Maduro, Chavismo and the Venezuelan Military

The protagonist of one of the most striking moments in last night’s post-election spectacle in Venezuela was not presumed victor Nicolás Maduro nor his unrelenting opponent Henrique Capriles, but rather Major General Wilmer Barrientos. One of several generals to speak in their own press conference, Barrientos is the Strategic Operational Commander of the Venezuelan (“Bolivarian”) National Armed Forces (Comandante Estratégico Operacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana or “FANB”), who was called upon to effectuate a military operation designed to ensure peaceful and transparent elections. In his press conference late last night (04/14/13), Barrientos celebrated the victory of governmental official candidate Maduro over opposition candidate Capriles, and declared that the opposition’s refusal to accept defeat was “irresponsible” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NmKWA3Cn3E).

The imagery of a stage packed with the Venezuelan top brass voicing their support of a political candidate brought to mind a statement made by Brazilian historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy of the University of São Paulo around 1984. As an outside observer of the campaigns and election process in the United States, he expressed dismay at the multimillion dollar marketing schemes that dragged on for more than a year, but came away with one critical observation: In the United States, nobody ever raised the question of which presidential candidate the military supported. Indeed, in the U.S. there is no such thing as an official candidate formally representing the armed forces. Brazil at the time was in the waning days of its 20-year military government. Five generals held the title of “President of the Republic” from April 1964 through March 1985, with a brief triumvirate junta in control in the latter half of 1969. Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and other Latin American countries were abuzz with the notion of re-democratization: the transition from authoritarian power to democratically elected civilian control of the government. The discussions included not only issues of how to remove the yoke of “illegitimate” governments but also how to develop new forms of public policy with representational input and transparency. Three decades after much of the continent dealt with the transition away from military meddling or even direct control of the government, history seems to be poised to repeat itself in Venezuela.

Former career military man Hugo Chávez’s political career was a blend of authoritarianism and populism, not unlike numerous other charismatic politicians around the globe. Reminiscent of Munich’s 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Chávez first tried to seize power in a coup d’etat in February 1992, was unsuccessful and eventually imprisoned. Released in 1994, Chávez adjusted his strategy and developed his popular base to eventually win the 1998 presidential elections. In other words, his attempted military revolution failed as such, but laid the groundwork for his rise to power from within the framework of the existing constitution. After that, in the manner of Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s, Chávez began modifying the constitution and other political apparatuses to continually strengthen his own hold on presidential power. Under the laws that he had created, Chávez legally retained his position for 14 years. Yesterday’s election was practically a draw: official results gave Maduro approximately 50.7% of the vote and Capriles 49.1%. These figures reflect an almost evenly divided – and strongly polarized – country, similar to the situation in Chile under Augusto Pinochet in the 1980s. Maduro does not have the charisma of Chávez, but for now appears to have the Military’s support. The big questions are: How long will that support endure? And at what point will a true majority of the Venezuelan people tire asking who the military wants to run the country.