The hemisphere is facing an impending realignment as a result of Hugo
Chávez’s death. For years Chávez has been the center of gravity for the
left-leaning governments that emerged in Latin America’s post-privatization
world of the 21st Century. When many of the promises of 1990s failed
to bring the lasting socio-economic improvements expected from neo-liberal
economics and hemispheric integration, countries like Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil and, of course, Venezuela reacted against many of the political parties
that had promoted the economic policies. These electorates brought into office
leftist leaders such as Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, and Hugo
Chávez. Of these, the latter is clearly the most similar to charismatic leaders
of other eras, recalling Perón or maybe Vargas.
In Brazil, while Lula had a long track record as leader of the Workers’
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), after several frustrated attempts to
get himself elected President he finally won the majority in 2002 on a platform
that basically maintained Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. As his
hand-picked successor, Dilma Roussef’s economic policy for the most part
follows the trail blazed by Lula. This policy has either contributed to a
significant period of economic growth in the country, or is the beneficiary of
that growth (most likely some of both). However, the grass-roots supporters of
the PT to a large extend felt alienated by Lula’s – and now Dilma’s – apparent
abandonment of traditional party lines, together with increasing accusations of
corruption.
Cristina Kirchner took office
as President of Argentina in 2007, in essence a re-election of her husband
Néstor. She also maintained a pre-existing economic policy that attempted to
marry social reforms with the economic growth that developed under Néstor. More
recently, however, Cristina has reverted to older, protectionist economic
models, straining relations with some trading partners. Like Dilma in Brazil,
Cristina seems to be trying to balance her political ideology with the
management of an economy that resisted the downturns of the 2000s better than
most G20 nations, even though there are warning signs in both countries.
In contrast to the balancing
acts in Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s Evo Morales has defined his seven years
in office along more traditional Latin American leftist terms, adopting an
attitude of resistance of the United States’ foreign policy and the role of
multinational or transnational business interests. Nevertheless, likely due to
the limited size and scope of Bolivia’s economy, Morales has not occupied the
international stage in the manner of Chávez. Like Chávez, Morales frequently
has honored Fidel Castro as the patriarch of the Latin American Left and he has
maintained an “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, although his domestic policies have
been erratic.
What made Hugo Chávez such a presence in the hemisphere was his vocal
anti-Americanism financed by Venezuela’s oil production. Like the autocratic
Latin American rulers of the 20th Century, Chávez managed to
leverage populism to inculcate a lack of pluralism into the Venezuelan
political reality. He fuelled the masses with apparent social welfare programs
while limiting the political discourse. And as with similar regimes, Chavismo
could count on much popular support. As Eric Farnsworth indicated:
“Even his opponents took pains before the last presidential election,
on October 7, 2012 to convince voters that if opposition candidate Henrique
Capriles had been elected, he would have respected the gains of the Bolivarian
revolution.” Eric Farnsworth (01/11/13 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-can%E2%80%99t-stay-quiet-over-ch%C3%A1vez-absence)
The question now is who, if anyone, may fill the void left by Chávez. Dilma
Roussef and perhaps to a lesser extent Cristina Kirchner would shun the role of
anti-American firebrand, preferring to try to manage their countries’ economic
growth while resisting both American and Chinese commercial pressures. Evo
Morales cannot muster the populational and economic clout. Raúl Castro is
really a transitional place-holder. Most likely, Chavismo, unlike Peronismo I Argentina,
will not have the long-reaching implications in the Venezuelan national
political arena.
