Dictators II: Controllers and Collaborators

In my posting on 13 December 2013 [http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/12/latin-american-dictators.html], I commented on the execution of North Korean elder statesman and dictatorial uncle Jang Song Thaek. I related the dictatorship of Kim Jong Un to many similar egocentric and/or totalitarian regimes in history, making special mention of the numerous dictators who have subjugated regions of Latin America over the last couple of centuries, with special emphasis on the “desaparecidos” as an example of the utmost in dictatorial cowardice. Parallels also can be drawn between Kim Jong Un and leaders such as Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Fidel Castro, Idi Amin, “Papa Doc” Duvalier, and others. A commonality within this group is the role of a few individuals who helped enable the rise to power of the eventual dictator, and the much larger groups that actively or passively collaborated with oppressive regimes.

In the current case of North Korea, Jang Song Thaek presumably shored up his nephew’s bid for power under the assumption that he could control the frivolous, pampered dilettante and exercise true power behind the throne. In the tradition of Cardinal Wolsley’s fate, the puppet protégé eventually turned on his mentor and eliminated him. More often, however, dictators seize control of a country with the support of special interest groups who embrace the leader as a means to realize their own desires for control.  Frequently this elite sees the strong-arm practices of the totalitarian regime as a means to their own specific ends, usually a way of preserving their source of power. In some cases, once the supposed figurehead consolidates his authority, he moves to neutralize anyone who may pose a challenge to his administration.  In pre-Nazi Germany, Hitler rose to prominence through the support of the Brown Shirts (Sturmabteilung or “SA”). Once he procured the Chancellorship in 1933, Hitler began questioning the role of the SA and finally disempowered them through the “Blood Purge” of 1934. Stalin eliminated Trotsky and other old-school Bolsheviks in the “Great Purge.” Mao decimated the senior ranks of his Communist Party with the “Cultural Revolution.” By 1965, a Soviet-supported Castro freed himself of the ever-revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

In post-colonial Latin America, some totalitarian or corporativist governments have been backed by oligarchies comprised of large land owners and/or industrialists, while others emerged as populist. Among the 19^th-Century “caudillos,” Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina, Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia of Paraguay, and the numerous Brazilian “coronéis” derived their power from an almost feudal socio-political structure based on immense tracts of land and the cooperation among those who owned them. In the 20^th Century, Juan Domingo Perón and Getúlio Vargas defined modern populist dictatorships in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. These two leaders managed to appeal to the masses while still serving the interests of a select group of business, industry, and land owners. The general populous who supported them did not directly endorse secret police, torture, and the other trappings of a (quasi)dictatorial regime. Rather, they the sought to ensure an overall livelihood and economic standard that they felt would be well served by these particular leaders. In this they are quite distinct from the cynical and blatantly self-serving supporters who lined their own pockets at the expense of this very citizenry.

In situations resulting from a revolutionary rise to power, several kinds of collaborators stand out, as defined by the nature of their participation in or support of the new regime. Some are actual ideologues or members of the revolutionary body that activity participated in over-throwing the previous government and who benefit directly from the new order. Others are petty technocrats and bureaucrats without ideology or moral compass who readily embrace the “brave new world” as an automatic response to the presence of power. They seek power for power’s sake, and are prepared to “drink the Cool-Aid” if necessary in order to feed their addiction. Yet another group sins through omission by avoiding taking any position and thus winds up empowering the atrocities that extreme regimes commit. The Southern Cone countries of the 1960s and 1970s housed actual majorities that turned a blind eye to disappearances and torture, much like the German people under the Nazis who chose not to think about what fate befell their Jewish neighbors, albeit to a lesser degree in terms of the number of victims.

There is also a special group of unwitting collaborators: the “inocentes úteis” in Portuguese, or most often “useful idiots” in English. These are individuals who can be manipulated by the regime but are too naïve to realize what role they have been acquired. Frequently these people can believe that they are endorsing a noble goal, incapable of critically analyzing the political and ideological rhetoric that the regime spoon-feeds them. They often are self-righteous about the purpose of their actions, be it the implementation of a truly egalitarian socialist state, the consolidation of economic prosperity and industrial competitiveness for the nation, or the grand panacea of change and progress as in the 19^th Century’s positivist movements or the case of nationalist modernization under Vargas.

What is common to all of these groups is their capacity to ignore atrocities either by commission or omission. If confronted by the facts of abuses effectuated by the state or the specific leader, they chose not to believe them. Ultimately, no dictatorial regime could endure to make a mark in history without the tacit or explicit support of the majority.

Latin American Dictators

The recent execution of Jang Song Thaek (12/12/13) by his nephew, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, brought to mind the various ways in which ego-centric totalitarian leaders have sought to silence criticism throughout the ages, and especially the Latin American regimes of the 20^th Century. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of for Brazilian president João “Jango” Goulart and the 40^th anniversary of Pinochet’s coup d’etat underline this historical nadir.

New leaders always try to consolidate their power, be it a freshly minted CEO of a large corporation, the recently appointed director of a governmental agency, or a usurping monarch who won the crown on the field of battle. The less democratic the institution or the circumstances, the more ruthless these individuals tend to be in the elimination of dissenting voices. Stalin’s purges, Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” Elizabeth’s execution of Mary, Queen of Scots: all of these are examples of absolute power attacking others who may more or less legitimately oppose it, especially when said opposition may itself house some form of power-base, be it military, political, or moral authority.

The history of Latin America overflows with totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian regimes, from the first European monarchs, through the corporatist models of the mid-20^th Century such as Vargas and Peron, and including various military regimes throughout the region.  In some cases, dissenting voices were stifled by fiat: the government suspended rights of expression and assembly, utilizing strong-arm tactics to enforce the decrees. More hardline rulers also used fabricated and/or exaggerated charges of treason, similar to Kim Jong Un’s declarations regarding his uncle, as reported in CNN, describing him as a “traitor for all ages” who plotted to overthrow the dictator’s regime “by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods.” CNN quoted Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who described Jang Song Thaek’s arrest as “theatrical” and execution as “unprecedented.”¹

As obviously false and vile as these kangaroo court proceedings may be, the dictators of Latin America in the latter half of the 20^th Century developed an even more insidious mechanism for silencing critics who could potentially harm their credibility by casting the light of truth on their lies and abuses: the dissidents simply disappeared. The military regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, among others, disposed of inconvenient individuals in a manner that defined the ultimate lack of transparency. Friends, family and coworkers would not know the fate of a “disappeared person,” encountering stone walls when inquiring of police and other governmental agencies. Someone could leave for work one morning and never be heard from again. At places of employment, colleagues would find mysteriously vacant offices. At schools and universities, desks and lecterns would suddenly be empty without explanation. And adjacent to secret government installations, such as the “31 de Março” ranch in São Paulo² or the “300 Carlos” at the headquarters of the 13^th Infantry Battalion in Montevideo, clandestine cemeteries received the mutilated bodies of those “disappeared” who were tortured to death.³ Vast numbers of these individuals were erased from the face of the Earth by their own governments, gone without a trace. As 86-year old former coroner and director of the Brazilian Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto Médico Legal) under the military regime, Harry Shibata, declared, “Disappeared is disappeared.”⁴

The disappearance of hundreds of individuals under these Latin American dictatorships defines the extreme in cowardice. Afraid to operate under democratic institutions – sometimes regent in constitutions the very regimes purported to uphold – this practice lacked even the theatrical “transparency” of Kim Jong Un’s farce.  At the same time, it constituted an act of domestic terrorism, for a collateral intention was to strike such fear into the hearts of the general citizenry that further dissent would be dissuaded.  This facilitated the role of secret police. Like the infamous Gestapo of the Nazi regime, agents or informants could be lurking around the next corner, or at the next table. Others would be too terrified to speak out, since they, too, could simply disappear.

In the final analysis, the tactic of “disappearing” people demonstrated the actual impotence of those who practiced it. Unable to govern openly, incapable of leading their people honestly, too weak to build a democratic base for their governments, the self-serving tyrants chose deceit and violence in an attempt to cover up their own inadequacies.

1. www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-executed/index.html

2. http://www.apublica.org/2011/08/o-sitio-da-tortura/

3. www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Direitos-Humanos/Quartel-uruguaio-pode-abrigar-cemiterio-clandestina/5/1321

4. http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/legista-da-ditadura-promete-revelacoes-na-comissao-4946084

¿Chavismo sin Chávez?: The possibilities for regional realignment

The hemisphere is facing an impending realignment as a result of Hugo Chávez’s death. For years Chávez has been the center of gravity for the left-leaning governments that emerged in Latin America’s post-privatization world of the 21^st Century. When many of the promises of 1990s failed to bring the lasting socio-economic improvements expected from neo-liberal economics and hemispheric integration, countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and, of course, Venezuela reacted against many of the political parties that had promoted the economic policies. These electorates brought into office leftist leaders such as Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, and Hugo Chávez. Of these, the latter is clearly the most similar to charismatic leaders of other eras, recalling Perón or maybe Vargas.

In Brazil, while Lula had a long track record as leader of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), after several frustrated attempts to get himself elected President he finally won the majority in 2002 on a platform that basically maintained Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. As his hand-picked successor, Dilma Roussef’s economic policy for the most part follows the trail blazed by Lula. This policy has either contributed to a significant period of economic growth in the country, or is the beneficiary of that growth (most likely some of both). However, the grass-roots supporters of the PT to a large extend felt alienated by Lula’s – and now Dilma’s – apparent abandonment of traditional party lines, together with increasing accusations of corruption.

Cristina Kirchner took office as President of Argentina in 2007, in essence a re-election of her husband Néstor. She also maintained a pre-existing economic policy that attempted to marry social reforms with the economic growth that developed under Néstor. More recently, however, Cristina has reverted to older, protectionist economic models, straining relations with some trading partners. Like Dilma in Brazil, Cristina seems to be trying to balance her political ideology with the management of an economy that resisted the downturns of the 2000s better than most G20 nations, even though there are warning signs in both countries.

In contrast to the balancing acts in Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s Evo Morales has defined his seven years in office along more traditional Latin American leftist terms, adopting an attitude of resistance of the United States’ foreign policy and the role of multinational or transnational business interests. Nevertheless, likely due to the limited size and scope of Bolivia’s economy, Morales has not occupied the international stage in the manner of Chávez. Like Chávez, Morales frequently has honored Fidel Castro as the patriarch of the Latin American Left and he has maintained an “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, although his domestic policies have been erratic.

What made Hugo Chávez such a presence in the hemisphere was his vocal anti-Americanism financed by Venezuela’s oil production. Like the autocratic Latin American rulers of the 20^th Century, Chávez managed to leverage populism to inculcate a lack of pluralism into the Venezuelan political reality. He fuelled the masses with apparent social welfare programs while limiting the political discourse. And as with similar regimes, Chavismo could count on much popular support. As Eric Farnsworth indicated:

“Even his opponents took pains before the last presidential election, on October 7, 2012 to convince voters that if opposition candidate Henrique Capriles had been elected, he would have respected the gains of the Bolivarian revolution.”  Eric Farnsworth (01/11/13 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-can%E2%80%99t-stay-quiet-over-ch%C3%A1vez-absence)

The question now is who, if anyone, may fill the void left by Chávez. Dilma Roussef and perhaps to a lesser extent Cristina Kirchner would shun the role of anti-American firebrand, preferring to try to manage their countries’ economic growth while resisting both American and Chinese commercial pressures. Evo Morales cannot muster the populational and economic clout. Raúl Castro is really a transitional place-holder. Most likely, Chavismo, unlike Peronismo I Argentina, will not have the long-reaching implications in the Venezuelan national political arena.