Snowden, Espionage, Human Rights, and U.S.-Latin American Relations

In the July 12 edition of the Los Angeles Times, Tracy Wilkinson begins with an extremely apropos reference to an iconographic scene from “Casablanca”: “Mexicans are shocked — shocked! — to learn that their American neighbors have been spying on them. What’s more, the Americans have been helping the Mexican government become better at spying!” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-snowden-20130712,0,5645423.story).  Politicians from throughout the hemisphere are expressing outrage over the alleged infringement of their sovereign nations. From Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto to Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, heads of state are concerned, distressed, insulted and demanding clarification. Americans themselves are disturbed and irate over news of widespread interception of personal communications; in Latin America Snowden’s revelations are a black eye in the face of Barack Obama’s efforts in U.S.-Latin American relations, evoking regional criticisms that echo the strained times of purported CIA-supported dictatorships, coups and assassinations. Of course, just as Captain Renault was shocked to find gambling going on, no one is genuinely surprised by eavesdropping, surveillance and spying being carried out by Americans and numerous others. Every major country in the world maintains intelligence agencies and almost all embassies and consulates include an intelligence officer.  The tacit understanding is that you are not supposed to be too overt or too aggressive with your allies, and by all means you should avoid being discovered. Allies spying on their friends is an international embarrassment for all parties and creates significant political problems for the politicians of the countries being watched as much as for those who ordered the watching. Nobody wants such incidents to come to light. Just ask Peña Nieto whose predecessor and political ally Felipe Calderón cozied up U.S. intelligence services.

What Edward Snowden has done spits in the face of the diplomatic niceties of the various foreign services around the world. In The United States prior to the 1960s and in many countries to this day, Snowden’s actions would constitute high treason punishable by death. But every traitor is a valuable asset to another party, and right now Snowden represents enough potential information that any foreign government would willingly stick its neck out to reap the benefits.  Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Nicolás Madura would be overjoyed to parade Snowden down the streets of La Paz or Caracas as a massive black-eye in the face of their ideological enemy, the United States. For them the benefits would be both symbolic and real. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and even Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on the other hand, would be equally pleased but significantly more wary of overt involvement with Snowden. While Snowden assuredly would like to escape from the transit area of Sheremetyevo International Airport and enjoy the hospitality of President Morales, for the time being he remains a man without a country in that he cannot return home, U.S. pressure prevents him from easily traveling to many countries, and many others cannot afford the consequences of aiding and abetting America’s de facto public enemy #1. This is the case for Rousseff who has pursued a global economic policy that can only benefit from positive relations with the United States. And while Morales might be preparing his guest suite, the Bolivian president himself could not fly home from a recent meeting in Russia without his plane being diverted to Vienna by countries not wanting to act against the interests of the United States. Léo Gerchmann of the Brazilian News agency RBS reports that Snowden acknowledged the current impossibility of traveling to Venezuela in a meeting with representatives from Human Rights Watch (http://www.clicrbs.com.br/anoticia/jsp/default2.jsp?uf=2&local=18&source=a4199059.xml&template=4187.dwt&edition=22344&section=1485).

Russia is attempting a delicate balancing act. Sergei Loiko of the Los Angeles Times reports, “The meeting with Snowden also put organizations that regularly accuse the Russian government of human rights abuses in the position of being asked to serve as intermediary to the Kremlin on his behalf.” At the same time, Putin understands the hand he has been dealt.  As Alexander Ryklin, editor of the online Daily Journal, points out, “Putin may dislike and even despise him for what he is, a traitor in his eyes, but he won't let Snowden out of his hands" (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20130713,0,6124806.story). As former head of the KGB, Putin knows as well as anyone the value of Snowden’s information, and he would know how to extract and use the intelligence. At the same time, he very publicly values strengthening U.S.-Russian bilateral relations and thus has stipulated that Snowden’s presence in Russia only can be granted if the former NSA contractor will guarantee no further leaks that could harm the United States. One assumes that Putin means no further public leaks, not that Russian intelligence agencies would not pick Snowden’s brains.

Denis Dyomkin and Alexei Anishchuk of Reuters state that “Putin has used the case of Snowden to accuse the United States of preaching to the world about rights and freedoms it does not uphold at home” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-usa-security-snowden-russia-idUSBRE96F0I020130717). Nevertheless, for Putin as for any leader, assuming the role of human rights supporter for Snowden could appear hypocritical: How can a country embrace a fugitive as a human rights activist when their own record in the area is being called into question? Maduro, Morales and company should also take note.

¿Chavismo sin Chávez?: The possibilities for regional realignment

The hemisphere is facing an impending realignment as a result of Hugo Chávez’s death. For years Chávez has been the center of gravity for the left-leaning governments that emerged in Latin America’s post-privatization world of the 21^st Century. When many of the promises of 1990s failed to bring the lasting socio-economic improvements expected from neo-liberal economics and hemispheric integration, countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and, of course, Venezuela reacted against many of the political parties that had promoted the economic policies. These electorates brought into office leftist leaders such as Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, and Hugo Chávez. Of these, the latter is clearly the most similar to charismatic leaders of other eras, recalling Perón or maybe Vargas.

In Brazil, while Lula had a long track record as leader of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), after several frustrated attempts to get himself elected President he finally won the majority in 2002 on a platform that basically maintained Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. As his hand-picked successor, Dilma Roussef’s economic policy for the most part follows the trail blazed by Lula. This policy has either contributed to a significant period of economic growth in the country, or is the beneficiary of that growth (most likely some of both). However, the grass-roots supporters of the PT to a large extend felt alienated by Lula’s – and now Dilma’s – apparent abandonment of traditional party lines, together with increasing accusations of corruption.

Cristina Kirchner took office as President of Argentina in 2007, in essence a re-election of her husband Néstor. She also maintained a pre-existing economic policy that attempted to marry social reforms with the economic growth that developed under Néstor. More recently, however, Cristina has reverted to older, protectionist economic models, straining relations with some trading partners. Like Dilma in Brazil, Cristina seems to be trying to balance her political ideology with the management of an economy that resisted the downturns of the 2000s better than most G20 nations, even though there are warning signs in both countries.

In contrast to the balancing acts in Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s Evo Morales has defined his seven years in office along more traditional Latin American leftist terms, adopting an attitude of resistance of the United States’ foreign policy and the role of multinational or transnational business interests. Nevertheless, likely due to the limited size and scope of Bolivia’s economy, Morales has not occupied the international stage in the manner of Chávez. Like Chávez, Morales frequently has honored Fidel Castro as the patriarch of the Latin American Left and he has maintained an “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, although his domestic policies have been erratic.

What made Hugo Chávez such a presence in the hemisphere was his vocal anti-Americanism financed by Venezuela’s oil production. Like the autocratic Latin American rulers of the 20^th Century, Chávez managed to leverage populism to inculcate a lack of pluralism into the Venezuelan political reality. He fuelled the masses with apparent social welfare programs while limiting the political discourse. And as with similar regimes, Chavismo could count on much popular support. As Eric Farnsworth indicated:

“Even his opponents took pains before the last presidential election, on October 7, 2012 to convince voters that if opposition candidate Henrique Capriles had been elected, he would have respected the gains of the Bolivarian revolution.”  Eric Farnsworth (01/11/13 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-can%E2%80%99t-stay-quiet-over-ch%C3%A1vez-absence)

The question now is who, if anyone, may fill the void left by Chávez. Dilma Roussef and perhaps to a lesser extent Cristina Kirchner would shun the role of anti-American firebrand, preferring to try to manage their countries’ economic growth while resisting both American and Chinese commercial pressures. Evo Morales cannot muster the populational and economic clout. Raúl Castro is really a transitional place-holder. Most likely, Chavismo, unlike Peronismo I Argentina, will not have the long-reaching implications in the Venezuelan national political arena.