BBC's Venezuela blackout: 'Like living in the apocalypse'

Transparency & Freedom of Speech

The level of democracy of any regime can be measured to a great extend by the transparency of its institutions and the freedom of speech allowed to its citizenry. Some governments grant a wide array of expression with almost no restriction except in strictly defined cases of slander. Others also are very open but with more limitations based on “time, place and manner.” An example of this latter would be the prohibition on falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater, to paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. However, on the other end of the spectrum we encounter administrations that unabashedly squash any type of communication that they believe threaten themselves or the society they purport to represent. China’s current rigorous filtering of internet sites, especially those of social media, is a prime example. Numerous regimes have instituted quasi-Orwellian “thought police” to check what people communicate to one another using tactics such as wiretaps, screening of mail, censoring of all mass communications, and a vast array of informants whose objective was to report anti-governmental behavior. Germany’s “Hilter Youth” were educated to uphold a devotion to the State and the Führer over all else. As part of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, children were isolated from their parents for indoctrination that encouraged them to denounce their parents for counter-revolutionary attitudes.

Two interesting incidents occurred recently in Latin America that emphasize the different degrees to which supposedly democratic governments curtail freedom of expression. Earlier this month in Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, a 19 year-old man was cited for “contempt of authority” (desacato a autoridade) after posting angry comments on his Facebook page about the way he was treated by police in a car stop. Although the next day he apologized for his posting and admitted that he was driving with an expired license, the issue as raised by his public defender, Ana Carolina Dihl Cavalin, is the validity of Brazilian laws that violate the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, of which Brazil is a signatory.  In 2012, the Brazilian Senate revised the Penal Code changing “desacato a autoridade” from a crime in and of itself into an aggravating factor for cases of slander. The original slander law, written in 1940 during the Vargas regime, determined a sentence of from six months to one year of prison for the crime of slander. Under the new modification, the maximum sentence became from one to two years of prison for cases in which the slanderous statement is directed toward a public official. This includes police officers, judges, and any government official. A nuance of the law is that only offenses directed at a specific individual should be considered “in contempt”; in this case the accused directed his comments at the agency in general.

The Organization of American States actively opposes “desacato” laws throughout the hemisphere, based on the principle that “the American Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right of freedom of expression.”¹ The Office of the Special Rapporteur of the OAS has implemented a two-year cycle for reviewing the status of such limitations on freedom of expression. In 2011, that office published a special report indicating:

few countries have taken purposeful steps to abolish the crime of desacato. In some states, legislative reform processes have stalled or restrictive judicial interpretations have been adopted. In other countries, the interpretations of the courts have recognized the incompatibility of “desacato” with the due guarantees of freedom of expression; however, those decisions have not been echoed in legislative reforms. Nevertheless, while the successful abolition of desacato laws may not have been the norm in the Hemisphere, in those countries where it has come about, the elimination of this crime has entailed a very significant stride toward the creation of a favorable climate for the full exercise of freedom of expression.²

The report refers to Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, prepared by the Office of the Special Rapporteur and adopted in 2000 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which

clearly introduces the so-called dual system of protection of honor, according to which, public persons or private persons who have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased scrutiny on the part of society must be more tolerant of criticism, in order also to enable the social control necessary to ensure that the powers of government are exercised in an efficient and appropriate manner. The protection of a person’s honor in such cases should be invoked in a civil proceeding because a criminal sanction could impede the control of public office necessary in a democratic society. This principle also adopts the standard of the “actual malice” doctrine, which considers that civil penalties should be imposed on expressions about public officials and only when information is published in the knowledge that it is false, there is express intent to cause injury, or there is gross negligence in ascertaining the truth.³

The second recent incident that reflects on the lack of freedom of expression is a crack-down on dissent from the office of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. In recent weeks, Maduro has ordered the arrest and impending arrest of political opposition leaders who express criticism of Maduro’s administration. In February, Maduro issued orders for the incarceration of former presidential candidate Leopoldo López on charges of terrorism and murder stemming from confrontations between riot police and anti-Maduro activists that left several protesters dead. After initially hiding from federal officials, López turned himself in to authorities as the culmination of a rallying event he organized through YouTube and other social media.⁴ Then on March 19, 2014, the Los Angeles Times reported that national assembly member Maria Corina Machado is to be stripped of her legislative immunity and charged with criminal conspiracy, homicide, and treason for also publicly criticizing President Maduro.⁵ These two incidents and numerous other arrests of less prominent political figures and private individuals underscore the denial of freedom of expression that now exists in Venezuela.

Strong-arm governments have long used repressive tactics in attempts to stifle criticism from political opposition: the use of armed forces or police agencies to prevent the lawful assembly of critics, reliance on laws that systematically inhibit freedom of expression, manipulation of the means of communication including censorship and dissemination of false information, misrepresentation of critics as threats to the State, and a reliance on general political apathy on the part the populace at large.

Notes:

1. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI - ''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. B.1.5. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1

2. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI - ''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. A.2. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1

3. Cf. IACHR, Annual Report 2000. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II, App. B.

4. http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/americas/profile-leopoldo-lopez/

5. http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-venezuela-maduro-opposition-machado-20140319,0,6100430.story#axzz2wYIo7zTR

Snowden, Espionage, Human Rights, and U.S.-Latin American Relations

In the July 12 edition of the Los Angeles Times, Tracy Wilkinson begins with an extremely apropos reference to an iconographic scene from “Casablanca”: “Mexicans are shocked — shocked! — to learn that their American neighbors have been spying on them. What’s more, the Americans have been helping the Mexican government become better at spying!” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-snowden-20130712,0,5645423.story).  Politicians from throughout the hemisphere are expressing outrage over the alleged infringement of their sovereign nations. From Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto to Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, heads of state are concerned, distressed, insulted and demanding clarification. Americans themselves are disturbed and irate over news of widespread interception of personal communications; in Latin America Snowden’s revelations are a black eye in the face of Barack Obama’s efforts in U.S.-Latin American relations, evoking regional criticisms that echo the strained times of purported CIA-supported dictatorships, coups and assassinations. Of course, just as Captain Renault was shocked to find gambling going on, no one is genuinely surprised by eavesdropping, surveillance and spying being carried out by Americans and numerous others. Every major country in the world maintains intelligence agencies and almost all embassies and consulates include an intelligence officer.  The tacit understanding is that you are not supposed to be too overt or too aggressive with your allies, and by all means you should avoid being discovered. Allies spying on their friends is an international embarrassment for all parties and creates significant political problems for the politicians of the countries being watched as much as for those who ordered the watching. Nobody wants such incidents to come to light. Just ask Peña Nieto whose predecessor and political ally Felipe Calderón cozied up U.S. intelligence services.

What Edward Snowden has done spits in the face of the diplomatic niceties of the various foreign services around the world. In The United States prior to the 1960s and in many countries to this day, Snowden’s actions would constitute high treason punishable by death. But every traitor is a valuable asset to another party, and right now Snowden represents enough potential information that any foreign government would willingly stick its neck out to reap the benefits.  Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Nicolás Madura would be overjoyed to parade Snowden down the streets of La Paz or Caracas as a massive black-eye in the face of their ideological enemy, the United States. For them the benefits would be both symbolic and real. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and even Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on the other hand, would be equally pleased but significantly more wary of overt involvement with Snowden. While Snowden assuredly would like to escape from the transit area of Sheremetyevo International Airport and enjoy the hospitality of President Morales, for the time being he remains a man without a country in that he cannot return home, U.S. pressure prevents him from easily traveling to many countries, and many others cannot afford the consequences of aiding and abetting America’s de facto public enemy #1. This is the case for Rousseff who has pursued a global economic policy that can only benefit from positive relations with the United States. And while Morales might be preparing his guest suite, the Bolivian president himself could not fly home from a recent meeting in Russia without his plane being diverted to Vienna by countries not wanting to act against the interests of the United States. Léo Gerchmann of the Brazilian News agency RBS reports that Snowden acknowledged the current impossibility of traveling to Venezuela in a meeting with representatives from Human Rights Watch (http://www.clicrbs.com.br/anoticia/jsp/default2.jsp?uf=2&local=18&source=a4199059.xml&template=4187.dwt&edition=22344&section=1485).

Russia is attempting a delicate balancing act. Sergei Loiko of the Los Angeles Times reports, “The meeting with Snowden also put organizations that regularly accuse the Russian government of human rights abuses in the position of being asked to serve as intermediary to the Kremlin on his behalf.” At the same time, Putin understands the hand he has been dealt.  As Alexander Ryklin, editor of the online Daily Journal, points out, “Putin may dislike and even despise him for what he is, a traitor in his eyes, but he won't let Snowden out of his hands" (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20130713,0,6124806.story). As former head of the KGB, Putin knows as well as anyone the value of Snowden’s information, and he would know how to extract and use the intelligence. At the same time, he very publicly values strengthening U.S.-Russian bilateral relations and thus has stipulated that Snowden’s presence in Russia only can be granted if the former NSA contractor will guarantee no further leaks that could harm the United States. One assumes that Putin means no further public leaks, not that Russian intelligence agencies would not pick Snowden’s brains.

Denis Dyomkin and Alexei Anishchuk of Reuters state that “Putin has used the case of Snowden to accuse the United States of preaching to the world about rights and freedoms it does not uphold at home” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-usa-security-snowden-russia-idUSBRE96F0I020130717). Nevertheless, for Putin as for any leader, assuming the role of human rights supporter for Snowden could appear hypocritical: How can a country embrace a fugitive as a human rights activist when their own record in the area is being called into question? Maduro, Morales and company should also take note.

Maduro, Chavismo and the Venezuelan Military

The protagonist of one of the most striking moments in last night’s post-election spectacle in Venezuela was not presumed victor Nicolás Maduro nor his unrelenting opponent Henrique Capriles, but rather Major General Wilmer Barrientos. One of several generals to speak in their own press conference, Barrientos is the Strategic Operational Commander of the Venezuelan (“Bolivarian”) National Armed Forces (Comandante Estratégico Operacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana or “FANB”), who was called upon to effectuate a military operation designed to ensure peaceful and transparent elections. In his press conference late last night (04/14/13), Barrientos celebrated the victory of governmental official candidate Maduro over opposition candidate Capriles, and declared that the opposition’s refusal to accept defeat was “irresponsible” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NmKWA3Cn3E).

The imagery of a stage packed with the Venezuelan top brass voicing their support of a political candidate brought to mind a statement made by Brazilian historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy of the University of São Paulo around 1984. As an outside observer of the campaigns and election process in the United States, he expressed dismay at the multimillion dollar marketing schemes that dragged on for more than a year, but came away with one critical observation: In the United States, nobody ever raised the question of which presidential candidate the military supported. Indeed, in the U.S. there is no such thing as an official candidate formally representing the armed forces. Brazil at the time was in the waning days of its 20-year military government. Five generals held the title of “President of the Republic” from April 1964 through March 1985, with a brief triumvirate junta in control in the latter half of 1969. Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and other Latin American countries were abuzz with the notion of re-democratization: the transition from authoritarian power to democratically elected civilian control of the government. The discussions included not only issues of how to remove the yoke of “illegitimate” governments but also how to develop new forms of public policy with representational input and transparency. Three decades after much of the continent dealt with the transition away from military meddling or even direct control of the government, history seems to be poised to repeat itself in Venezuela.

Former career military man Hugo Chávez’s political career was a blend of authoritarianism and populism, not unlike numerous other charismatic politicians around the globe. Reminiscent of Munich’s 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Chávez first tried to seize power in a coup d’etat in February 1992, was unsuccessful and eventually imprisoned. Released in 1994, Chávez adjusted his strategy and developed his popular base to eventually win the 1998 presidential elections. In other words, his attempted military revolution failed as such, but laid the groundwork for his rise to power from within the framework of the existing constitution. After that, in the manner of Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s, Chávez began modifying the constitution and other political apparatuses to continually strengthen his own hold on presidential power. Under the laws that he had created, Chávez legally retained his position for 14 years. Yesterday’s election was practically a draw: official results gave Maduro approximately 50.7% of the vote and Capriles 49.1%. These figures reflect an almost evenly divided – and strongly polarized – country, similar to the situation in Chile under Augusto Pinochet in the 1980s. Maduro does not have the charisma of Chávez, but for now appears to have the Military’s support. The big questions are: How long will that support endure? And at what point will a true majority of the Venezuelan people tire asking who the military wants to run the country.

Chavismo without Chávez II

What is surprising is not that Hugo Chávez’s chosen successor Nicolás Maduro has claimed victory in the special election necessitated by Chávez’s death, but rather that even with the full force of the Chavista political machine the National Electoral Council declared Maduro the winner with a margin of only 1.5%. As can be expected in such circumstances, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles has not recognized the results, and has called for the ballot boxes to be opened and the ballots recounted. Few international observers doubt that the ultimate victor of this election will be Maduro, given that the President of the National Electoral Council, Tibisay Lucena, stated that the announced results favoring Maduro were “irreversible,” and given that, as observed by the University of Miami’s Bruce Bagley, “In the final analysis, it will be the Chavistas counting the votes” (L.A. Times, 04/14/13, A3). Regardless of the final outcome or the recount – if there is one – one comment repeated tonight by Capriles goes to the heart of the situation. Addressing his opponent, Capriles said, “The loser is you” (“El derrotado es usted”). Just last October, an ailing Hugo Chávez extended his 14-year reign winning re-election against Capriles by almost 10 percentage points. Tonight Maduro’s “mandate from the people” depended on a difference of less than 235,000 votes, out of 18.9 million registered voters. It remains to be seen how he will be able to consolidate his support more effectively than during this brief campaign. It will be surprising if he learns how to project the kind of charisma that Chávez leveraged into what might best be deemed a “constitutional coup de etat.”

Significantly, the top brass of the Venezuelan armed forces announced their support for the official results. The military’s press conference included General Wilmer Barrientos – the man charged with ensuring the transparency and fairness of the election process – celebrating Maduro’s win.

¿Chavismo sin Chávez?: The possibilities for regional realignment

The hemisphere is facing an impending realignment as a result of Hugo Chávez’s death. For years Chávez has been the center of gravity for the left-leaning governments that emerged in Latin America’s post-privatization world of the 21^st Century. When many of the promises of 1990s failed to bring the lasting socio-economic improvements expected from neo-liberal economics and hemispheric integration, countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and, of course, Venezuela reacted against many of the political parties that had promoted the economic policies. These electorates brought into office leftist leaders such as Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, and Hugo Chávez. Of these, the latter is clearly the most similar to charismatic leaders of other eras, recalling Perón or maybe Vargas.

In Brazil, while Lula had a long track record as leader of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), after several frustrated attempts to get himself elected President he finally won the majority in 2002 on a platform that basically maintained Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. As his hand-picked successor, Dilma Roussef’s economic policy for the most part follows the trail blazed by Lula. This policy has either contributed to a significant period of economic growth in the country, or is the beneficiary of that growth (most likely some of both). However, the grass-roots supporters of the PT to a large extend felt alienated by Lula’s – and now Dilma’s – apparent abandonment of traditional party lines, together with increasing accusations of corruption.

Cristina Kirchner took office as President of Argentina in 2007, in essence a re-election of her husband Néstor. She also maintained a pre-existing economic policy that attempted to marry social reforms with the economic growth that developed under Néstor. More recently, however, Cristina has reverted to older, protectionist economic models, straining relations with some trading partners. Like Dilma in Brazil, Cristina seems to be trying to balance her political ideology with the management of an economy that resisted the downturns of the 2000s better than most G20 nations, even though there are warning signs in both countries.

In contrast to the balancing acts in Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s Evo Morales has defined his seven years in office along more traditional Latin American leftist terms, adopting an attitude of resistance of the United States’ foreign policy and the role of multinational or transnational business interests. Nevertheless, likely due to the limited size and scope of Bolivia’s economy, Morales has not occupied the international stage in the manner of Chávez. Like Chávez, Morales frequently has honored Fidel Castro as the patriarch of the Latin American Left and he has maintained an “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, although his domestic policies have been erratic.

What made Hugo Chávez such a presence in the hemisphere was his vocal anti-Americanism financed by Venezuela’s oil production. Like the autocratic Latin American rulers of the 20^th Century, Chávez managed to leverage populism to inculcate a lack of pluralism into the Venezuelan political reality. He fuelled the masses with apparent social welfare programs while limiting the political discourse. And as with similar regimes, Chavismo could count on much popular support. As Eric Farnsworth indicated:

“Even his opponents took pains before the last presidential election, on October 7, 2012 to convince voters that if opposition candidate Henrique Capriles had been elected, he would have respected the gains of the Bolivarian revolution.”  Eric Farnsworth (01/11/13 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-can%E2%80%99t-stay-quiet-over-ch%C3%A1vez-absence)

The question now is who, if anyone, may fill the void left by Chávez. Dilma Roussef and perhaps to a lesser extent Cristina Kirchner would shun the role of anti-American firebrand, preferring to try to manage their countries’ economic growth while resisting both American and Chinese commercial pressures. Evo Morales cannot muster the populational and economic clout. Raúl Castro is really a transitional place-holder. Most likely, Chavismo, unlike Peronismo I Argentina, will not have the long-reaching implications in the Venezuelan national political arena.