Dilma’s Apologist

As Brazil’s political crisis has worsened over the past year, one of the country’s leading dailies, O Jornal do Brasil, has repeatedly revealed itself to be determined to support President Dilma Rousseff in every slant possible.

In an unsigned opinion piece entitled “Unemployment in Brazil and Europe: Where is the crisis really?”¹ the paper takes the rhetorical approach of erroneously extrapolating global conclusions from a restricted subset of data. Reporting on recently released figures from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics or IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) that indicate Brazil’s unemployment rate to be 6.9%, the paper belittles public and political concerns about the economy and the out-of-work population, referring to European nations with similarly high unemployment. The article cites specific figures for various countries representing an assortment of economic conditions:

France: 10.3% in May

United Kingdom: 5.6% in April

Germany: 4.7% in May

Italy: 12.4% in May

Portugal: 13.2% in May

Spain: 22.5% in May

and, of course, Greece: 25.6% in May

The article naively concludes that if no one is alarmed over economic crisis in France, Germany and the U.K., then Brazilians facing a similar rate also should not be alarmed. The commentary fails to consider the state of the respective economies, the role of the European Union as a stabilizing agent, and the underlying basis for the unemployment. It also glosses over the fact that both Spain and especially Greece are indeed alarmed about the dire state of their economies, with the latter facing possible economic collapse, political upheaval, and wide-spread social turmoil. Furthermore, the public perception of economic conditions in other countries neither negates nor validates consumer and voter confidence in Brazil. The newspaper implies that domestic uncertainties over the Brazilian economy are unfounded, and ignores the on-going political corruption scandal that has plagued the administrations of both Rousseff and her predecessor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.

This line of reasoning falls into the rhetoric of the Rousseff regime which is branding political opponents as illegal “coup plotters” (golpistas), especially the masses of protestors who have periodically taken to the streets calling for her impeachment. Apparently, Rousseff supporters including O Jornal do Brasil disregard the fact that the impeachment process is defined by the Brazilian constitution and was successfully implemented to remove democratically-elected president Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. Indeed, the very possibility of impeachment was a significant democratic landmark when the current Brazilian constitution was promulgated after the demise of the military’s 20-year, undemocratic rule.  Almost all other major Brazilian media outlets and major political parties on both the right and the left of the spectrum are critical of the president, with founding members of Rousseff’s own Workers’ Party or PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) publically denouncing the regime. 

It remains very unlikely that Rousseff actually will be impeached, but the on-going revelations about money laundering and influence peddling continue to undermine domestic and international confidence in an economy that had seemed robust while many developed nations struggled over the past decade.

Notes:

      1.  “O desemprego no Brasil e na Europa: onde mesmo está a crise?” Jornal do Brasil, 27 July 2015:

http://www.jb.com.br/opiniao/noticias/2015/07/27/o-desemprego-no-brasil-e-na-europa-onde-mesmo-esta-a-crise/

Snowden, Espionage, Human Rights, and U.S.-Latin American Relations

In the July 12 edition of the Los Angeles Times, Tracy Wilkinson begins with an extremely apropos reference to an iconographic scene from “Casablanca”: “Mexicans are shocked — shocked! — to learn that their American neighbors have been spying on them. What’s more, the Americans have been helping the Mexican government become better at spying!” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-snowden-20130712,0,5645423.story).  Politicians from throughout the hemisphere are expressing outrage over the alleged infringement of their sovereign nations. From Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto to Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, heads of state are concerned, distressed, insulted and demanding clarification. Americans themselves are disturbed and irate over news of widespread interception of personal communications; in Latin America Snowden’s revelations are a black eye in the face of Barack Obama’s efforts in U.S.-Latin American relations, evoking regional criticisms that echo the strained times of purported CIA-supported dictatorships, coups and assassinations. Of course, just as Captain Renault was shocked to find gambling going on, no one is genuinely surprised by eavesdropping, surveillance and spying being carried out by Americans and numerous others. Every major country in the world maintains intelligence agencies and almost all embassies and consulates include an intelligence officer.  The tacit understanding is that you are not supposed to be too overt or too aggressive with your allies, and by all means you should avoid being discovered. Allies spying on their friends is an international embarrassment for all parties and creates significant political problems for the politicians of the countries being watched as much as for those who ordered the watching. Nobody wants such incidents to come to light. Just ask Peña Nieto whose predecessor and political ally Felipe Calderón cozied up U.S. intelligence services.

What Edward Snowden has done spits in the face of the diplomatic niceties of the various foreign services around the world. In The United States prior to the 1960s and in many countries to this day, Snowden’s actions would constitute high treason punishable by death. But every traitor is a valuable asset to another party, and right now Snowden represents enough potential information that any foreign government would willingly stick its neck out to reap the benefits.  Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Nicolás Madura would be overjoyed to parade Snowden down the streets of La Paz or Caracas as a massive black-eye in the face of their ideological enemy, the United States. For them the benefits would be both symbolic and real. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and even Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on the other hand, would be equally pleased but significantly more wary of overt involvement with Snowden. While Snowden assuredly would like to escape from the transit area of Sheremetyevo International Airport and enjoy the hospitality of President Morales, for the time being he remains a man without a country in that he cannot return home, U.S. pressure prevents him from easily traveling to many countries, and many others cannot afford the consequences of aiding and abetting America’s de facto public enemy #1. This is the case for Rousseff who has pursued a global economic policy that can only benefit from positive relations with the United States. And while Morales might be preparing his guest suite, the Bolivian president himself could not fly home from a recent meeting in Russia without his plane being diverted to Vienna by countries not wanting to act against the interests of the United States. Léo Gerchmann of the Brazilian News agency RBS reports that Snowden acknowledged the current impossibility of traveling to Venezuela in a meeting with representatives from Human Rights Watch (http://www.clicrbs.com.br/anoticia/jsp/default2.jsp?uf=2&local=18&source=a4199059.xml&template=4187.dwt&edition=22344&section=1485).

Russia is attempting a delicate balancing act. Sergei Loiko of the Los Angeles Times reports, “The meeting with Snowden also put organizations that regularly accuse the Russian government of human rights abuses in the position of being asked to serve as intermediary to the Kremlin on his behalf.” At the same time, Putin understands the hand he has been dealt.  As Alexander Ryklin, editor of the online Daily Journal, points out, “Putin may dislike and even despise him for what he is, a traitor in his eyes, but he won't let Snowden out of his hands" (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20130713,0,6124806.story). As former head of the KGB, Putin knows as well as anyone the value of Snowden’s information, and he would know how to extract and use the intelligence. At the same time, he very publicly values strengthening U.S.-Russian bilateral relations and thus has stipulated that Snowden’s presence in Russia only can be granted if the former NSA contractor will guarantee no further leaks that could harm the United States. One assumes that Putin means no further public leaks, not that Russian intelligence agencies would not pick Snowden’s brains.

Denis Dyomkin and Alexei Anishchuk of Reuters state that “Putin has used the case of Snowden to accuse the United States of preaching to the world about rights and freedoms it does not uphold at home” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-usa-security-snowden-russia-idUSBRE96F0I020130717). Nevertheless, for Putin as for any leader, assuming the role of human rights supporter for Snowden could appear hypocritical: How can a country embrace a fugitive as a human rights activist when their own record in the area is being called into question? Maduro, Morales and company should also take note.

Disenchantment with Lula

In 1982, the late historian Robert Levine¹ gave an informal address to a group of American college students attending the University of São Paulo in Brazil. He made a statement that did not go over well with most of the politically engagé students assembled. In referring to the entrenched corruption of both civil and official societies, Levine commented that it didn't matter who was the president since the bureaucracies and practices of daily life would remain the same. He concluded that you could have Lula² or Maluf³ as president and nothing would change. The underlying issue as identified by Levine was the need for reform in the very fabric of society.

It is often said that in Brazil there are two ways to accomplish any task, the official way and the unofficial way or “jeitinho.” Some scholars have postulated that the (in)famous “jeitinho” developed as a necessity because of the immense, and at times contradictory, bureaucracies that can bring to a halt almost any interaction with official organs. The need for society to function leads to extra-official practices enacted by functionaries who deal directly with those seeking resolution.  Obviously, the very nature of these arrangements lead to corruption, sometimes softer – such as a donation to the “coffee fund” (pagar o cafezinho) or the “tip box” (caixinha dois) – and other times more blatant and abusive. A major problem is the wide-spread acceptance of the practice as a simple fact of life and cost of doing business in Brazil. This reality is so entrenched in Brazil that some U.S. businesses found themselves unable to do business in Brazil without violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, which prohibit the bribing of foreign officials.

Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva was a founder of the Brazilian Workers’ Party or PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in 1980 when the last military president, João Figueiredo, abolished the prescriptive bipartisan political system and allowed for the organization of new parties under the “Political Opening” (Abertura Política). In addition to several elected offices, Lula ran for President of the Republic in 1989 and 1994, losing both times in the second round run-offs, first to Fernando Collor de Mello and later to Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Throughout his political career up to that point, Lula distinguished himself as a tireless union organizer and social reformer. The Workers’ Party, whose symbol is a red star, was the farthest left party legal in Brazil when it was formed, and its platform included policies of redistribution of wealth including agrarian reform. In the years prior to his eventual election as president, Lula was often portrayed even by his detractors as perhaps Brazil’s only “honest politician.” In preparing himself to run again in the 2002 elections, Lula adopted a significantly different public persona, opting for smartly tailored suits and trimmed beard in place of his signature casual shirt sleeves and bushier facial hair. One of his first moves was to meet with the powerful Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), the most significant industrial organization in the country and a long-time opponent of a Lula presidency. Lula assured these economic leaders that he would not threaten their hegemony and would maintain the economic policies of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Most of his hardcore supporters probably assumed that this was merely a ploy to get into office, the ends justifying the means. However, once elected Lula was good to his word largely left unmodified the policies that had led to the economic stability under Cardoso. This policy alienated some of his party’s staunchest vanguard and led to sharp criticism from within the political left. However, Lula’s overall popularity grew during his presidency, at one point achieving the highest ever approval ratings for a Brazilian president. In 2009, Barack Obama referred to Lula as "the most popular politician on Earth" during a G20 summit in London.

Nevertheless, in 2005 during Lula’s presidency a massive influence peddling scheme operated within the corridors of the National Congress. Known as the “mensalão”(more or less the big monthly allowance), suitcases full of money regularly were brought into congressional offices, somehow bypassing security stations. These were distributed across a broad spectrum of political offices under the supervision of Lula’s Chief of Staff, José Dirceu. Ultimately, after the scandal broke, numerous members of Lula’s cabinet and other office holders lost their jobs, some eventually being indicted. Reminiscent of the Watergate scandal in the U.S., the question that surfaced regarding the president was, “What did he know and when did he know it?” While Lula was never directly implicated in the corruption, with wry humor, the joke at the time was: The good news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs. The bad news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs.

Lula’s popularity remained high throughout his presidency, enough so to allow current president Dilma Rousseff to coat-tail into the presidency after filling Dirceu’s post at the end of Lula’s second term. In August 2007, 40 participants were indicted by Brazil’s Supreme Court, almost all political allies of Lula and the PT. The trial began five years later, and many of the defendants were convicted of various charges of corruption. José Dirceu and several others were convicted of bribery (corrupção ativa).  

Even though Lula has managed to maintain a certain distance from the proceedings, his legacy has been tainted by the detailed revelations that continue to surface stemming from the trials and their aftermath. The image that has gradually supplanted that of “the one honest politician” seems to be that of “just another politician.” Those who most ardently supported Lula, and in some cases the Workers’ Party itself, have grown steadily more disillusioned.

NOTES

1. Robert M. Levine (1941-2003) was a scholar of Latin American history with a special emphasis on Brazil. When he addressed the American students in 1982, he was visiting his long-time friend and fellow historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy, then the Director of the Interuniversity Study Program (ISP-USP). Years later when I was at Florida International University and Bob was at the University of Miami, he was surprised to have made such a remark, being a strong supporter of Lula’s various political activities.

2. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva (b. 1945) was president of Brazil from 2003-2010.

3. Paulo Salim Maluf (b. 1931) is a Brazilian politician who has held multiple state and national offices since getting appointed Mayor of the city of São Paulo in 1969, due to his personal connections to General Artur da Costa e Silva, the second military president. His appointment was made possible by the fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) of 12/13/68, that suspended most political and civil rights, recessed the national congress, and instituted direct control of political processes by the president and governors.  In 1982, Maluf was finishing his term as Governor of the state of São Paulo and demonstrated clear aspirations to the presidency. He was a candidate for the chief executive office in 1985, supported by the out-going military régime and thus expected to become Brazil’s first civilian president since the 1964 coup. However, in a surprising upset, Tancredo Neves won the indirect election held through the Electoral College.