff’s approach: today she officially changed tactics and praised the manifestations as signs of Brazil’s strong democracy. She is right. Some 45 years ago the people would not have even had the right to protest and the troops would have responded with bullets rather than pepper spray, but if Rousseff cannot successfully co-opt and appease – as she is trying to do – the wide range of people taking to the streets, she could end up out of the game.