Brazilian Protests and the Confederations Cup

Above the fold on the front page of today’s (06/19/13) hardcopy New York Times a large photograph shows a Brazilian police officer dousing a protestor’s face in pepper spray from barely over a foot away [permalink to the online Times article below]. The unarmed and seemingly unthreatening protester is cringing and raising her hand in a vain attempt to cover her face as the officer in riot gear soaks her in enough spray to drip down her neck. This is the kind of image that undoubtedly interferes with the sleep of President Dilma Rousseff, herself a former urban guerrilla who decades ago most likely would have been on the receiving end of such governmental shows of strength. Tens of thousands of similar episodes took place across the country today, mostly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but also in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and especially national capital Brasília, along with many other major cities. According to the newspaper Jornal do Brasil, in Rio alone, more than 100,000 people took to the streets to protest rising bus fares and the lack of investment in urban infrastructure and education. The flash point for these protests that have been growing over the last few months was the increase in the cost of municipal transportation in various major cities, notable Florianópolis (capital of Santa Catarina state) were rioters have been setting fire to local buses all year, sometimes (albeit rarely) with people still on board. The deeper problems, however, relate to the country’s massive investment in the 2014 World Cup and the lingering irritation with a huge corruption scandal that unfolded during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, predecessor and political godfather to current president Rousseff.

Currently Brazil is hosting the Confederations Cup, a shake-down for next year’s World Cup which serves to both ramp up enthusiasm for the quadriannual sporting event and also to test infrastructure preparations in terms of transportation, lodging, security, and most importantly the stadiums themselves.  Even though the country already boasted major league soccer stadiums in every large city – and cities such as Rio, São Paulo and Porto Alegre each had several – all of the venues required significant retrofitting, and in some cases entirely new stadiums are being built. The hundreds of millions of dollars flowing from public coffers to cover these costs promise to provide significant returns as visitors flood the country in July of next year, and for Rio again in 2016 for the Olympics.  While the accepted wisdom may be that the investment will pay for itself in the short term and provide long-term benefits for the populace, the rash of ever more violent conflicts around the country demonstrate that the government sorely underestimated the level of resentment over corruption, exacerbated by a slowing economy and a renewed specter of inflation. According to the newspaper Zero Hora, a new poll released by the National Confederation of Industry together with the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Confederação Nacional da Indústria-CNI, and Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística-Ibope), President Rousseff’s approval rating fell another 8% since March. Moreover, the percentage of people who consider her administration bad or terrible grew from 7% to 13% in the same period. The irony of Rousseff’s position is not lost on the people of Brazil, especially among those who traditionally were the strongest supporters of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT). In the 1960s and into the 1970s, Rousseff was part of Marxist urban guerrilla groups that engaged in armed conflict in opposition to the oppressive military regime. Now as president she is ultimately responsible for the policing of the present day activists and protesters, in essence the one commanding the force that pepper sprayed the unarmed woman in the Times photo. Moreover, Rousseff’s rise to the presidency was a direct result of the corruption scandal under Lula’s watch which toppled his Chief of Staff José Dirceu. Until that happened, Dirceu was Lula’s political heir apparent, and Rousseff not only filled his cabinet position but also assumed the role as Lula’s chosen successor. To date, none of the politicians found guilty in connection with the "Mensalão" corruption scandal has served time in prison.

In soccer, the Brazilian national team needs a strong showing in the Confederations Cup to boost public morale and player confidence. Indeed, anything short of total victory will be viewed as a significant disappointment. Politically, Rousseff needs a quick win to control the protesters not only to ensure the success of this Cup and the next, but also to bolster her own agenda. Her harshest critics are openly questioning if Rousseff will be able to govern effectively if/when the popular manifestations die down. When introduced by FIFA president Sepp Blatter to officially open the Confederations Cup on Saturday, Rousseff was soundly booed by the tens of thousands filling Maracanã Stadium. The Times article compares what is happening in Brazil to what has happened in Turkey and other Arab countries where seemingly local protests quickly exploded into large-scale national uprisings. While the comparison seems far-fetched, given that even the most violent of these Brazilian protests do not include armies of citizens aiming guns at government troops, the parallels are worth considering. The article does emphasize the difference of Rousseff’s approach: today she officially changed tactics and praised the manifestations as signs of Brazil’s strong democracy. She is right. Some 45 years ago the people would not have even had the right to protest and the troops would have responded with bullets rather than pepper spray, but if Rousseff cannot successfully co-opt and appease – as she is trying to do – the wide range of people taking to the streets, she could end up out of the game. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/americas/brazilian-leaders-brace-for-more-protests.html?smid=pl-share

Disenchantment with Lula

In 1982, the late historian Robert Levine¹ gave an informal address to a group of American college students attending the University of São Paulo in Brazil. He made a statement that did not go over well with most of the politically engagé students assembled. In referring to the entrenched corruption of both civil and official societies, Levine commented that it didn't matter who was the president since the bureaucracies and practices of daily life would remain the same. He concluded that you could have Lula² or Maluf³ as president and nothing would change. The underlying issue as identified by Levine was the need for reform in the very fabric of society.

It is often said that in Brazil there are two ways to accomplish any task, the official way and the unofficial way or “jeitinho.” Some scholars have postulated that the (in)famous “jeitinho” developed as a necessity because of the immense, and at times contradictory, bureaucracies that can bring to a halt almost any interaction with official organs. The need for society to function leads to extra-official practices enacted by functionaries who deal directly with those seeking resolution.  Obviously, the very nature of these arrangements lead to corruption, sometimes softer – such as a donation to the “coffee fund” (pagar o cafezinho) or the “tip box” (caixinha dois) – and other times more blatant and abusive. A major problem is the wide-spread acceptance of the practice as a simple fact of life and cost of doing business in Brazil. This reality is so entrenched in Brazil that some U.S. businesses found themselves unable to do business in Brazil without violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, which prohibit the bribing of foreign officials.

Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva was a founder of the Brazilian Workers’ Party or PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in 1980 when the last military president, João Figueiredo, abolished the prescriptive bipartisan political system and allowed for the organization of new parties under the “Political Opening” (Abertura Política). In addition to several elected offices, Lula ran for President of the Republic in 1989 and 1994, losing both times in the second round run-offs, first to Fernando Collor de Mello and later to Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Throughout his political career up to that point, Lula distinguished himself as a tireless union organizer and social reformer. The Workers’ Party, whose symbol is a red star, was the farthest left party legal in Brazil when it was formed, and its platform included policies of redistribution of wealth including agrarian reform. In the years prior to his eventual election as president, Lula was often portrayed even by his detractors as perhaps Brazil’s only “honest politician.” In preparing himself to run again in the 2002 elections, Lula adopted a significantly different public persona, opting for smartly tailored suits and trimmed beard in place of his signature casual shirt sleeves and bushier facial hair. One of his first moves was to meet with the powerful Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), the most significant industrial organization in the country and a long-time opponent of a Lula presidency. Lula assured these economic leaders that he would not threaten their hegemony and would maintain the economic policies of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Most of his hardcore supporters probably assumed that this was merely a ploy to get into office, the ends justifying the means. However, once elected Lula was good to his word largely left unmodified the policies that had led to the economic stability under Cardoso. This policy alienated some of his party’s staunchest vanguard and led to sharp criticism from within the political left. However, Lula’s overall popularity grew during his presidency, at one point achieving the highest ever approval ratings for a Brazilian president. In 2009, Barack Obama referred to Lula as "the most popular politician on Earth" during a G20 summit in London.

Nevertheless, in 2005 during Lula’s presidency a massive influence peddling scheme operated within the corridors of the National Congress. Known as the “mensalão”(more or less the big monthly allowance), suitcases full of money regularly were brought into congressional offices, somehow bypassing security stations. These were distributed across a broad spectrum of political offices under the supervision of Lula’s Chief of Staff, José Dirceu. Ultimately, after the scandal broke, numerous members of Lula’s cabinet and other office holders lost their jobs, some eventually being indicted. Reminiscent of the Watergate scandal in the U.S., the question that surfaced regarding the president was, “What did he know and when did he know it?” While Lula was never directly implicated in the corruption, with wry humor, the joke at the time was: The good news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs. The bad news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs.

Lula’s popularity remained high throughout his presidency, enough so to allow current president Dilma Rousseff to coat-tail into the presidency after filling Dirceu’s post at the end of Lula’s second term. In August 2007, 40 participants were indicted by Brazil’s Supreme Court, almost all political allies of Lula and the PT. The trial began five years later, and many of the defendants were convicted of various charges of corruption. José Dirceu and several others were convicted of bribery (corrupção ativa).  

Even though Lula has managed to maintain a certain distance from the proceedings, his legacy has been tainted by the detailed revelations that continue to surface stemming from the trials and their aftermath. The image that has gradually supplanted that of “the one honest politician” seems to be that of “just another politician.” Those who most ardently supported Lula, and in some cases the Workers’ Party itself, have grown steadily more disillusioned.

NOTES

1. Robert M. Levine (1941-2003) was a scholar of Latin American history with a special emphasis on Brazil. When he addressed the American students in 1982, he was visiting his long-time friend and fellow historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy, then the Director of the Interuniversity Study Program (ISP-USP). Years later when I was at Florida International University and Bob was at the University of Miami, he was surprised to have made such a remark, being a strong supporter of Lula’s various political activities.

2. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva (b. 1945) was president of Brazil from 2003-2010.

3. Paulo Salim Maluf (b. 1931) is a Brazilian politician who has held multiple state and national offices since getting appointed Mayor of the city of São Paulo in 1969, due to his personal connections to General Artur da Costa e Silva, the second military president. His appointment was made possible by the fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) of 12/13/68, that suspended most political and civil rights, recessed the national congress, and instituted direct control of political processes by the president and governors.  In 1982, Maluf was finishing his term as Governor of the state of São Paulo and demonstrated clear aspirations to the presidency. He was a candidate for the chief executive office in 1985, supported by the out-going military régime and thus expected to become Brazil’s first civilian president since the 1964 coup. However, in a surprising upset, Tancredo Neves won the indirect election held through the Electoral College.