Costa Rica Opts for the Third Party: Luis Guillermo Solís

On April 6, 2014, Costa Ricans elected Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) candidate Luis Guillermo Solís to be their new president, upsetting the order of a de facto two-party system that has dominated presidential politics for half a century. Founded in 1951 by José Figueres Ferrer after the conclusion of the civil war, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) has held the presidency for 38 out of the last 66 years, alternating with the Partido de Unidad Socialcristiana (PUSC) and its predecessors. Both of these parties are relatively centrist, especially as compared to the more extreme politics of other countries in the region, most notably Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Indeed, the political and social stability of Costa Rica constitutes the basis for the sustained economic advancement during the decades of regional turmoil. The lack of wide-spread violence and armed conflict over the past 30 to 40 years makes Costa Rica and Belize unique among a swath of countries ranging from Mexico through Central America, and south into Columbia, Venezuela, and Peru.

While externally and comparatively Costa Rican political platforms seem to differ only slightly – similar to the view many Latin Americans have of the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. – internally key individuals represent opposing positions on issues such as regional and hemispheric commercial cooperation and integration, especially alignment with U.S.-led initiatives. Oscar Arias has been the most dominant single political figure in Costa Rican politics since the mid-1980s. His first term as president (1986-1990) coincided with the various Central American wars that were both internal, partisan conflicts and proxy battles for the Cold War superpowers. Arias mediated the peace accords for the region’s civil wars, including between the Nicaraguan Contras and the Sandinistas, a feat that garnished him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. He remained the de facto leader of the PLN in the years ensuing his presidency. During this period, his personal influence came to define the party's identity, similar to the manner in which the traditional Latin American caudillos dominated political allegiance in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Arias's influence culminated in a constitutional amendment that opened the door to his re-election to the presidency in 2006. The conclusion of his second term in 2010 saw what some viewed as a virtual third term for Arias with the election of his Vice President Laura Chinchilla, Costa Rica’s first female head of state. 

Opponents to the “arismo” tilt of the PLN suggest that the long years in power have led to corruption and diminished transparency in the government. As a reaction to this apparent consolidation of influence and straying from the original platform of the PLN, various prominent political figures broke away from the party and formed the PAC, including Ottón Solís Fallas, Margarita Penón Góngora, and Alberto Cañas Escalante. The party’s surprisingly strong showing in the 2002 elections championing an anti-corruption platform led to disgruntled politicians from the PUSC and other parties also joining the PAC for the 2006 elections. The period from 2002 until the present has witnessed steady growth for the PAC in terms of congressional and municipal elections and percentages of votes in presidential elections. While to some extent the election of Solís to the presidency builds solidly upon the foundation constructed by the PAC over twelve years, it is nevertheless extremely noteworthy of his own political stature that Solís was able to break the bipartisan lock on the country’s highest office.

One can argue that the initial strength of the PAC as a political party stems from the established positions of its founding members within the PLN. This extends to the most recent elections: President-elect Luis Guillermo Solís was himself the Chief of Staff for the first Oscar Arias administration. At the same time, the PAC’s current platform reflects a notable shift away from the regional economic integration that was one of the cornerstones of the PLN’s policy in the 1990s and early 2000s, until regional and international economies contracted after the “Great Recession” in the U.S. and the corresponding ripple effect across international economies, especially in Europe.  Solís is in no way hostile towards the United States; indeed, he studied at Tulane and the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and was a visiting scholar and researcher at Florida International University in Miami. Nevertheless, he has a more moderated view of U.S. involvement in the region than many of his former PLN colleagues. This is not to say that he opposes strong economic and diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other market-driven economies. Bloomberg/Businessweek noted that the in-coming president took steps to reassure investors and the public as to the direction of his policy by selecting an economic team comprised of such established figures as economist and Vice President-elect Helio Fallas to be Finance Minister, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica Director Olivier Castro as central bank president, and Welmer Ramos as economy minister. These appointments are an attempt to counteract the continued loss of investor confidence during the presidency of Laura Chinchilla, in spite of improvements in unemployment during her administration. As Bloomberg/Businessweek reports: 

Moody’s Investors Service lowered its outlook on Costa Rica to negative from neutral in September, citing a rising debt burden and widening budget deficit. Moody’s rates the country Baa3, putting it in the same category as Turkey and Iceland.1

On a more positive note, on February 28, 2014, Standard and Poor’s affirmed Costa Rica’s sovereign credit rating as BB/B. They analysis emphasized the country’s overall stability and tradition of peaceful governmental transition. They point out the rising burden of debt and are cautious regarding the new administration’s ability to manage the economy with requisite agility given the fractured nature of the congress. This in itself reflects the same elements that helped Solís consolidate his candidacy and attain the presidency, especially the discontent with the PLN-led government since 2006. As a result, the PLN lost six congressional seats, now holding 18 out of 57; the PAC has 13, the Frente Amplio has nine, and the PUSC has eight. Solís will need to develop coalitions in the congress to enact his policies. For this, he will undoubtedly call upon his personal ability to connect with the individual lawmakers.

1. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-04-14/costa-rica-president-elect-names-economic-team-after-firings

Transparency & Freedom of Speech

The level of democracy of any regime can be measured to a great extend by the transparency of its institutions and the freedom of speech allowed to its citizenry. Some governments grant a wide array of expression with almost no restriction except in strictly defined cases of slander. Others also are very open but with more limitations based on “time, place and manner.” An example of this latter would be the prohibition on falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater, to paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. However, on the other end of the spectrum we encounter administrations that unabashedly squash any type of communication that they believe threaten themselves or the society they purport to represent. China’s current rigorous filtering of internet sites, especially those of social media, is a prime example. Numerous regimes have instituted quasi-Orwellian “thought police” to check what people communicate to one another using tactics such as wiretaps, screening of mail, censoring of all mass communications, and a vast array of informants whose objective was to report anti-governmental behavior. Germany’s “Hilter Youth” were educated to uphold a devotion to the State and the Führer over all else. As part of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, children were isolated from their parents for indoctrination that encouraged them to denounce their parents for counter-revolutionary attitudes.

Two interesting incidents occurred recently in Latin America that emphasize the different degrees to which supposedly democratic governments curtail freedom of expression. Earlier this month in Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, a 19 year-old man was cited for “contempt of authority” (desacato a autoridade) after posting angry comments on his Facebook page about the way he was treated by police in a car stop. Although the next day he apologized for his posting and admitted that he was driving with an expired license, the issue as raised by his public defender, Ana Carolina Dihl Cavalin, is the validity of Brazilian laws that violate the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, of which Brazil is a signatory.  In 2012, the Brazilian Senate revised the Penal Code changing “desacato a autoridade” from a crime in and of itself into an aggravating factor for cases of slander. The original slander law, written in 1940 during the Vargas regime, determined a sentence of from six months to one year of prison for the crime of slander. Under the new modification, the maximum sentence became from one to two years of prison for cases in which the slanderous statement is directed toward a public official. This includes police officers, judges, and any government official. A nuance of the law is that only offenses directed at a specific individual should be considered “in contempt”; in this case the accused directed his comments at the agency in general.

The Organization of American States actively opposes “desacato” laws throughout the hemisphere, based on the principle that “the American Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right of freedom of expression.”¹ The Office of the Special Rapporteur of the OAS has implemented a two-year cycle for reviewing the status of such limitations on freedom of expression. In 2011, that office published a special report indicating:

few countries have taken purposeful steps to abolish the crime of desacato. In some states, legislative reform processes have stalled or restrictive judicial interpretations have been adopted. In other countries, the interpretations of the courts have recognized the incompatibility of “desacato” with the due guarantees of freedom of expression; however, those decisions have not been echoed in legislative reforms. Nevertheless, while the successful abolition of desacato laws may not have been the norm in the Hemisphere, in those countries where it has come about, the elimination of this crime has entailed a very significant stride toward the creation of a favorable climate for the full exercise of freedom of expression.²

The report refers to Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, prepared by the Office of the Special Rapporteur and adopted in 2000 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which

clearly introduces the so-called dual system of protection of honor, according to which, public persons or private persons who have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased scrutiny on the part of society must be more tolerant of criticism, in order also to enable the social control necessary to ensure that the powers of government are exercised in an efficient and appropriate manner. The protection of a person’s honor in such cases should be invoked in a civil proceeding because a criminal sanction could impede the control of public office necessary in a democratic society. This principle also adopts the standard of the “actual malice” doctrine, which considers that civil penalties should be imposed on expressions about public officials and only when information is published in the knowledge that it is false, there is express intent to cause injury, or there is gross negligence in ascertaining the truth.³

The second recent incident that reflects on the lack of freedom of expression is a crack-down on dissent from the office of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. In recent weeks, Maduro has ordered the arrest and impending arrest of political opposition leaders who express criticism of Maduro’s administration. In February, Maduro issued orders for the incarceration of former presidential candidate Leopoldo López on charges of terrorism and murder stemming from confrontations between riot police and anti-Maduro activists that left several protesters dead. After initially hiding from federal officials, López turned himself in to authorities as the culmination of a rallying event he organized through YouTube and other social media.⁴ Then on March 19, 2014, the Los Angeles Times reported that national assembly member Maria Corina Machado is to be stripped of her legislative immunity and charged with criminal conspiracy, homicide, and treason for also publicly criticizing President Maduro.⁵ These two incidents and numerous other arrests of less prominent political figures and private individuals underscore the denial of freedom of expression that now exists in Venezuela.

Strong-arm governments have long used repressive tactics in attempts to stifle criticism from political opposition: the use of armed forces or police agencies to prevent the lawful assembly of critics, reliance on laws that systematically inhibit freedom of expression, manipulation of the means of communication including censorship and dissemination of false information, misrepresentation of critics as threats to the State, and a reliance on general political apathy on the part the populace at large.

Notes:

1. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI - ''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. B.1.5. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1

2. “Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression”: 7. Chapter VI - ''Desacato'' Laws and Criminal Defamation. A.2. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=442&lID=1

3. Cf. IACHR, Annual Report 2000. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II, App. B.

4. http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/americas/profile-leopoldo-lopez/

5. http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-venezuela-maduro-opposition-machado-20140319,0,6100430.story#axzz2wYIo7zTR

Learning Latin American Languages

A significant issue for students of Latin America is language proficiency. Primarily Spanish and Portuguese, but also Quechua, Guarani, and others are essential tools for communication in the region. Amidst the not-so-ivory towers of academia, faculty and administrators face difficult questions regarding what to include in graduate and undergraduate curricula, especially when needing to balance declining budgets and an ever-increasing body of knowledge and skill sets that they wish their students to master in completion of the program. In the field of Latin American Studies – as in other areas of study that are region-specific or transnational – foreign language instruction and/or competency can become an easy target for elimination. Ultimately, however, such a decision proves to be short-sighted, weakening the overall caliber of the program and the qualifications of those who emerge from it supposedly prepared to enter professional life.

Several years ago, I was among a group of professors advising a business school in the creation of an International MBA program. The core faculty had decided to eliminate any foreign language requirement in an attempt to streamline their course of study. In order to be competitive in the academic market, graduate programs – and especially MBAs – must be able to offer a package to prospective students that will not delay their progress toward degree completion. This is in addition to ensuring that their graduates will exit the program equipped with the necessary skills to succeed in their profession. The faculty explained that their justification for cutting out the foreign language requirement from their IMBA was that “everyone speaks English anyway.” I strongly disagreed with their reasoning, arguing that such a supposition will guarantee that their graduates will be less prepared and, perhaps more importantly, at a strategic disadvantage when in a business meeting or across a negotiating table. Their putative monolingual graduates would find themselves in situations in which their counter parts would understand everything the MBAs said but the MBAs would not be able to follow the asides in other languages.

Another common mistake made by ill-informed administrators or educators is that students can just pick up languages on the street. While many domestic, non-international students in places such as Miami, Los Angeles, and Austin do indeed possess a high degree of fluency in Spanish, Haitian Creole, and other languages, rarely does this reach a level of proficiency that could be categorized as academic or professional fluency. This is especially true in cultural settings where the “street language” exhibits significant informalities and grammatical errors. While these students certainly have an advantage over monolingual students who may attempt to learn a new language with no previous knowledge of it, especially in terms of the evident comfort with which the heritage speakers will transit into the “foreign” language, most still require more formal study to reach professional standards of communication. Ultimately, this is no different than monolingual English-speaking students who must learn language and writing skills in English from elementary school, through their secondary education, and on into college. Most institutions across the country require “Freshman English” competency. Normally, the institutions offer alternatives to passing the class, such as Advanced Placement scores, proficiency tests, or similar. Rather than eliminating foreign language competency requirements, programs that wish to thoroughly prepare their students could follow a parallel approach, utilizing acceptance of multiple measures in satisfying the program completion requirement.

International students coming from non-English speaking countries are not adversely affected by the exclusion of any foreign language requirement, since they frequently have an advantage of educated fluency in the language of the region. Similarly, they normally are not delayed in degree completion because of the presence of such a requirement since for them English itself is the foreign language and institutions like the University of California require the TOEFL exam for admission and accept it in fulfillment of their foreign language requirement. This is increasing significant as institutions of higher learning – especially public ones that rely on state funding – seek to offset budgetary reductions through augmented out-of-state fees.

Foreign language learning has ramifications well beyond the simply mastery of grammatical forms. Successful language instruction must include a deeper understanding of the culture in which the target language developed and persists. Being able to “speak the language” of another people entails more than an understanding of grammar and vocabulary. It means that one can grasp the nuances and connotations of the other speaker, and can appreciate why particular groups behave in a particular manner. This is as priceless in business as it is in diplomacy, and students thus prepared will succeed where others will fail.

Dictators II: Controllers and Collaborators

In my posting on 13 December 2013 [http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/12/latin-american-dictators.html], I commented on the execution of North Korean elder statesman and dictatorial uncle Jang Song Thaek. I related the dictatorship of Kim Jong Un to many similar egocentric and/or totalitarian regimes in history, making special mention of the numerous dictators who have subjugated regions of Latin America over the last couple of centuries, with special emphasis on the “desaparecidos” as an example of the utmost in dictatorial cowardice. Parallels also can be drawn between Kim Jong Un and leaders such as Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Fidel Castro, Idi Amin, “Papa Doc” Duvalier, and others. A commonality within this group is the role of a few individuals who helped enable the rise to power of the eventual dictator, and the much larger groups that actively or passively collaborated with oppressive regimes.

In the current case of North Korea, Jang Song Thaek presumably shored up his nephew’s bid for power under the assumption that he could control the frivolous, pampered dilettante and exercise true power behind the throne. In the tradition of Cardinal Wolsley’s fate, the puppet protégé eventually turned on his mentor and eliminated him. More often, however, dictators seize control of a country with the support of special interest groups who embrace the leader as a means to realize their own desires for control.  Frequently this elite sees the strong-arm practices of the totalitarian regime as a means to their own specific ends, usually a way of preserving their source of power. In some cases, once the supposed figurehead consolidates his authority, he moves to neutralize anyone who may pose a challenge to his administration.  In pre-Nazi Germany, Hitler rose to prominence through the support of the Brown Shirts (Sturmabteilung or “SA”). Once he procured the Chancellorship in 1933, Hitler began questioning the role of the SA and finally disempowered them through the “Blood Purge” of 1934. Stalin eliminated Trotsky and other old-school Bolsheviks in the “Great Purge.” Mao decimated the senior ranks of his Communist Party with the “Cultural Revolution.” By 1965, a Soviet-supported Castro freed himself of the ever-revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

In post-colonial Latin America, some totalitarian or corporativist governments have been backed by oligarchies comprised of large land owners and/or industrialists, while others emerged as populist. Among the 19^th-Century “caudillos,” Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina, Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia of Paraguay, and the numerous Brazilian “coronéis” derived their power from an almost feudal socio-political structure based on immense tracts of land and the cooperation among those who owned them. In the 20^th Century, Juan Domingo Perón and Getúlio Vargas defined modern populist dictatorships in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. These two leaders managed to appeal to the masses while still serving the interests of a select group of business, industry, and land owners. The general populous who supported them did not directly endorse secret police, torture, and the other trappings of a (quasi)dictatorial regime. Rather, they the sought to ensure an overall livelihood and economic standard that they felt would be well served by these particular leaders. In this they are quite distinct from the cynical and blatantly self-serving supporters who lined their own pockets at the expense of this very citizenry.

In situations resulting from a revolutionary rise to power, several kinds of collaborators stand out, as defined by the nature of their participation in or support of the new regime. Some are actual ideologues or members of the revolutionary body that activity participated in over-throwing the previous government and who benefit directly from the new order. Others are petty technocrats and bureaucrats without ideology or moral compass who readily embrace the “brave new world” as an automatic response to the presence of power. They seek power for power’s sake, and are prepared to “drink the Cool-Aid” if necessary in order to feed their addiction. Yet another group sins through omission by avoiding taking any position and thus winds up empowering the atrocities that extreme regimes commit. The Southern Cone countries of the 1960s and 1970s housed actual majorities that turned a blind eye to disappearances and torture, much like the German people under the Nazis who chose not to think about what fate befell their Jewish neighbors, albeit to a lesser degree in terms of the number of victims.

There is also a special group of unwitting collaborators: the “inocentes úteis” in Portuguese, or most often “useful idiots” in English. These are individuals who can be manipulated by the regime but are too naïve to realize what role they have been acquired. Frequently these people can believe that they are endorsing a noble goal, incapable of critically analyzing the political and ideological rhetoric that the regime spoon-feeds them. They often are self-righteous about the purpose of their actions, be it the implementation of a truly egalitarian socialist state, the consolidation of economic prosperity and industrial competitiveness for the nation, or the grand panacea of change and progress as in the 19^th Century’s positivist movements or the case of nationalist modernization under Vargas.

What is common to all of these groups is their capacity to ignore atrocities either by commission or omission. If confronted by the facts of abuses effectuated by the state or the specific leader, they chose not to believe them. Ultimately, no dictatorial regime could endure to make a mark in history without the tacit or explicit support of the majority.

Brazil Outlook 2014: Positive Opportunity for Foreign Direct Investment

As we enter 2014, there are a few givens regarding Brazil’s outlook for the new year. Partying across the nation will ramp up leading into Carnaval. The country will go crazy hosting the World Cup in June & July. The construction and remodeling of numerous soccer stadiums will be completed just barely in time, provoking much negative commentary from FIFA and other “soccer countries.” The renovations of infrastructure will not be fully completed. Airline ticket prices, hotel rates, restaurant costs and a plethora of other service areas will gouge every Dollar, Euro, Yen, etc. out of the multitude of tourists attending both events. There will be increased protests leading up to and during the international competition provoking much uneasiness among travelers and investors.

In my post from 15 August 2013 (“Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment”),¹ I looked at economic data from the first two quarters of the year and suggested a positive investment environment moving forward into 2014.  Last month (21 Jan 2014), Frederico Rosas and Carla Jiménez reported in the Spanish newspaper El País that Brazil remains one of the ten countries most attractive for foreign direct investment based on year-end economic indicators. They emphasized that Brazil’s situation remains strong in spite of the perhaps exaggerated pessimism surrounding the Brazilian economy due to concerns about a fall in its investment ranking.² On June 6, 2013, Standard & Poor’s revised its risk analysis for Brazil from “stable” to “negative” indicating: “Slow GDP growth and continued expansionary fiscal policy (including off-budget measures) risk weakening Brazil's financial profile and could, absent corrective measures, result in weaker fiscal performance and an increase in the government's debt burden.”³  The company’s press release indicated:

“The credit ratings on Brazil reflect its well-established political institutions, diversified economy, manageable levels of net external debt, and political commitment to policies that maintain economic stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebastian Briozzo. "The ratings also incorporate its relatively large government debt and refinancing needs." Moreover, they reflect the country's substantial demand for investment to improve its physical infrastructure, as well as structural impediments that contribute to low overall investment as a share of GDP (just above 18% in 2012) and constrain GDP growth potential.⁴

Nevertheless, Standard & Poor’s analysis affirmed Brazil’s investment ratings based on counterparty risk, political risk, monetary stability, and the country’s overall debt burden:

Local Currency: A-

Foreign Currency: BBB

Transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessments: A-

This affirmation probably reflects Brazil’s relatively steady albeit low GDP growth rates and its fairly stable inflation over the past two years, among other factors. Moreover, during the last two years, the exchange rate for the US dollar has remained strong, ranging from 1.8676-to-1 in January 2012, to 2.2118 in December 2013.

Table 1: Brazilian quarterly GDP growth, core inflation & US$ exchange rate, 2012-2013. Data source: Banco Central do Brasil, and http://www.tradingeconomics.com based on reports from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).

In their mapping of global risk, Marsh consultants in conjunction with Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics ranked Brazil as “medium”; among the BRICS group, the Marsh-Maplecroft study ranked only South Africa at the same level. It ranked China and India as “high” risk, and Russia as “extreme.” Their website explains: “The Political Risk (Dynamic) Index assesses risks that have the potential to undergo change and in particular to deteriorate rapidly. It is comprised of 30 political risk indices under the four themes of governance framework, political violence, business and macroeconomic risk and societal forced regime change risk.”⁵ The completeness of this analysis underscores the potential for positive returns in the Brazilian economic sphere. In spite of the still present fall-out from the Mensalão and other political scandals, Brazil’s national political arena remains relatively stable with President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings climbing slightly to 41% towards the end of 2013, after plummeting during the protests mid-year, according to Datafolha.⁶ There is no significant political violence or threat of popular uprisings that could threaten national security, and the economy remains relatively strong. While the Brazilian stock market BOVESPA is performing poorly, the US dollar’s consistently firm buying power favors foreign direct investment in the country.

1. http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/08/brazilian-protests-and-foreign-direct.html

2. http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2014/01/21/actualidad/1390262836_394451.html

3. http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245352730529

4. http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245352730529

5. http://usa.marsh.com/Portals/9/Documents/Political_Risk_Map_MARSH_MAPLECROFT_2014.pdf

6. http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaopublica/2013/12/1379486-41-aprovam-dilma-apoio-ainda-distante-do-cenario-pre-protestos.shtml

Peru x Chile: Struggle for the High Seas

The International Court of Justice in The Hague’s decision this week (01/27/14) regarding the maritime line of demarcation between Peruvian and Chilean waters generated high spirits in Lima and clenched teeth in Santiago. The Court’s findings actually balanced tradition – in the form of historical practices and signed treaties – with a perceived need to adjust to modern realities.

For the last few hundred years, the territorial waters recognized for the two countries have been in dispute, especially since the War of the Pacific (1879-84). Chile’s advances in that war also left Bolivia a landlocked nation. According to the Menas Border blog (www.menasborders.com), Chile considered the matter of the maritime border with Peru definitively settled after two treaties in 1952 and 1954 that addressed fishing rights in the Pacific Ocean. Chile claimed territorial waters along a latitudinal parallel originating at the established international land boundary. Peru claimed maritime territory along a south-westerly line extending from the international border essentially perpendicular and equidistant from their coastline.

http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/WO-AR133A_PERUC_G_20140127184204.jpg

The progressive nature of the decision attempts to address knowledge regarding the value of natural resources that did not exist at the time of the treaties, and conform to more recent traditions of equidistant maritime demarcation. Conversely, Chilean critics see the findings as undermining the necessary stability inherent in international accords, and lament the impending loss in revenue from fishing rights.

Importantly, Chile’s president, Sebastián Piñera, expressed his strong disagreement with the court’s finding but assured that Chile would abide by the ruling. This is no small development given the long history of the dispute. Writing for Reuters, Thomas Escritt and Rosalba O'Brien projected that the decision would ultimately strengthen relations between Chile and Peru, whose growing bilateral trade reached US$ 3 billion last year.¹ Robert Kozak and Ryan Dube reported in The Wall Street Journal that tensions have been higher lately, especially among Peruvians living in Chile. They cite Michael Shifter, president of U.S.-based think tank Inter-American Dialogue, who said, "The loss of quite a bit of ocean territory will not go down easily with many Chileans."² However, the article indicates that Shifter as well as analysts from the Eurasia Group do not believe that there will be lasting negative effects from the finding but tend to agree with the assessment that the settlement will lead to better economic stability.

The new demarcation line runs along the parallel recognized by Chile for 80 miles, and then veers southwest to the 200-mile boundary of international waters. This confusing arrangement transfers some 8,000 square miles from Chilean to Peruvian territory, nevertheless preserving much of the most strategic fishing regions for Chile. Ultimately, the court opted for a compromise between the two claims, reaching a settlement that the court clearly hopes will finally bring to a close the dispute. A century ago in Latin America a conflict like would have been resolved by armies and navies. The present outcome is indicative of the region’s political and economic development.

1. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-chile-peru-court-idUSBREA0Q1ER20140127

2. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303277704579346682451335434

Latin American Dictators

The recent execution of Jang Song Thaek (12/12/13) by his nephew, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, brought to mind the various ways in which ego-centric totalitarian leaders have sought to silence criticism throughout the ages, and especially the Latin American regimes of the 20^th Century. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of for Brazilian president João “Jango” Goulart and the 40^th anniversary of Pinochet’s coup d’etat underline this historical nadir.

New leaders always try to consolidate their power, be it a freshly minted CEO of a large corporation, the recently appointed director of a governmental agency, or a usurping monarch who won the crown on the field of battle. The less democratic the institution or the circumstances, the more ruthless these individuals tend to be in the elimination of dissenting voices. Stalin’s purges, Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” Elizabeth’s execution of Mary, Queen of Scots: all of these are examples of absolute power attacking others who may more or less legitimately oppose it, especially when said opposition may itself house some form of power-base, be it military, political, or moral authority.

The history of Latin America overflows with totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian regimes, from the first European monarchs, through the corporatist models of the mid-20^th Century such as Vargas and Peron, and including various military regimes throughout the region.  In some cases, dissenting voices were stifled by fiat: the government suspended rights of expression and assembly, utilizing strong-arm tactics to enforce the decrees. More hardline rulers also used fabricated and/or exaggerated charges of treason, similar to Kim Jong Un’s declarations regarding his uncle, as reported in CNN, describing him as a “traitor for all ages” who plotted to overthrow the dictator’s regime “by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods.” CNN quoted Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who described Jang Song Thaek’s arrest as “theatrical” and execution as “unprecedented.”¹

As obviously false and vile as these kangaroo court proceedings may be, the dictators of Latin America in the latter half of the 20^th Century developed an even more insidious mechanism for silencing critics who could potentially harm their credibility by casting the light of truth on their lies and abuses: the dissidents simply disappeared. The military regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, among others, disposed of inconvenient individuals in a manner that defined the ultimate lack of transparency. Friends, family and coworkers would not know the fate of a “disappeared person,” encountering stone walls when inquiring of police and other governmental agencies. Someone could leave for work one morning and never be heard from again. At places of employment, colleagues would find mysteriously vacant offices. At schools and universities, desks and lecterns would suddenly be empty without explanation. And adjacent to secret government installations, such as the “31 de Março” ranch in São Paulo² or the “300 Carlos” at the headquarters of the 13^th Infantry Battalion in Montevideo, clandestine cemeteries received the mutilated bodies of those “disappeared” who were tortured to death.³ Vast numbers of these individuals were erased from the face of the Earth by their own governments, gone without a trace. As 86-year old former coroner and director of the Brazilian Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto Médico Legal) under the military regime, Harry Shibata, declared, “Disappeared is disappeared.”⁴

The disappearance of hundreds of individuals under these Latin American dictatorships defines the extreme in cowardice. Afraid to operate under democratic institutions – sometimes regent in constitutions the very regimes purported to uphold – this practice lacked even the theatrical “transparency” of Kim Jong Un’s farce.  At the same time, it constituted an act of domestic terrorism, for a collateral intention was to strike such fear into the hearts of the general citizenry that further dissent would be dissuaded.  This facilitated the role of secret police. Like the infamous Gestapo of the Nazi regime, agents or informants could be lurking around the next corner, or at the next table. Others would be too terrified to speak out, since they, too, could simply disappear.

In the final analysis, the tactic of “disappearing” people demonstrated the actual impotence of those who practiced it. Unable to govern openly, incapable of leading their people honestly, too weak to build a democratic base for their governments, the self-serving tyrants chose deceit and violence in an attempt to cover up their own inadequacies.

1. www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-executed/index.html

2. http://www.apublica.org/2011/08/o-sitio-da-tortura/

3. www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Direitos-Humanos/Quartel-uruguaio-pode-abrigar-cemiterio-clandestina/5/1321

4. http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/legista-da-ditadura-promete-revelacoes-na-comissao-4946084