Friday, December 13, 2013

Latin American Dictators

The recent execution of Jang Song Thaek (12/12/13) by his nephew, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, brought to mind the various ways in which ego-centric totalitarian leaders have sought to silence criticism throughout the ages, and especially the Latin American regimes of the 20th Century. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of for Brazilian president João “Jango” Goulart and the 40th anniversary of Pinochet’s coup d’etat underline this historical nadir.

New leaders always try to consolidate their power, be it a freshly minted CEO of a large corporation, the recently appointed director of a governmental agency, or a usurping monarch who won the crown on the field of battle. The less democratic the institution or the circumstances, the more ruthless these individuals tend to be in the elimination of dissenting voices. Stalin’s purges, Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” Elizabeth’s execution of Mary, Queen of Scots: all of these are examples of absolute power attacking others who may more or less legitimately oppose it, especially when said opposition may itself house some form of power-base, be it military, political, or moral authority.

The history of Latin America overflows with totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian regimes, from the first European monarchs, through the corporatist models of the mid-20th Century such as Vargas and Peron, and including various military regimes throughout the region.  In some cases, dissenting voices were stifled by fiat: the government suspended rights of expression and assembly, utilizing strong-arm tactics to enforce the decrees. More hardline rulers also used fabricated and/or exaggerated charges of treason, similar to Kim Jong Un’s declarations regarding his uncle, as reported in CNN, describing him as a “traitor for all ages” who plotted to overthrow the dictator’s regime “by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods.” CNN quoted Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who described Jang Song Thaek’s arrest as “theatrical” and execution as “unprecedented.”1

As obviously false and vile as these kangaroo court proceedings may be, the dictators of Latin America in the latter half of the 20th Century developed an even more insidious mechanism for silencing critics who could potentially harm their credibility by casting the light of truth on their lies and abuses: the dissidents simply disappeared. The military regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, among others, disposed of inconvenient individuals in a manner that defined the ultimate lack of transparency. Friends, family and coworkers would not know the fate of a “disappeared person,” encountering stone walls when inquiring of police and other governmental agencies. Someone could leave for work one morning and never be heard from again. At places of employment, colleagues would find mysteriously vacant offices. At schools and universities, desks and lecterns would suddenly be empty without explanation. And adjacent to secret government installations, such as the “31 de Março” ranch in São Paulo2 or the “300 Carlos” at the headquarters of the 13th Infantry Battalion in Montevideo, clandestine cemeteries received the mutilated bodies of those “disappeared” who were tortured to death.3 Vast numbers of these individuals were erased from the face of the Earth by their own governments, gone without a trace. As 86-year old former coroner and director of the Brazilian Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto Médico Legal) under the military regime, Harry Shibata, declared, “Disappeared is disappeared.”4

The disappearance of hundreds of individuals under these Latin American dictatorships defines the extreme in cowardice. Afraid to operate under democratic institutions – sometimes regent in constitutions the very regimes purported to uphold – this practice lacked even the theatrical “transparency” of Kim Jong Un’s farce.  At the same time, it constituted an act of domestic terrorism, for a collateral intention was to strike such fear into the hearts of the general citizenry that further dissent would be dissuaded.  This facilitated the role of secret police. Like the infamous Gestapo of the Nazi regime, agents or informants could be lurking around the next corner, or at the next table. Others would be too terrified to speak out, since they, too, could simply disappear.

In the final analysis, the tactic of “disappearing” people demonstrated the actual impotence of those who practiced it. Unable to govern openly, incapable of leading their people honestly, too weak to build a democratic base for their governments, the self-serving tyrants chose deceit and violence in an attempt to cover up their own inadequacies.



Thursday, August 15, 2013

Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment

During the first two quarters of 2013, increasing, persistent social unrest in Brazil has negatively impacted retail sales as indicated by data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the official organ for economic statistical data (Table 1). 
Table 1. Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/
According to the Jornal do Brasil, the Central Bank’s Index of Economic Activity (IBC-Br) grew 1.13% in June compared to May.1 However, overall the second quarter closed with a grow rate of 0.89% as compared to the previous period. This is a slowing trend in relation to the last quarter of 2012, which registered a growth rate of 1.1%. The IBC-Br index is considered a prime indicator of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has steadily declined since reaching a high of 9.3% YOY in March 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp-growth-annual

Not surprisingly, the US dollar has strengthened over the same period, with a noticeable acceleration in June. By the end of the second quarter, the dollar reached R$ 2.25 (Table 3), with the trend continuing into August. By 15 Aug 2013, the dollar surpassed R$2.35, marking the greatest gain since March 2009.  The increased buying power of the dollar could benefit foreign direct investments in the Brazilian economy in areas that present the potential for stable growth, such as agriculture which grew 17 percent in the first quarter of 2013, supported by a strong harvest of soy (+23%), corn (+9.1%), tobacco (+5.7%) and rice (+5.1%).2

Table 3. Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/port/ptaxnpesq.asp?id=txcotacao

It is important to note that the social and political instability in Brazil does not necessarily indicate a troubled economy in the long term. As Evodio Kaltenecker correctly points out, this is not a parallel to the Arab spring, but rather the manifestation of a series of unresolved issues: “Lack of trust in government institutions, high levels of corruption, low quality of state-provided services, high living & transportation costs, increase of inflation, runaway costs of 2014 World Cup.”3 These underlying frustrations have brought individuals out into the streets in a rather amorphous mass lacking any over-arching organization or leadership. The cost of public transportation was a flash-point, and the recent Confederations Cup hosted by Brazil fueled criticism of the massive spending of public funds on World Cup preparation,4 but the demands call for reformation rather than revolution. These stem from what James Hunter deems moral and practical dissatisfaction.5 The former reflects the outrage fired by such things as the “Mensalão” corruption trials that seemed to allow most of the guilty parties to escape punishment. The latter stems from such things as disproportionately high prices, high taxes, and faulty services including health care, education and transportation.

While the Brazilian unrest coupled with the slowing economic growth certainly will taint foreign direct investment over the short term, the current situation should not significantly destabilize Brazil’s economy assuming the government avoids exacerbating the circumstances. So far, President Dilma Rousseff has responded to the protests in an innocuous if confusing manner by calling for a plebiscite not demanded by protesters, pushing to repeal the hike in municipal bus fees that set off much of the agitation, and promoting a polemic program to recruit foreign physicians to work in under-served communities.  The 2014 World Cup will likely stir further contention, but in true “panen et circenses” fashion it will also generate significant revenue as well as popular excitement and goodwill, especially if Brazil wins the competition.








Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Violence in the Stadiums

Under the subtitle “The End of Civility,” yesterday’s (07/30/13) edition of the Brazilian newspaper Zero Hora1 featured an article about a recent decision to eliminate the divided stadium sections for rival teams’ fans. Traditionally, when the cross-town adversaries Grêmio Foot-Ball Porto Alegrense and Sport Club Internacional (frequently referred to as simply Grêmio and Inter) face off, officials segregate fans into clearly demarcated and fenced-off sectors of whichever stadium they are using. This segregation, which extends to entries and exits, is designed to avoid physical confrontations between rival fans. Similar measures exist at numerous professional sporting venues around the country. At first glance, the desegregation may appear to be a positive development towards a more amicable coexistence among all those in the stands. However, the case is exactly the opposite: local police have acknowledged their inability to guarantee the safety of the opposing team fans in and around the stadium for Sunday’s “Gre-Nal” between the two teams.

Violence in sports venues obviously is not limited to Brazilian soccer matches. The most notorious disaster in the soccer world took place during the Liverpool vs. Juventus match for the 1985 European Cup final at Heysel Stadiumin in Brussels. Thirty nine people died and over 600 were injured which led to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) imposing a five-year ban on English teams participating in any of the three European competitions.2 Even with other sports in “fan friendly” venues, violence can erupt as it did on baseball’s opening day 2011 for San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow who just now in 2013 returned home after two years in treatment for massive injuries leading to brain damage sustained in a beating by locals at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles.3 Dodger Stadium had long been known as a family-friendly, sportsmanlike venue, and in the aftermath of the senseless beating police and stadium security presence has intensified visibly. Nevertheless, the persistent violence at Brazilian professional soccer stadiums is a growing concern, especially when the police “throw in the towel” (to mix sports metaphors).

The Zero Hora article cites Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda, professor of the School of Social Science at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, one of the most prestigious institutions in Brazil. He points out that while the police have become the sole arbiters of public safety, the violence associated with soccer matches is a much more complex phenomenon that includes other societal factors. Many of the contributing elements parallel the rise of gang violence and begin far from the stadiums and the matches. The incidents that are occurring within the walls of the stadiums demonstrate a breakdown of extramural civil society, ranging from impoverished home life through precarious education, and extending into the relationship between the general populace and governmental authority. In a “civilized” community, it is absurd that the violence inside a sporting location should be so great that police and stadium security cannot readily control it, given that it is not a one-time aberration but rather a constant.


There is no question that the vast majority of fans attending soccer games in Brazil are not participants in the turmoil. Almost everyone comes for the pleasure of watching a match and supporting their team. The few, however, who do engage in the attacks can be savage toward rival fans, and even toward other organized groups of fans for their own teams. It is imperative that Brazilian authorities find the means to restore peace to the soccer pitches prior to next year’s World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.




Friday, July 19, 2013

Snowden, Espionage, Human Rights, and U.S.-Latin American Relations

In the July 12 edition of the Los Angeles Times, Tracy Wilkinson begins with an extremely apropos reference to an iconographic scene from “Casablanca”: “Mexicans are shocked — shocked! — to learn that their American neighbors have been spying on them. What’s more, the Americans have been helping the Mexican government become better at spying!” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-snowden-20130712,0,5645423.story).  Politicians from throughout the hemisphere are expressing outrage over the alleged infringement of their sovereign nations. From Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto to Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, heads of state are concerned, distressed, insulted and demanding clarification. Americans themselves are disturbed and irate over news of widespread interception of personal communications; in Latin America Snowden’s revelations are a black eye in the face of Barack Obama’s efforts in U.S.-Latin American relations, evoking regional criticisms that echo the strained times of purported CIA-supported dictatorships, coups and assassinations. Of course, just as Captain Renault was shocked to find gambling going on, no one is genuinely surprised by eavesdropping, surveillance and spying being carried out by Americans and numerous others. Every major country in the world maintains intelligence agencies and almost all embassies and consulates include an intelligence officer.  The tacit understanding is that you are not supposed to be too overt or too aggressive with your allies, and by all means you should avoid being discovered. Allies spying on their friends is an international embarrassment for all parties and creates significant political problems for the politicians of the countries being watched as much as for those who ordered the watching. Nobody wants such incidents to come to light. Just ask Peña Nieto whose predecessor and political ally Felipe Calderón cozied up U.S. intelligence services.

What Edward Snowden has done spits in the face of the diplomatic niceties of the various foreign services around the world. In The United States prior to the 1960s and in many countries to this day, Snowden’s actions would constitute high treason punishable by death. But every traitor is a valuable asset to another party, and right now Snowden represents enough potential information that any foreign government would willingly stick its neck out to reap the benefits.  Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Nicolás Madura would be overjoyed to parade Snowden down the streets of La Paz or Caracas as a massive black-eye in the face of their ideological enemy, the United States. For them the benefits would be both symbolic and real. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and even Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on the other hand, would be equally pleased but significantly more wary of overt involvement with Snowden. While Snowden assuredly would like to escape from the transit area of Sheremetyevo International Airport and enjoy the hospitality of President Morales, for the time being he remains a man without a country in that he cannot return home, U.S. pressure prevents him from easily traveling to many countries, and many others cannot afford the consequences of aiding and abetting America’s de facto public enemy #1. This is the case for Rousseff who has pursued a global economic policy that can only benefit from positive relations with the United States. And while Morales might be preparing his guest suite, the Bolivian president himself could not fly home from a recent meeting in Russia without his plane being diverted to Vienna by countries not wanting to act against the interests of the United States. Léo Gerchmann of the Brazilian News agency RBS reports that Snowden acknowledged the current impossibility of traveling to Venezuela in a meeting with representatives from Human Rights Watch (http://www.clicrbs.com.br/anoticia/jsp/default2.jsp?uf=2&local=18&source=a4199059.xml&template=4187.dwt&edition=22344&section=1485).

Russia is attempting a delicate balancing act. Sergei Loiko of the Los Angeles Times reports, “The meeting with Snowden also put organizations that regularly accuse the Russian government of human rights abuses in the position of being asked to serve as intermediary to the Kremlin on his behalf.” At the same time, Putin understands the hand he has been dealt.  As Alexander Ryklin, editor of the online Daily Journal,Putin may dislike and even despise him for what he is, a traitor in his eyes, but he won't let Snowden out of his hands"
Denis Dyomkin and Alexei Anishchuk of Reuters state that “Putin has used the case of Snowden to accuse the United States of preaching to the world about rights and freedoms it does not uphold at home(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-usa-security-snowden-russia-idUSBRE96F0I020130717). Nevertheless, for Putin as for any leader, assuming the role of human rights supporter for Snowden could appear hypocritical: How can a country embrace a fugitive as a human rights activist when their own record in the area is being called into question? Maduro, Morales and company should also take note.

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Judiciary vs. Executive: Bureaucratic Legacy from the Boate Kiss Fire

The administrative offices for the state of Rio Grande do Sul were shut down yesterday (Tuesday, 07/09/13) by judicial decree issued by Justice Hilbert Maximiliano Akihito Obara (5ª Vara da Fazenda Pública do Foro Central). The interdiction of the Fernando Ferrari Administrative Center, in the capital city of Porto Alegre, resulted from a review of public safety documents required for occupation of and public access to the building. All such structures are required to maintain a current “Plan for Protection and Prevention Against Fires” (PPCI). In the aftermath of the horrific blaze at the Kiss nightclub that massacred 242 young patrons (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/05/boate-kiss-and-brazilian-public-policy.html), the governments of Brazil as a whole and of Rio Grande do Sul in particular have taken great pains to demonstrate their dedication to fire prevention and safety in public venues.

The reaction from the state house, Palácio Piratini, was to ignore the interdiction and open for business as usual today (Wednesday, 07/10/13). After all, how can the State conduct its business if its primary administrative offices are closed? How can the very PPCI documents required by Justice Obara be processed if the Judiciary effectively shut down the Executive branch’s daily operations? The Executive’s decision to ignore the court order and open the doors of the Administrative Center spurred major labor unions to organize a protest against allegedly unsafe working conditions in the building since the documents were not up to date. This led to confrontations between the union representatives and government workers who reported to duty only to find the doors blocked by union personnel. Tensions escalated when ordinary citizens began to arrive to conduct their business, including receipt of state-supported medications for needy individuals. Eventually the State rolled out the riot police, and the protesters declared that their planned time period was completed. Right when conditions appeared to be heading toward normalcy, a substantial group of university students arrived to co-opt the protest for purposes of the large-scale manifestations that have been disrupting the country in recent months (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/06/brazilian-protests-and-confederations.html). However, at the end of the day, Justice Obara’s decision was overturned by the State’s higher court, Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul (TJ-RS). This court ruled that content of the fire safety documents was complete, and that the State’s primary administrative office was in compliance.


This apparent antagonism between the Judiciary and the Executive branches of the Rio Grande do Sul government demonstrates the extent to which the tragedy has brought to light the failures in public safety and policy. All levels of government are scrambling to cover their political assets. All of this takes place against a backdrop of continuing, heterogeneous social unrest. The posturing and bickering of branches of the government would be comical if they did not have such an impact on the functioning of the State.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Brazilian Protests and the Confederations Cup

Above the fold on the front page of today’s (06/19/13) hardcopy New York Times a large photograph shows a Brazilian police officer dousing a protestor’s face in pepper spray from barely over a foot away [permalink to the online Times article below]. The unarmed and seemingly unthreatening protester is cringing and raising her hand in a vain attempt to cover her face as the officer in riot gear soaks her in enough spray to drip down her neck. This is the kind of image that undoubtedly interferes with the sleep of President Dilma Rousseff, herself a former urban guerrilla who decades ago most likely would have been on the receiving end of such governmental shows of strength. Tens of thousands of similar episodes took place across the country today, mostly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but also in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and especially national capital Brasília, along with many other major cities. According to the newspaper Jornal do Brasil, in Rio alone, more than 100,000 people took to the streets to protest rising bus fares and the lack of investment in urban infrastructure and education. The flash point for these protests that have been growing over the last few months was the increase in the cost of municipal transportation in various major cities, notable Florianópolis (capital of Santa Catarina state) were rioters have been setting fire to local buses all year, sometimes (albeit rarely) with people still on board. The deeper problems, however, relate to the country’s massive investment in the 2014 World Cup and the lingering irritation with a huge corruption scandal that unfolded during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, predecessor and political godfather to current president Rousseff.

Currently Brazil is hosting the Confederations Cup, a shake-down for next year’s World Cup which serves to both ramp up enthusiasm for the quadriannual sporting event and also to test infrastructure preparations in terms of transportation, lodging, security, and most importantly the stadiums themselves.  Even though the country already boasted major league soccer stadiums in every large city – and cities such as Rio, São Paulo and Porto Alegre each had several – all of the venues required significant retrofitting, and in some cases entirely new stadiums are being built. The hundreds of millions of dollars flowing from public coffers to cover these costs promise to provide significant returns as visitors flood the country in July of next year, and for Rio again in 2016 for the Olympics.  While the accepted wisdom may be that the investment will pay for itself in the short term and provide long-term benefits for the populace, the rash of ever more violent conflicts around the country demonstrate that the government sorely underestimated the level of resentment over corruption, exacerbated by a slowing economy and a renewed specter of inflation. According to the newspaper Zero Hora, a new poll released by the National Confederation of Industry together with the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Confederação Nacional da Indústria-CNI, and Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística-Ibope), President Rousseff’s approval rating fell another 8% since March. Moreover, the percentage of people who consider her administration bad or terrible grew from 7% to 13% in the same period. The irony of Rousseff’s position is not lost on the people of Brazil, especially among those who traditionally were the strongest supporters of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT). In the 1960s and into the 1970s, Rousseff was part of Marxist urban guerrilla groups that engaged in armed conflict in opposition to the oppressive military regime. Now as president she is ultimately responsible for the policing of the present day activists and protesters, in essence the one commanding the force that pepper sprayed the unarmed woman in the Times photo. Moreover, Rousseff’s rise to the presidency was a direct result of the corruption scandal under Lula’s watch which toppled his Chief of Staff José Dirceu. Until that happened, Dirceu was Lula’s political heir apparent, and Rousseff not only filled his cabinet position but also assumed the role as Lula’s chosen successor. To date, none of the politicians found guilty in connection with the "Mensalão" corruption scandal has served time in prison.

In soccer, the Brazilian national team needs a strong showing in the Confederations Cup to boost public morale and player confidence. Indeed, anything short of total victory will be viewed as a significant disappointment. Politically, Rousseff needs a quick win to control the protesters not only to ensure the success of this Cup and the next, but also to bolster her own agenda. Her harshest critics are openly questioning if Rousseff will be able to govern effectively if/when the popular manifestations die down. When introduced by FIFA president Sepp Blatter to officially open the Confederations Cup on Saturday, Rousseff was soundly booed by the tens of thousands filling Maracanã Stadium. The Times article compares what is happening in Brazil to what has happened in Turkey and other Arab countries where seemingly local protests quickly exploded into large-scale national uprisings. While the comparison seems far-fetched, given that even the most violent of these Brazilian protests do not include armies of citizens aiming guns at government troops, the parallels are worth considering. The article does emphasize the difference of Rousseff’s approach: today she officially changed tactics and praised the manifestations as signs of Brazil’s strong democracy. She is right. Some 45 years ago the people would not have even had the right to protest and the troops would have responded with bullets rather than pepper spray, but if Rousseff cannot successfully co-opt and appease – as she is trying to do – the wide range of people taking to the streets, she could end up out of the game. 



Monday, May 27, 2013

“Boate Kiss” and Brazilian Public Policy


In the classic Hollywood film “Casablanca,” the character Vichy Captain Louis Renault (played by Claude Rains) is given a directive from his Nazi overseers to find an excuse to shut down "Rick's Café Américain" run by Humphrey Bogart’s character Rick Blaine. Captain Renault announces, “I am shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.” Immediately after this announcement, Rick’s croupier hands Renault a stack of money: “Your winnings, sir.” As this scene demonstrates, the character of Captain Renault is designed to epitomize hypocrisy and bureaucracy as a condemnation of the collaboratist Vichy régime.

In the early morning hours of January 27, 2013, a fire broke out in the nightclub “Kiss” in the southern Brazilian town of Santa Maria. The death toll was 242, with another 116 injured, many of them seriously. Almost every victim was in their late teens or early twenties. The deaths resulted from horribly inadequate infrastructure, including a single entry/exit point, no emergency exits and barred windows that condemned many of the youth to a charred death in the restrooms as they tried to flee the inferno. The tragedy affected every family in this town of 262,000 inhabitants, and traumatized the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Repercussions rippled throughout the country. It was the third largest number of deaths in a nightclub in world history, and was eerily similar to the 2003 fire in the Station nightclub in Rhode Island in which 100 people died, and the República Cromañón nightclub fire in Buenos Aires that killed 194 people in 2004. In all three cases, indoor pyrotechnics, over-crowding, and inadequate evacuation escalated the loss.

In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, local and state governments quickly raised the alarm about public safety in bars, nightclubs, and similar venues. Government officials were shocked, shocked to find that the vast majority of these establishments were functioning without conforming to fire and public safety codes. In the state capital of Porto Alegre, approximately 46 out of 50 registered night spots were shut down in the weeks after the fire due to noncompliance with the codes governing the operation of public establishments. In Santa Maria it was discovered that Fire officials knew of the noncompliance at “Kiss” yet for some reason the venue not only remained open but was allowed to regularly host musical acts that included indoor pyrotechnics. The venue’s official capacity was 691 persons, yet normally – and on the night of the tragedy – between 1,000 and 1,500 people were admitted.

While there was clear negligence on the part of the establishment’s owners, the greater breakdown was on the part of Brazil’s de facto public policy that accepts legal infractions as regular practice. Public officials in Santa Maria were aware of the overcrowding; some officials’ own children frequented the trendy club, and some died. Fire officials were aware of the bolted emergency exits, barred windows, and restricted main entry. From July 31, 2009, until the night of the fire, the nightclub operated continually under improper conditions, yet public officials never fully enforced regulations. The club was even ordered shut down, but the order was never carried out. Instead, the establishment was fined four times. The amount of the fines obviously was all but meaningless in face of the huge profits, another element in the inadequacy of public policy. For such measures to be effective, the value must be significant enough to deter infraction and not simply a small part of the cost of doing business. Similarly, there must be real enforcement of regulations, especially in areas of public safety.

Today marks the four-month anniversary of the tragedy. In this time, many actions have been taken at the local, state and national levels. Major reviews of operating licenses have revealed similar defects throughout the country; in the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, only 5% of the 209 registered nightclubs conformed to fire safety codes. Commissions, investigations, and hearings have emerged across Brazil. Yet all of this will be meaningless unless followed by an actual change in how the people and the government perceive and act on issues of public safety. Conditions at the “Boate Kiss” were no secret, yet for three and a half years government officials allowed the nightclub to operate as a deathtrap.