BBC's Venezuela blackout: 'Like living in the apocalypse'
Wednesday, March 13, 2019
Saturday, August 1, 2015
Dilma’s Apologist
As Brazil’s political crisis has worsened over the past year, one of
the country’s leading dailies, O Jornal
do Brasil, has repeatedly revealed itself to be determined to support
President Dilma Rousseff in every slant possible.
In an unsigned opinion piece entitled “Unemployment in Brazil and
Europe: Where is the crisis really?”1 the paper takes the rhetorical
approach of erroneously extrapolating global conclusions from a restricted
subset of data. Reporting on recently released figures from the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics or IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística) that indicate Brazil’s unemployment rate to be 6.9%,
the paper belittles public and political concerns about the economy and the
out-of-work population, referring to European nations with similarly high
unemployment. The article cites specific figures for various countries
representing an assortment of economic conditions:
France: 10.3% in May
United Kingdom: 5.6%
in April
Germany: 4.7% in May
Italy: 12.4% in May
Portugal: 13.2% in
May
Spain: 22.5% in May
and, of course,
Greece: 25.6% in May
The article naively concludes that if no one is alarmed over economic
crisis in France, Germany and the U.K., then Brazilians facing a similar rate
also should not be alarmed. The commentary fails to consider the state of the
respective economies, the role of the European Union as a stabilizing agent,
and the underlying basis for the unemployment. It also glosses over the fact
that both Spain and especially Greece are indeed alarmed about the dire state
of their economies, with the latter facing possible economic collapse, political
upheaval, and wide-spread social turmoil. Furthermore, the public perception of
economic conditions in other countries neither negates nor validates consumer and
voter confidence in Brazil. The newspaper implies that domestic uncertainties
over the Brazilian economy are unfounded, and ignores the on-going political
corruption scandal that has plagued the administrations of both Rousseff and
her predecessor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.
This line of reasoning falls into the rhetoric of the Rousseff regime
which is branding political opponents as illegal “coup plotters” (golpistas),
especially the masses of protestors who have periodically taken to the streets
calling for her impeachment. Apparently, Rousseff supporters including O Jornal do Brasil disregard the fact
that the impeachment process is defined by the Brazilian constitution and was
successfully implemented to remove democratically-elected president Fernando
Collor de Mello in 1992. Indeed, the very possibility of impeachment was a
significant democratic landmark when the current Brazilian constitution was promulgated
after the demise of the military’s 20-year, undemocratic rule. Almost all other major Brazilian media outlets
and major political parties on both the right and the left of the spectrum are
critical of the president, with founding members of Rousseff’s own Workers’
Party or PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) publically denouncing the regime.
It remains very unlikely that Rousseff actually will be impeached, but
the on-going revelations about money laundering and influence peddling continue
to undermine domestic and international confidence in an economy that had seemed
robust while many developed nations struggled over the past decade.
Notes:
1. “O desemprego no Brasil e na Europa:
onde mesmo está a crise?” Jornal do Brasil, 27 July 2015:
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Opinion Polls, Bed-Fellows, and the Brazilian Presidential Elections
Earlier this week (10/12/14), former Brazilian presidential candidate
Marina Silva of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) announced her support of Aécio
Neves da Cunha of the center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).
While this is not as extreme as the temporary alliance of Lula’s Workers’ Party
(PT) with Paulo Maluf’s Social Democratic Party (PDS) against the sudden
hegemony of the PMDB after the 1985 elections,1 it still seems
surprising to an outside observer that the socialist PSB would break with the
“leftist” PT and support the more conservative candidate, especially given that
Marina herself rose to political prominence as a member of the PT under then-president
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Ideologically,
Marina and her supporters would appear more aligned with current president and
candidate for re-election Dilma Rousseff than with challenger Aécio Neves.
At this point, it is impossible to predict accurately the winner of the
second round (run-off) election on October 26, 2014. According to a poll
released by the Instituto Vox Populi on Monday, 10/13/14, the two presidential
candidates are in a statistical tie (Dilma 51%, Aécio 49%), and on Wednesday,
10/15/14, both IBOPE and Datafolha had similar results (Aécio 51%, Dilma 49%).2
Moreover, there has been no clear trend throughout the campaign but rather
constant fluctuations. What has become increasingly clear is a growing
anti-Dilma – and to an extent anti-PT – sentiment among many politicians and
the electorate. Some people, such as novelist and journalist Lya Luft, feel
that it is simply time for a change, that there should not be a single-party
domination of political power but rather the plurality necessary in a democracy.3
Others are offended by the corruption scandals that have surfaced during the
dozen years in which the PT has controlled the presidency, especially given
that the party’s platform had long been one of opposition to corrupt status quo
government. This in no small part includes the Mensalão bribes and the issues
with Petrobras.4 Certainly, there also is a group whose political
aspirations lead it to seek a place in the sun by trying to cast out the
current power structure, but it seems to be more of a strange-bedfellows arrangement
that is developing among those against the re-election of Dilma and the
continuation of the PT in control of the government. It is not likely that such
disparate interests would be able to maintain an alliance government for an
extended length of time, but for the immediate future, Marina’s Brazilian Socialist
Party has seats reserved in the cabinet of President Aécio Neves da Cunha,
should that come to pass.
Notes:
1. Maluf orchestrated the election of ex-president Jânio Quadros of the
center-left PTB as mayor of São Paulo, defeating the PMDB candidate, Senator
(and future president) Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Essentially, Jânio was supported
by a short-lived anti-PMDB coalition that included the PT.
2. http://www.jb.com.br/eleicoes-2014/noticias/2014/10/14/vox-populi-dilma-tem-51-e-aecio-49/;
http://www.jb.com.br/eleicoes-2014/noticias/2014/10/15/ibope-aecio-tem-51-dos-votos-validos-e-dilma-49/
3. “Está na hora de
mudar: não digo isso por achar importante, pois está superado o conceito
estrito de direita ou de esquerda, mas porque democracia implica não haver
domínio de poder, de cargos, de ideologias e, sim, de alternância para que se
conceda espaço e oportunidade a todos.”
4. See, for example, http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/02/petrobras-and-pasadena-refinery.html
Saturday, July 19, 2014
Kirchner’s Disconnect
The day after losing to Germany by one goal with only seven minutes
left to play in the second overtime period in the final of the 2014 FIFA World
Cup, Argentina’s selección returned
home greeted by throngs of enthusiastic supporters and were heralded by
Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as “veritable lions” on the
pitch who demonstrated “dignity, pride, and capability.”1 However,
standing between head coach Alejandro Sabella and one of the greatest players the
game of soccer has ever seen, Lionel Messi, Fernández de Kircher admitted that
she is not a fan of the sport and that she did not watch a single match, not
even the final. Sarah Marsh of Reuters reports that this series of gaffes
reinforces speculation that the Argentine president is disconnected from the
national culture.2 While much of the media continues to obsess over
the World Cup – 48 hours after it ended, El Clarín’s main page was almost
exclusively devoted to the international competition,3 La Nación
featured a photo of the team’s return,4 and the Diario Popular
covered its entire front page with a giant image of the arrival5 –
the President rambled in seemingly unprepared remarks, apparently trying to
make up for being so disinterested in the national passion. To make matters
worse, several of the president’s comments, such as a reference to a player who
was escorted from the pitch in the final due to a blow to the head, made it
clear that Fernández de Kirchner had been briefed on the key points of the
match. This makes her slight of the team all the more remarkable and, for some,
bewildering.
Notes:
1. http://www.abc.es/internacional/20140715/abci-cristina-kirchner-recibe-argentina-201407142333.html
Monday, July 7, 2014
2014 FIFA World Cup: The Demise of National Identity on the Pitch
Soccer – futebol, fútbol – is
unquestionably a significant part of Latin American culture, with the notable
exception of some Caribbean nations. It
is almost impossible to imagine modern Mexican, Brazilian, or Argentinian
cultural identity without soccer, and nothing brings this to the forefront more
than the FIFA World Cup, the phenomenon that develops into a nationalistic
frenzy every four years. By the time Brazil won the first of its five (to date)
World Cup titles in 1958, it had become clear that game as played by the
various national teams had evolved into distinct styles easily contrasting the
methodical Swedish journeyman play from Brazilian showmanship, for example.
Many scholars have debated how realistic such an assertion could be,
given that FIFA’s Laws of the Games apply equally to all competitions. These
students of the game claimed that international football was an English
invention and had not substantively changed from its origins. Everybody played
the same game by the same rules. Scholars with an opposing view pointed out the
differences in tactics and ball control styles that were relatively consistent
within countries’ national squads but varied greatly from one nation to the
next. While large regional distinctions were evident – e.g. the northern
European approach in contrast with the Latin approach – even within a given
geographical area, teams could be identified by their style of play: Brazilians
favored complicated footwork and individualism, Argentinians played with closer
marking and more physical contact, Uruguayans used tightly structured defense
and counter-attacks.
As recently as the 2006 World Cup, I argued in favor of the national
identities of soccer. I based my assertions not only on the actual way in which
teams played but also on the approaches to the game most highly favored in the
national media and general populace. In Brazil, looking at the teams that put
together three World Cup titles in the course of four tournaments (1958, 1962,
1970), a popular distinction was evident in the way Brazilians viewed Pelé
(Édson Arantes do Nascimento) and Garrincha (Manuel Francisco dos Santos). The
two were teammates in three World Cups: 1958, 1962, and 1966. While Brazilians
recognize Pelé as “the greatest footballer ever” (most career professional
goals, only person to win three World Cup titles, etc.), they tended to embrace
Garrincha’s flashy, playful style and off-the-pitch partying more than Pelé’s
professional athleticism. Observing the teams fielded by Brazil in 1978, 1982,
1986, 1990, and 1994, the least favorite leading into the World Cup was the
less arty and more defensive ’94 squad. Brazilian futebol, it was said, should be the epitome of the “jogo bonito,” the beautiful, stylized
way of playing. Prior to the ’94 finals, many Brazilians felt that the more
pedestrian group led by team captain Dunga (Carlos Caetano Bledorn Verri) would
fail miserably. Instead, they capture the title in the final against Italy, and
blazed the trail for Brazilian teams that went to the World Cup final in 1998
(lost to France) and 2002 (beat Germany). Four years later in 2006, the
Brazilian superstars seemed to approach the tournament as one giant Nike
commercial featuring their amazing ball control talent and trick passes. While
they did advance as far as the quarter finals, their game-winning abilities
were precarious throughout the tournament, their focus apparently more on style
than points. Still, they embodied the jogo
bonito of Brazilian soccer and, until their elimination, were much more
heartily received than the ’94 squad.
By 2010, things had changed. The best players from around the world
were now playing with and against each other in Europe. English, German,
Italian, and Spanish leagues surged with foreign players from Africa, Eastern
Europe, and the Americas. No longer isolated geographically between World Cups
and occasional friendlies or qualifiers, these players now shared their day-to-day
experiences and learned from one another. During the 2010 competition, nowhere
was this more evident than in the Argentina x Germany match. Traditionally,
German success on the pitch relied upon overwhelming athleticism. In the 1974
Cup, the amazing Dutch carousel – the
“Clock-Work Orange” as they were called popularly – dominated opponents through
their innovative “total football.” In the finals, however, the sheer
physicality of the West German athletes ended the Netherlands’ dream. The
German style of play depended to a great extent on being bigger, stronger and
faster than their opponents. They could boot the ball downfield and out run the
other team, leading to strong, accurate shots on goal. In the 2010 face-off
with Argentina, the South American squad expected to dissect the Germans
relying greatly on Lionel Messi’s incredible dribbling and passing abilities.
Messi had spent the years leading up to 2010 demonstrating on Barcelona just
how to cut apart opposing defenses in precisely such a manner, and garnishing
for himself the title of greatest soccer player in the world. The Germans who
defeated the Argentinians were a surprise. They exhibited ball control and
passing techniques similar to the traditional Latin American style of play.
They still dominated the long ball and fast break, but now had the flashy
footwork and intricate passing supposedly of another cultural identity.
This week, the 2014 FIFA World
Cup enters the semi-final stage. Few observers of the game would be surprised
to know that Brazil, Germany, Argentina, and the Netherlands are the final four
participants, three multiple champions and the historically best team never to
have won. What has been surprising are the upsets during the group stage and
the teams that qualified for the round of 16. Some European powerhouses went
home early, while “lesser” teams from African and the Americas demonstrated a
level of play equal and even superior to the favorites. Going nose to nose with
the soccer strongholds, the second stage included such teams as Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, USA and Uruguay, as well as Nigeria, Algeria, and
Greece. Even more surprising, Colombia and Costa Rica both progressed to the
quarter finals. The two teams had won their groups, Costa Rica besting three
previous World Cup champions: Italy, Uruguay and England.
What is most significant about
this is not merely how less traditional teams have surfaced to such a high
level of competition, but rather what it means in terms of national styles of
play. The leading players of the world have been blending their styles in
European leagues in growing numbers over the past 15 years or so. For example,
of the 23 players that Mexico took to this year’s World Cup, in their final
game against the Netherlands six (if you count Ochoa who just finished his
contract with AC Ajaccio) of the starting 11 and all three
substitutes play in Europe. In contrast, on the team that Mexico took to the
’94 Cup, only star forwards Hugo Sánchez and Luis García played in Europe.
Another way to look at the question of nation-specific styles of play is in the
current embodiment of Argentine soccer, Lionel Messi. He developed his skills
since youth playing for Barcelona in Spain, starting in their farm system at
age 13. While his unquestionably natural ability factors immensely in his
success on the pitch, the coaching and environment in which he has honed his
craft are Spanish. When Messi first gained international media attention, some
observers suggested that his manner of play was that of a Spaniard rather than an
Argentinian. Now in 2014, such comments have lost meaning. Messi is Messi. He
plays for Barcelona regularly, and represents his country, Argentina, in the
World Cup. In the same manner, Robin van Persie plays for Manchester United and
represents the Netherlands in the quadriannual competition. At the highest
level of the sport, no one plays “Argentinian soccer” or “Brazilian soccer” or “Chilean
soccer.” They just play soccer.
Friday, April 25, 2014
Costa Rica Opts for the Third Party: Luis Guillermo Solís
On April 6, 2014, Costa Ricans elected Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) candidate Luis Guillermo Solís to be their new president, upsetting the order of a de facto two-party system that has dominated presidential politics for half a century. Founded in 1951 by José Figueres Ferrer after the conclusion of the civil war, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) has held the presidency for 38 out of the last 66 years, alternating with the Partido de Unidad Socialcristiana (PUSC) and its predecessors. Both of these parties are relatively centrist, especially as compared to the more extreme politics of other countries in the region, most notably Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Indeed, the political and social stability of Costa Rica constitutes the basis for the sustained economic advancement during the decades of regional turmoil. The lack of wide-spread violence and armed conflict over the past 30 to 40 years makes Costa Rica and Belize unique among a swath of countries ranging from Mexico through Central America, and south into Columbia, Venezuela, and Peru.
While externally and comparatively Costa Rican political platforms seem to differ only slightly – similar to the view many Latin Americans have of the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. – internally key individuals represent opposing positions on issues such as regional and hemispheric commercial cooperation and integration, especially alignment with U.S.-led initiatives. Oscar Arias has been the most dominant single political figure in Costa Rican politics since the mid-1980s. His first term as president (1986-1990) coincided with the various Central American wars that were both internal, partisan conflicts and proxy battles for the Cold War superpowers. Arias mediated the peace accords for the region’s civil wars, including between the Nicaraguan Contras and the Sandinistas, a feat that garnished him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. He remained the de facto leader of the PLN in the years ensuing his presidency. During this period, his personal influence came to define the party's identity, similar to the manner in which the traditional Latin American caudillos dominated political allegiance in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Arias's influence culminated in a constitutional amendment that opened the door to his re-election to the presidency in 2006. The conclusion of his second term in 2010 saw what some viewed as a virtual third term for Arias with the election of his Vice President Laura Chinchilla, Costa Rica’s first female head of state.
Opponents to the “arismo” tilt of the PLN suggest that the long years in power have led to corruption and diminished transparency in the government. As a reaction to this apparent consolidation of influence and straying from the original platform of the PLN, various prominent political figures broke away from the party and formed the PAC, including Ottón Solís Fallas, Margarita Penón Góngora, and Alberto Cañas Escalante. The party’s surprisingly strong showing in the 2002 elections championing an anti-corruption platform led to disgruntled politicians from the PUSC and other parties also joining the PAC for the 2006 elections. The period from 2002 until the present has witnessed steady growth for the PAC in terms of congressional and municipal elections and percentages of votes in presidential elections. While to some extent the election of Solís to the presidency builds solidly upon the foundation constructed by the PAC over twelve years, it is nevertheless extremely noteworthy of his own political stature that Solís was able to break the bipartisan lock on the country’s highest office.
One can argue that the initial strength of the PAC as a political party stems from the established positions of its founding members within the PLN. This extends to the most recent elections: President-elect Luis Guillermo Solís was himself the Chief of Staff for the first Oscar Arias administration. At the same time, the PAC’s current platform reflects a notable shift away from the regional economic integration that was one of the cornerstones of the PLN’s policy in the 1990s and early 2000s, until regional and international economies contracted after the “Great Recession” in the U.S. and the corresponding ripple effect across international economies, especially in Europe. Solís is in no way hostile towards the United States; indeed, he studied at Tulane and the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and was a visiting scholar and researcher at Florida International University in Miami. Nevertheless, he has a more moderated view of U.S. involvement in the region than many of his former PLN colleagues. This is not to say that he opposes strong economic and diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other market-driven economies. Bloomberg/Businessweek noted that the in-coming president took steps to reassure investors and the public as to the direction of his policy by selecting an economic team comprised of such established figures as economist and Vice President-elect Helio Fallas to be Finance Minister, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica Director Olivier Castro as central bank president, and Welmer Ramos as economy minister. These appointments are an attempt to counteract the continued loss of investor confidence during the presidency of Laura Chinchilla, in spite of improvements in unemployment during her administration. As Bloomberg/Businessweek reports:
Moody’s Investors Service lowered its outlook on Costa Rica to negative from neutral in September, citing a rising debt burden and widening budget deficit. Moody’s rates the country Baa3, putting it in the same category as Turkey and Iceland.1
On a more positive note, on February 28, 2014, Standard and Poor’s affirmed Costa Rica’s sovereign credit rating as BB/B. They analysis emphasized the country’s overall stability and tradition of peaceful governmental transition. They point out the rising burden of debt and are cautious regarding the new administration’s ability to manage the economy with requisite agility given the fractured nature of the congress. This in itself reflects the same elements that helped Solís consolidate his candidacy and attain the presidency, especially the discontent with the PLN-led government since 2006. As a result, the PLN lost six congressional seats, now holding 18 out of 57; the PAC has 13, the Frente Amplio has nine, and the PUSC has eight. Solís will need to develop coalitions in the congress to enact his policies. For this, he will undoubtedly call upon his personal ability to connect with the individual lawmakers.
Friday, March 21, 2014
Transparency & Freedom of Speech
The level of democracy of any regime can be measured to a great extend
by the transparency of its institutions and the freedom of speech allowed to
its citizenry. Some governments grant a wide array of expression with almost no
restriction except in strictly defined cases of slander. Others also are very
open but with more limitations based on “time, place and manner.” An example of
this latter would be the prohibition on falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater,
to paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. However, on the other end of the
spectrum we encounter administrations that unabashedly squash any type of
communication that they believe threaten themselves or the society they purport
to represent. China’s current rigorous filtering of internet sites, especially
those of social media, is a prime example. Numerous regimes have instituted
quasi-Orwellian “thought police” to check what people communicate to one
another using tactics such as wiretaps, screening of mail, censoring of all
mass communications, and a vast array of informants whose objective was to
report anti-governmental behavior. Germany’s “Hilter Youth” were educated to
uphold a devotion to the State and the Führer
over all else. As part of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, children were isolated
from their parents for indoctrination that encouraged them to denounce their
parents for counter-revolutionary attitudes.
Two interesting incidents occurred recently in Latin America that
emphasize the different degrees to which supposedly democratic governments
curtail freedom of expression. Earlier this month in Brazilian state of Santa Catarina,
a 19 year-old man was cited for “contempt of authority” (desacato a autoridade) after posting angry comments on his Facebook
page about the way he was treated by police in a car stop. Although the next
day he apologized for his posting and admitted that he was driving with an
expired license, the issue as raised by his public defender, Ana Carolina Dihl
Cavalin, is the validity of Brazilian laws that violate the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, of which Brazil is a signatory. In 2012, the Brazilian Senate revised the
Penal Code changing “desacato a autoridade” from a crime in and of itself into
an aggravating factor for cases of slander. The original slander law, written
in 1940 during the Vargas regime, determined a sentence of from six months to
one year of prison for the crime of slander. Under the new modification, the
maximum sentence became from one to two years of prison for cases in which the
slanderous statement is directed toward a public official. This includes police
officers, judges, and any government official. A nuance of the law is that only
offenses directed at a specific individual should be considered “in contempt”;
in this case the accused directed his comments at the agency in general.
The Organization of American States actively opposes “desacato” laws
throughout the hemisphere, based on the principle that “the American Convention
on Human Rights enshrines the right of freedom of expression.”1 The Office
of the Special Rapporteur of the OAS has implemented a two-year cycle for
reviewing the status of such limitations on freedom of expression. In 2011,
that office published a special report indicating:
few countries have
taken purposeful steps to abolish the crime of desacato. In some states,
legislative reform processes have stalled or restrictive judicial
interpretations have been adopted. In other countries, the interpretations of
the courts have recognized the incompatibility of “desacato” with the
due guarantees of freedom of expression; however, those decisions have not been
echoed in legislative reforms. Nevertheless, while the successful abolition of desacato
laws may not have been the norm in the Hemisphere, in those countries where it
has come about, the elimination of this crime has entailed a very significant
stride toward the creation of a favorable climate for the full exercise of
freedom of expression.2
The report refers to Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression, prepared by the Office of the Special Rapporteur and
adopted in 2000 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which
clearly introduces
the so-called dual system of protection of honor, according to which, public
persons or private persons who have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
scrutiny on the part of society must be more tolerant of criticism, in order
also to enable the social control necessary to ensure that the powers of
government are exercised in an efficient and appropriate manner. The protection
of a person’s honor in such cases should be invoked in a civil proceeding
because a criminal sanction could impede the control of public office necessary
in a democratic society. This principle also adopts the standard of the “actual
malice” doctrine, which considers that civil penalties should be imposed on
expressions about public officials and only when information is published in
the knowledge that it is false, there is express intent to cause injury, or
there is gross negligence in ascertaining the truth.3
The second recent incident that reflects on the lack of freedom of
expression is a crack-down on dissent from the office of Venezuelan President
Nicolás Maduro. In recent weeks, Maduro has ordered the arrest and impending
arrest of political opposition leaders who express criticism of Maduro’s administration.
In February, Maduro issued orders for the incarceration of former presidential candidate
Leopoldo López on charges of terrorism and murder stemming from confrontations
between riot police and anti-Maduro activists that left several protesters
dead. After initially hiding from federal officials, López turned himself in to
authorities as the culmination of a rallying event he organized through YouTube
and other social media.4 Then on March 19, 2014, the Los Angeles
Times reported that national assembly member Maria Corina Machado is to be
stripped of her legislative immunity and charged with criminal conspiracy,
homicide, and treason for also publicly criticizing President Maduro.5
These two incidents and numerous other arrests of less prominent political
figures and private individuals underscore the denial of freedom of expression
that now exists in Venezuela.
Strong-arm governments have long used repressive tactics in attempts to
stifle criticism from political opposition: the use of armed forces or police
agencies to prevent the lawful assembly of critics, reliance on laws that
systematically inhibit freedom of expression, manipulation of the means of
communication including censorship and dissemination of false information, misrepresentation
of critics as threats to the State, and a reliance on general political apathy
on the part the populace at large.
Notes:
1. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI -
''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. B.1.5. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1
2. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI -
''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. A.2. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1
3. Cf. IACHR, Annual Report 2000. Report of the Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II, App. B.
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