Friday, December 13, 2013

Latin American Dictators

The recent execution of Jang Song Thaek (12/12/13) by his nephew, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, brought to mind the various ways in which ego-centric totalitarian leaders have sought to silence criticism throughout the ages, and especially the Latin American regimes of the 20th Century. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of for Brazilian president João “Jango” Goulart and the 40th anniversary of Pinochet’s coup d’etat underline this historical nadir.

New leaders always try to consolidate their power, be it a freshly minted CEO of a large corporation, the recently appointed director of a governmental agency, or a usurping monarch who won the crown on the field of battle. The less democratic the institution or the circumstances, the more ruthless these individuals tend to be in the elimination of dissenting voices. Stalin’s purges, Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” Elizabeth’s execution of Mary, Queen of Scots: all of these are examples of absolute power attacking others who may more or less legitimately oppose it, especially when said opposition may itself house some form of power-base, be it military, political, or moral authority.

The history of Latin America overflows with totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian regimes, from the first European monarchs, through the corporatist models of the mid-20th Century such as Vargas and Peron, and including various military regimes throughout the region.  In some cases, dissenting voices were stifled by fiat: the government suspended rights of expression and assembly, utilizing strong-arm tactics to enforce the decrees. More hardline rulers also used fabricated and/or exaggerated charges of treason, similar to Kim Jong Un’s declarations regarding his uncle, as reported in CNN, describing him as a “traitor for all ages” who plotted to overthrow the dictator’s regime “by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods.” CNN quoted Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who described Jang Song Thaek’s arrest as “theatrical” and execution as “unprecedented.”1

As obviously false and vile as these kangaroo court proceedings may be, the dictators of Latin America in the latter half of the 20th Century developed an even more insidious mechanism for silencing critics who could potentially harm their credibility by casting the light of truth on their lies and abuses: the dissidents simply disappeared. The military regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, among others, disposed of inconvenient individuals in a manner that defined the ultimate lack of transparency. Friends, family and coworkers would not know the fate of a “disappeared person,” encountering stone walls when inquiring of police and other governmental agencies. Someone could leave for work one morning and never be heard from again. At places of employment, colleagues would find mysteriously vacant offices. At schools and universities, desks and lecterns would suddenly be empty without explanation. And adjacent to secret government installations, such as the “31 de Março” ranch in São Paulo2 or the “300 Carlos” at the headquarters of the 13th Infantry Battalion in Montevideo, clandestine cemeteries received the mutilated bodies of those “disappeared” who were tortured to death.3 Vast numbers of these individuals were erased from the face of the Earth by their own governments, gone without a trace. As 86-year old former coroner and director of the Brazilian Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto Médico Legal) under the military regime, Harry Shibata, declared, “Disappeared is disappeared.”4

The disappearance of hundreds of individuals under these Latin American dictatorships defines the extreme in cowardice. Afraid to operate under democratic institutions – sometimes regent in constitutions the very regimes purported to uphold – this practice lacked even the theatrical “transparency” of Kim Jong Un’s farce.  At the same time, it constituted an act of domestic terrorism, for a collateral intention was to strike such fear into the hearts of the general citizenry that further dissent would be dissuaded.  This facilitated the role of secret police. Like the infamous Gestapo of the Nazi regime, agents or informants could be lurking around the next corner, or at the next table. Others would be too terrified to speak out, since they, too, could simply disappear.

In the final analysis, the tactic of “disappearing” people demonstrated the actual impotence of those who practiced it. Unable to govern openly, incapable of leading their people honestly, too weak to build a democratic base for their governments, the self-serving tyrants chose deceit and violence in an attempt to cover up their own inadequacies.



Thursday, August 15, 2013

Brazilian Protests and Foreign Direct Investment

During the first two quarters of 2013, increasing, persistent social unrest in Brazil has negatively impacted retail sales as indicated by data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the official organ for economic statistical data (Table 1). 
Table 1. Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/
According to the Jornal do Brasil, the Central Bank’s Index of Economic Activity (IBC-Br) grew 1.13% in June compared to May.1 However, overall the second quarter closed with a grow rate of 0.89% as compared to the previous period. This is a slowing trend in relation to the last quarter of 2012, which registered a growth rate of 1.1%. The IBC-Br index is considered a prime indicator of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has steadily declined since reaching a high of 9.3% YOY in March 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp-growth-annual

Not surprisingly, the US dollar has strengthened over the same period, with a noticeable acceleration in June. By the end of the second quarter, the dollar reached R$ 2.25 (Table 3), with the trend continuing into August. By 15 Aug 2013, the dollar surpassed R$2.35, marking the greatest gain since March 2009.  The increased buying power of the dollar could benefit foreign direct investments in the Brazilian economy in areas that present the potential for stable growth, such as agriculture which grew 17 percent in the first quarter of 2013, supported by a strong harvest of soy (+23%), corn (+9.1%), tobacco (+5.7%) and rice (+5.1%).2

Table 3. Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/port/ptaxnpesq.asp?id=txcotacao

It is important to note that the social and political instability in Brazil does not necessarily indicate a troubled economy in the long term. As Evodio Kaltenecker correctly points out, this is not a parallel to the Arab spring, but rather the manifestation of a series of unresolved issues: “Lack of trust in government institutions, high levels of corruption, low quality of state-provided services, high living & transportation costs, increase of inflation, runaway costs of 2014 World Cup.”3 These underlying frustrations have brought individuals out into the streets in a rather amorphous mass lacking any over-arching organization or leadership. The cost of public transportation was a flash-point, and the recent Confederations Cup hosted by Brazil fueled criticism of the massive spending of public funds on World Cup preparation,4 but the demands call for reformation rather than revolution. These stem from what James Hunter deems moral and practical dissatisfaction.5 The former reflects the outrage fired by such things as the “Mensalão” corruption trials that seemed to allow most of the guilty parties to escape punishment. The latter stems from such things as disproportionately high prices, high taxes, and faulty services including health care, education and transportation.

While the Brazilian unrest coupled with the slowing economic growth certainly will taint foreign direct investment over the short term, the current situation should not significantly destabilize Brazil’s economy assuming the government avoids exacerbating the circumstances. So far, President Dilma Rousseff has responded to the protests in an innocuous if confusing manner by calling for a plebiscite not demanded by protesters, pushing to repeal the hike in municipal bus fees that set off much of the agitation, and promoting a polemic program to recruit foreign physicians to work in under-served communities.  The 2014 World Cup will likely stir further contention, but in true “panen et circenses” fashion it will also generate significant revenue as well as popular excitement and goodwill, especially if Brazil wins the competition.








Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Violence in the Stadiums

Under the subtitle “The End of Civility,” yesterday’s (07/30/13) edition of the Brazilian newspaper Zero Hora1 featured an article about a recent decision to eliminate the divided stadium sections for rival teams’ fans. Traditionally, when the cross-town adversaries Grêmio Foot-Ball Porto Alegrense and Sport Club Internacional (frequently referred to as simply Grêmio and Inter) face off, officials segregate fans into clearly demarcated and fenced-off sectors of whichever stadium they are using. This segregation, which extends to entries and exits, is designed to avoid physical confrontations between rival fans. Similar measures exist at numerous professional sporting venues around the country. At first glance, the desegregation may appear to be a positive development towards a more amicable coexistence among all those in the stands. However, the case is exactly the opposite: local police have acknowledged their inability to guarantee the safety of the opposing team fans in and around the stadium for Sunday’s “Gre-Nal” between the two teams.

Violence in sports venues obviously is not limited to Brazilian soccer matches. The most notorious disaster in the soccer world took place during the Liverpool vs. Juventus match for the 1985 European Cup final at Heysel Stadiumin in Brussels. Thirty nine people died and over 600 were injured which led to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) imposing a five-year ban on English teams participating in any of the three European competitions.2 Even with other sports in “fan friendly” venues, violence can erupt as it did on baseball’s opening day 2011 for San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow who just now in 2013 returned home after two years in treatment for massive injuries leading to brain damage sustained in a beating by locals at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles.3 Dodger Stadium had long been known as a family-friendly, sportsmanlike venue, and in the aftermath of the senseless beating police and stadium security presence has intensified visibly. Nevertheless, the persistent violence at Brazilian professional soccer stadiums is a growing concern, especially when the police “throw in the towel” (to mix sports metaphors).

The Zero Hora article cites Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda, professor of the School of Social Science at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, one of the most prestigious institutions in Brazil. He points out that while the police have become the sole arbiters of public safety, the violence associated with soccer matches is a much more complex phenomenon that includes other societal factors. Many of the contributing elements parallel the rise of gang violence and begin far from the stadiums and the matches. The incidents that are occurring within the walls of the stadiums demonstrate a breakdown of extramural civil society, ranging from impoverished home life through precarious education, and extending into the relationship between the general populace and governmental authority. In a “civilized” community, it is absurd that the violence inside a sporting location should be so great that police and stadium security cannot readily control it, given that it is not a one-time aberration but rather a constant.


There is no question that the vast majority of fans attending soccer games in Brazil are not participants in the turmoil. Almost everyone comes for the pleasure of watching a match and supporting their team. The few, however, who do engage in the attacks can be savage toward rival fans, and even toward other organized groups of fans for their own teams. It is imperative that Brazilian authorities find the means to restore peace to the soccer pitches prior to next year’s World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.




Friday, July 19, 2013

Snowden, Espionage, Human Rights, and U.S.-Latin American Relations

In the July 12 edition of the Los Angeles Times, Tracy Wilkinson begins with an extremely apropos reference to an iconographic scene from “Casablanca”: “Mexicans are shocked — shocked! — to learn that their American neighbors have been spying on them. What’s more, the Americans have been helping the Mexican government become better at spying!” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-snowden-20130712,0,5645423.story).  Politicians from throughout the hemisphere are expressing outrage over the alleged infringement of their sovereign nations. From Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto to Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, heads of state are concerned, distressed, insulted and demanding clarification. Americans themselves are disturbed and irate over news of widespread interception of personal communications; in Latin America Snowden’s revelations are a black eye in the face of Barack Obama’s efforts in U.S.-Latin American relations, evoking regional criticisms that echo the strained times of purported CIA-supported dictatorships, coups and assassinations. Of course, just as Captain Renault was shocked to find gambling going on, no one is genuinely surprised by eavesdropping, surveillance and spying being carried out by Americans and numerous others. Every major country in the world maintains intelligence agencies and almost all embassies and consulates include an intelligence officer.  The tacit understanding is that you are not supposed to be too overt or too aggressive with your allies, and by all means you should avoid being discovered. Allies spying on their friends is an international embarrassment for all parties and creates significant political problems for the politicians of the countries being watched as much as for those who ordered the watching. Nobody wants such incidents to come to light. Just ask Peña Nieto whose predecessor and political ally Felipe Calderón cozied up U.S. intelligence services.

What Edward Snowden has done spits in the face of the diplomatic niceties of the various foreign services around the world. In The United States prior to the 1960s and in many countries to this day, Snowden’s actions would constitute high treason punishable by death. But every traitor is a valuable asset to another party, and right now Snowden represents enough potential information that any foreign government would willingly stick its neck out to reap the benefits.  Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Nicolás Madura would be overjoyed to parade Snowden down the streets of La Paz or Caracas as a massive black-eye in the face of their ideological enemy, the United States. For them the benefits would be both symbolic and real. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and even Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on the other hand, would be equally pleased but significantly more wary of overt involvement with Snowden. While Snowden assuredly would like to escape from the transit area of Sheremetyevo International Airport and enjoy the hospitality of President Morales, for the time being he remains a man without a country in that he cannot return home, U.S. pressure prevents him from easily traveling to many countries, and many others cannot afford the consequences of aiding and abetting America’s de facto public enemy #1. This is the case for Rousseff who has pursued a global economic policy that can only benefit from positive relations with the United States. And while Morales might be preparing his guest suite, the Bolivian president himself could not fly home from a recent meeting in Russia without his plane being diverted to Vienna by countries not wanting to act against the interests of the United States. Léo Gerchmann of the Brazilian News agency RBS reports that Snowden acknowledged the current impossibility of traveling to Venezuela in a meeting with representatives from Human Rights Watch (http://www.clicrbs.com.br/anoticia/jsp/default2.jsp?uf=2&local=18&source=a4199059.xml&template=4187.dwt&edition=22344&section=1485).

Russia is attempting a delicate balancing act. Sergei Loiko of the Los Angeles Times reports, “The meeting with Snowden also put organizations that regularly accuse the Russian government of human rights abuses in the position of being asked to serve as intermediary to the Kremlin on his behalf.” At the same time, Putin understands the hand he has been dealt.  As Alexander Ryklin, editor of the online Daily Journal,Putin may dislike and even despise him for what he is, a traitor in his eyes, but he won't let Snowden out of his hands"
Denis Dyomkin and Alexei Anishchuk of Reuters state that “Putin has used the case of Snowden to accuse the United States of preaching to the world about rights and freedoms it does not uphold at home(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-usa-security-snowden-russia-idUSBRE96F0I020130717). Nevertheless, for Putin as for any leader, assuming the role of human rights supporter for Snowden could appear hypocritical: How can a country embrace a fugitive as a human rights activist when their own record in the area is being called into question? Maduro, Morales and company should also take note.

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Judiciary vs. Executive: Bureaucratic Legacy from the Boate Kiss Fire

The administrative offices for the state of Rio Grande do Sul were shut down yesterday (Tuesday, 07/09/13) by judicial decree issued by Justice Hilbert Maximiliano Akihito Obara (5ª Vara da Fazenda Pública do Foro Central). The interdiction of the Fernando Ferrari Administrative Center, in the capital city of Porto Alegre, resulted from a review of public safety documents required for occupation of and public access to the building. All such structures are required to maintain a current “Plan for Protection and Prevention Against Fires” (PPCI). In the aftermath of the horrific blaze at the Kiss nightclub that massacred 242 young patrons (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/05/boate-kiss-and-brazilian-public-policy.html), the governments of Brazil as a whole and of Rio Grande do Sul in particular have taken great pains to demonstrate their dedication to fire prevention and safety in public venues.

The reaction from the state house, Palácio Piratini, was to ignore the interdiction and open for business as usual today (Wednesday, 07/10/13). After all, how can the State conduct its business if its primary administrative offices are closed? How can the very PPCI documents required by Justice Obara be processed if the Judiciary effectively shut down the Executive branch’s daily operations? The Executive’s decision to ignore the court order and open the doors of the Administrative Center spurred major labor unions to organize a protest against allegedly unsafe working conditions in the building since the documents were not up to date. This led to confrontations between the union representatives and government workers who reported to duty only to find the doors blocked by union personnel. Tensions escalated when ordinary citizens began to arrive to conduct their business, including receipt of state-supported medications for needy individuals. Eventually the State rolled out the riot police, and the protesters declared that their planned time period was completed. Right when conditions appeared to be heading toward normalcy, a substantial group of university students arrived to co-opt the protest for purposes of the large-scale manifestations that have been disrupting the country in recent months (see http://latamperspectives.blogspot.com/2013/06/brazilian-protests-and-confederations.html). However, at the end of the day, Justice Obara’s decision was overturned by the State’s higher court, Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul (TJ-RS). This court ruled that content of the fire safety documents was complete, and that the State’s primary administrative office was in compliance.


This apparent antagonism between the Judiciary and the Executive branches of the Rio Grande do Sul government demonstrates the extent to which the tragedy has brought to light the failures in public safety and policy. All levels of government are scrambling to cover their political assets. All of this takes place against a backdrop of continuing, heterogeneous social unrest. The posturing and bickering of branches of the government would be comical if they did not have such an impact on the functioning of the State.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Brazilian Protests and the Confederations Cup

Above the fold on the front page of today’s (06/19/13) hardcopy New York Times a large photograph shows a Brazilian police officer dousing a protestor’s face in pepper spray from barely over a foot away [permalink to the online Times article below]. The unarmed and seemingly unthreatening protester is cringing and raising her hand in a vain attempt to cover her face as the officer in riot gear soaks her in enough spray to drip down her neck. This is the kind of image that undoubtedly interferes with the sleep of President Dilma Rousseff, herself a former urban guerrilla who decades ago most likely would have been on the receiving end of such governmental shows of strength. Tens of thousands of similar episodes took place across the country today, mostly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but also in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and especially national capital Brasília, along with many other major cities. According to the newspaper Jornal do Brasil, in Rio alone, more than 100,000 people took to the streets to protest rising bus fares and the lack of investment in urban infrastructure and education. The flash point for these protests that have been growing over the last few months was the increase in the cost of municipal transportation in various major cities, notable Florianópolis (capital of Santa Catarina state) were rioters have been setting fire to local buses all year, sometimes (albeit rarely) with people still on board. The deeper problems, however, relate to the country’s massive investment in the 2014 World Cup and the lingering irritation with a huge corruption scandal that unfolded during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, predecessor and political godfather to current president Rousseff.

Currently Brazil is hosting the Confederations Cup, a shake-down for next year’s World Cup which serves to both ramp up enthusiasm for the quadriannual sporting event and also to test infrastructure preparations in terms of transportation, lodging, security, and most importantly the stadiums themselves.  Even though the country already boasted major league soccer stadiums in every large city – and cities such as Rio, São Paulo and Porto Alegre each had several – all of the venues required significant retrofitting, and in some cases entirely new stadiums are being built. The hundreds of millions of dollars flowing from public coffers to cover these costs promise to provide significant returns as visitors flood the country in July of next year, and for Rio again in 2016 for the Olympics.  While the accepted wisdom may be that the investment will pay for itself in the short term and provide long-term benefits for the populace, the rash of ever more violent conflicts around the country demonstrate that the government sorely underestimated the level of resentment over corruption, exacerbated by a slowing economy and a renewed specter of inflation. According to the newspaper Zero Hora, a new poll released by the National Confederation of Industry together with the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Confederação Nacional da Indústria-CNI, and Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística-Ibope), President Rousseff’s approval rating fell another 8% since March. Moreover, the percentage of people who consider her administration bad or terrible grew from 7% to 13% in the same period. The irony of Rousseff’s position is not lost on the people of Brazil, especially among those who traditionally were the strongest supporters of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT). In the 1960s and into the 1970s, Rousseff was part of Marxist urban guerrilla groups that engaged in armed conflict in opposition to the oppressive military regime. Now as president she is ultimately responsible for the policing of the present day activists and protesters, in essence the one commanding the force that pepper sprayed the unarmed woman in the Times photo. Moreover, Rousseff’s rise to the presidency was a direct result of the corruption scandal under Lula’s watch which toppled his Chief of Staff José Dirceu. Until that happened, Dirceu was Lula’s political heir apparent, and Rousseff not only filled his cabinet position but also assumed the role as Lula’s chosen successor. To date, none of the politicians found guilty in connection with the "Mensalão" corruption scandal has served time in prison.

In soccer, the Brazilian national team needs a strong showing in the Confederations Cup to boost public morale and player confidence. Indeed, anything short of total victory will be viewed as a significant disappointment. Politically, Rousseff needs a quick win to control the protesters not only to ensure the success of this Cup and the next, but also to bolster her own agenda. Her harshest critics are openly questioning if Rousseff will be able to govern effectively if/when the popular manifestations die down. When introduced by FIFA president Sepp Blatter to officially open the Confederations Cup on Saturday, Rousseff was soundly booed by the tens of thousands filling Maracanã Stadium. The Times article compares what is happening in Brazil to what has happened in Turkey and other Arab countries where seemingly local protests quickly exploded into large-scale national uprisings. While the comparison seems far-fetched, given that even the most violent of these Brazilian protests do not include armies of citizens aiming guns at government troops, the parallels are worth considering. The article does emphasize the difference of Rousseff’s approach: today she officially changed tactics and praised the manifestations as signs of Brazil’s strong democracy. She is right. Some 45 years ago the people would not have even had the right to protest and the troops would have responded with bullets rather than pepper spray, but if Rousseff cannot successfully co-opt and appease – as she is trying to do – the wide range of people taking to the streets, she could end up out of the game. 



Monday, May 27, 2013

“Boate Kiss” and Brazilian Public Policy


In the classic Hollywood film “Casablanca,” the character Vichy Captain Louis Renault (played by Claude Rains) is given a directive from his Nazi overseers to find an excuse to shut down "Rick's Café Américain" run by Humphrey Bogart’s character Rick Blaine. Captain Renault announces, “I am shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.” Immediately after this announcement, Rick’s croupier hands Renault a stack of money: “Your winnings, sir.” As this scene demonstrates, the character of Captain Renault is designed to epitomize hypocrisy and bureaucracy as a condemnation of the collaboratist Vichy régime.

In the early morning hours of January 27, 2013, a fire broke out in the nightclub “Kiss” in the southern Brazilian town of Santa Maria. The death toll was 242, with another 116 injured, many of them seriously. Almost every victim was in their late teens or early twenties. The deaths resulted from horribly inadequate infrastructure, including a single entry/exit point, no emergency exits and barred windows that condemned many of the youth to a charred death in the restrooms as they tried to flee the inferno. The tragedy affected every family in this town of 262,000 inhabitants, and traumatized the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Repercussions rippled throughout the country. It was the third largest number of deaths in a nightclub in world history, and was eerily similar to the 2003 fire in the Station nightclub in Rhode Island in which 100 people died, and the República Cromañón nightclub fire in Buenos Aires that killed 194 people in 2004. In all three cases, indoor pyrotechnics, over-crowding, and inadequate evacuation escalated the loss.

In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, local and state governments quickly raised the alarm about public safety in bars, nightclubs, and similar venues. Government officials were shocked, shocked to find that the vast majority of these establishments were functioning without conforming to fire and public safety codes. In the state capital of Porto Alegre, approximately 46 out of 50 registered night spots were shut down in the weeks after the fire due to noncompliance with the codes governing the operation of public establishments. In Santa Maria it was discovered that Fire officials knew of the noncompliance at “Kiss” yet for some reason the venue not only remained open but was allowed to regularly host musical acts that included indoor pyrotechnics. The venue’s official capacity was 691 persons, yet normally – and on the night of the tragedy – between 1,000 and 1,500 people were admitted.

While there was clear negligence on the part of the establishment’s owners, the greater breakdown was on the part of Brazil’s de facto public policy that accepts legal infractions as regular practice. Public officials in Santa Maria were aware of the overcrowding; some officials’ own children frequented the trendy club, and some died. Fire officials were aware of the bolted emergency exits, barred windows, and restricted main entry. From July 31, 2009, until the night of the fire, the nightclub operated continually under improper conditions, yet public officials never fully enforced regulations. The club was even ordered shut down, but the order was never carried out. Instead, the establishment was fined four times. The amount of the fines obviously was all but meaningless in face of the huge profits, another element in the inadequacy of public policy. For such measures to be effective, the value must be significant enough to deter infraction and not simply a small part of the cost of doing business. Similarly, there must be real enforcement of regulations, especially in areas of public safety.

Today marks the four-month anniversary of the tragedy. In this time, many actions have been taken at the local, state and national levels. Major reviews of operating licenses have revealed similar defects throughout the country; in the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, only 5% of the 209 registered nightclubs conformed to fire safety codes. Commissions, investigations, and hearings have emerged across Brazil. Yet all of this will be meaningless unless followed by an actual change in how the people and the government perceive and act on issues of public safety. Conditions at the “Boate Kiss” were no secret, yet for three and a half years government officials allowed the nightclub to operate as a deathtrap.

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

Obama in Mexico: But what Mexico was he talking about?


Last Friday (05/03/13), U.S. President Barack Obama gave a speech at the National Museum of Anthropology in Mexico City during which he highly praised the great socio-economic progress currently taking place in that country.  While much of Mexico’s mainstream press reported positively on the bilateral meetings between Obama and his counterpart, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, and lauded Obama’s speech, the U.S. media took a different slant, fueled primarily by an article in the Los Angeles Times, “Obama sings Mexico's praises, but some Mexicans hear flat notes” (http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-obama-reaction-20130503,0,2714566.story). The Times story was picked up by wire services and became the dominant view of the speech in the U.S. media. It included numerous quotes, such as:

“‘[That was] a really good speech by President Obama, but what Mexico was he talking about?’ said Jose Carlos Cruz, 24, a graduate student in international relations.”

“Alberto Rios Lara, 26, who is studying to be an economist, said, ‘Obama is a great speaker; it's really impossible not to feel excited. However, the reality is different in Mexico. We need more action and fewer speeches.’"

The two major issues in U.S.-Mexico relations are drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Obama’s words can be interpreted as a call for Mexicans to stay at home in Mexico, a position that echoes the sentiments of Peña Nieto. The latter wants to showcase how the return to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI – Partido Revolucionario Institucional) has brought economic growth and stability to Mexico. At the same time, Peña Nieto has stepped back on cooperative ventures with U.S. law enforcement in the area of drug trafficking, trying to foster an image of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, Peña Nieto has to worry about the collateral effects of any U.S. economic slowdown and how it could affect Mexico’s growth. As primary trading partners, both the U.S. and Mexico have vested interests in shoring up their mutual commerce. According to the Mexican newspaper El Universal, there’s cause for concern in Mexico that a slowing U.S. recovery will adversely impact Mexico (http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/921054.html). The paper reported that in 2012, the U.S. economy grew by 2.2% annual rate, compared to 1.8% in 2011. Nevertheless, the last quarter showed signs of weakening, dropping from 3.1% in the third quarter to -0.1% in the fourth. The article claims that this slowing will hurt Mexico’s GDP, whose 3.9% growth in 2012 is projected to slow to 3.5% this year. This is why Peña Nieto’s government was so enthusiastic about Obama’s cheerleading, releasing a statement that “both governments are committed to working to make the North American region the most competitive and dynamic in the world,” according to a spokesperson for the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP - Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público). This is reflected in the opening address of the SHCP Minister, Luis Videgaray, at the G24 press conference in Washington, D.C. on April 18, 2013. Videgaray indicated emphasized, “This means that we still face very important challenges starting out with the crisis, financial imbalances, fiscal imbalances that create relevant risks for G24 countries. We need to, in parallel, push forward a pro-growth productivity-based agenda” (http://www.shcp.gob.mx/SALAPRENSA/doc_discurso_funcionarios/secretarioSHCP/2013/lvc_conferencia_g24_ing.pdf).

In spite of Obama’s and Peña Nieto’s expressed optimism in Mexico’s social and economic outlook, the very real specter of violence, poverty and death haunts U.S.-Mexico relations. The drug cartel wars now stretch across the entire length of the shared border, leaving tens of thousands dead annually. This violence together with rampant poverty push thousands more to seek opportunities in the U.S. With post-9/11 tightened security, most people entering the U.S. illegally risk their lives crossing through extreme desert environments. The NGO Humane Borders has compiled a map of confirmed fatalities in southern New Mexico. It reports 2,269 deaths from 10/01/99-03/28/12 (http://www.humaneborders.net/warning-posters/).

 These are the realities that will require serious cooperation, and not just speeches, on both sides of the line in the sand.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Disenchantment with Lula


In 1982, the late historian Robert Levine1 gave an informal address to a group of American college students attending the University of São Paulo in Brazil. He made a statement that did not go over well with most of the politically engagé students assembled. In referring to the entrenched corruption of both civil and official societies, Levine commented that it didn't matter who was the president since the bureaucracies and practices of daily life would remain the same. He concluded that you could have Lula2 or Maluf3 as president and nothing would change. The underlying issue as identified by Levine was the need for reform in the very fabric of society.

It is often said that in Brazil there are two ways to accomplish any task, the official way and the unofficial way or “jeitinho.” Some scholars have postulated that the (in)famous “jeitinho” developed as a necessity because of the immense, and at times contradictory, bureaucracies that can bring to a halt almost any interaction with official organs. The need for society to function leads to extra-official practices enacted by functionaries who deal directly with those seeking resolution.  Obviously, the very nature of these arrangements lead to corruption, sometimes softer – such as a donation to the “coffee fund” (pagar o cafezinho) or the “tip box” (caixinha dois) – and other times more blatant and abusive. A major problem is the wide-spread acceptance of the practice as a simple fact of life and cost of doing business in Brazil. This reality is so entrenched in Brazil that some U.S. businesses found themselves unable to do business in Brazil without violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, which prohibit the bribing of foreign officials.

Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva was a founder of the Brazilian Workers’ Party or PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in 1980 when the last military president, João Figueiredo, abolished the prescriptive bipartisan political system and allowed for the organization of new parties under the “Political Opening” (Abertura Política). In addition to several elected offices, Lula ran for President of the Republic in 1989 and 1994, losing both times in the second round run-offs, first to Fernando Collor de Mello and later to Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Throughout his political career up to that point, Lula distinguished himself as a tireless union organizer and social reformer. The Workers’ Party, whose symbol is a red star, was the farthest left party legal in Brazil when it was formed, and its platform included policies of redistribution of wealth including agrarian reform. In the years prior to his eventual election as president, Lula was often portrayed even by his detractors as perhaps Brazil’s only “honest politician.” In preparing himself to run again in the 2002 elections, Lula adopted a significantly different public persona, opting for smartly tailored suits and trimmed beard in place of his signature casual shirt sleeves and bushier facial hair. One of his first moves was to meet with the powerful Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), the most significant industrial organization in the country and a long-time opponent of a Lula presidency. Lula assured these economic leaders that he would not threaten their hegemony and would maintain the economic policies of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Most of his hardcore supporters probably assumed that this was merely a ploy to get into office, the ends justifying the means. However, once elected Lula was good to his word largely left unmodified the policies that had led to the economic stability under Cardoso. This policy alienated some of his party’s staunchest vanguard and led to sharp criticism from within the political left. However, Lula’s overall popularity grew during his presidency, at one point achieving the highest ever approval ratings for a Brazilian president. In 2009, Barack Obama referred to Lula as "the most popular politician on Earth" during a G20 summit in London.

Nevertheless, in 2005 during Lula’s presidency a massive influence peddling scheme operated within the corridors of the National Congress. Known as the “mensalão”(more or less the big monthly allowance), suitcases full of money regularly were brought into congressional offices, somehow bypassing security stations. These were distributed across a broad spectrum of political offices under the supervision of Lula’s Chief of Staff, José Dirceu. Ultimately, after the scandal broke, numerous members of Lula’s cabinet and other office holders lost their jobs, some eventually being indicted. Reminiscent of the Watergate scandal in the U.S., the question that surfaced regarding the president was, “What did he know and when did he know it?” While Lula was never directly implicated in the corruption, with wry humor, the joke at the time was: The good news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs. The bad news is that Lula knew nothing about the payoffs.

Lula’s popularity remained high throughout his presidency, enough so to allow current president Dilma Rousseff to coat-tail into the presidency after filling Dirceu’s post at the end of Lula’s second term. In August 2007, 40 participants were indicted by Brazil’s Supreme Court, almost all political allies of Lula and the PT. The trial began five years later, and many of the defendants were convicted of various charges of corruption. José Dirceu and several others were convicted of bribery (corrupção ativa).  

Even though Lula has managed to maintain a certain distance from the proceedings, his legacy has been tainted by the detailed revelations that continue to surface stemming from the trials and their aftermath. The image that has gradually supplanted that of “the one honest politician” seems to be that of “just another politician.” Those who most ardently supported Lula, and in some cases the Workers’ Party itself, have grown steadily more disillusioned.


NOTES
1. Robert M. Levine (1941-2003) was a scholar of Latin American history with a special emphasis on Brazil. When he addressed the American students in 1982, he was visiting his long-time friend and fellow historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy, then the Director of the Interuniversity Study Program (ISP-USP). Years later when I was at Florida International University and Bob was at the University of Miami, he was surprised to have made such a remark, being a strong supporter of Lula’s various political activities.
2. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva (b. 1945) was president of Brazil from 2003-2010.
3. Paulo Salim Maluf (b. 1931) is a Brazilian politician who has held multiple state and national offices since getting appointed Mayor of the city of São Paulo in 1969, due to his personal connections to General Artur da Costa e Silva, the second military president. His appointment was made possible by the fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) of 12/13/68, that suspended most political and civil rights, recessed the national congress, and instituted direct control of political processes by the president and governors.  In 1982, Maluf was finishing his term as Governor of the state of São Paulo and demonstrated clear aspirations to the presidency. He was a candidate for the chief executive office in 1985, supported by the out-going military régime and thus expected to become Brazil’s first civilian president since the 1964 coup. However, in a surprising upset, Tancredo Neves won the indirect election held through the Electoral College.

Monday, April 15, 2013

Maduro, Chavismo and the Venezuelan Military


The protagonist of one of the most striking moments in last night’s post-election spectacle in Venezuela was not presumed victor Nicolás Maduro nor his unrelenting opponent Henrique Capriles, but rather Major General Wilmer Barrientos. One of several generals to speak in their own press conference, Barrientos is the Strategic Operational Commander of the Venezuelan (“Bolivarian”) National Armed Forces (Comandante Estratégico Operacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana or “FANB”), who was called upon to effectuate a military operation designed to ensure peaceful and transparent elections. In his press conference late last night (04/14/13), Barrientos celebrated the victory of governmental official candidate Maduro over opposition candidate Capriles, and declared that the opposition’s refusal to accept defeat was “irresponsible” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NmKWA3Cn3E).

The imagery of a stage packed with the Venezuelan top brass voicing their support of a political candidate brought to mind a statement made by Brazilian historian José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy of the University of São Paulo around 1984. As an outside observer of the campaigns and election process in the United States, he expressed dismay at the multimillion dollar marketing schemes that dragged on for more than a year, but came away with one critical observation: In the United States, nobody ever raised the question of which presidential candidate the military supported. Indeed, in the U.S. there is no such thing as an official candidate formally representing the armed forces. Brazil at the time was in the waning days of its 20-year military government. Five generals held the title of “President of the Republic” from April 1964 through March 1985, with a brief triumvirate junta in control in the latter half of 1969. Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and other Latin American countries were abuzz with the notion of re-democratization: the transition from authoritarian power to democratically elected civilian control of the government. The discussions included not only issues of how to remove the yoke of “illegitimate” governments but also how to develop new forms of public policy with representational input and transparency. Three decades after much of the continent dealt with the transition away from military meddling or even direct control of the government, history seems to be poised to repeat itself in Venezuela.

Former career military man Hugo Chávez’s political career was a blend of authoritarianism and populism, not unlike numerous other charismatic politicians around the globe. Reminiscent of Munich’s 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Chávez first tried to seize power in a coup d’etat in February 1992, was unsuccessful and eventually imprisoned. Released in 1994, Chávez adjusted his strategy and developed his popular base to eventually win the 1998 presidential elections. In other words, his attempted military revolution failed as such, but laid the groundwork for his rise to power from within the framework of the existing constitution. After that, in the manner of Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s, Chávez began modifying the constitution and other political apparatuses to continually strengthen his own hold on presidential power. Under the laws that he had created, Chávez legally retained his position for 14 years. Yesterday’s election was practically a draw: official results gave Maduro approximately 50.7% of the vote and Capriles 49.1%. These figures reflect an almost evenly divided – and strongly polarized – country, similar to the situation in Chile under Augusto Pinochet in the 1980s. Maduro does not have the charisma of Chávez, but for now appears to have the Military’s support. The big questions are: How long will that support endure? And at what point will a true majority of the Venezuelan people tire asking who the military wants to run the country.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

Chavismo without Chávez II


What is surprising is not that Hugo Chávez’s chosen successor Nicolás Maduro has claimed victory in the special election necessitated by Chávez’s death, but rather that even with the full force of the Chavista political machine the National Electoral Council declared Maduro the winner with a margin of only 1.5%. As can be expected in such circumstances, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles has not recognized the results, and has called for the ballot boxes to be opened and the ballots recounted. Few international observers doubt that the ultimate victor of this election will be Maduro, given that the President of the National Electoral Council, Tibisay Lucena, stated that the announced results favoring Maduro were “irreversible,” and given that, as observed by the University of Miami’s Bruce Bagley, “In the final analysis, it will be the Chavistas counting the votes” (L.A. Times, 04/14/13, A3). Regardless of the final outcome or the recount – if there is one – one comment repeated tonight by Capriles goes to the heart of the situation. Addressing his opponent, Capriles said, “The loser is you” (“El derrotado es usted”). Just last October, an ailing Hugo Chávez extended his 14-year reign winning re-election against Capriles by almost 10 percentage points. Tonight Maduro’s “mandate from the people” depended on a difference of less than 235,000 votes, out of 18.9 million registered voters. It remains to be seen how he will be able to consolidate his support more effectively than during this brief campaign. It will be surprising if he learns how to project the kind of charisma that Chávez leveraged into what might best be deemed a “constitutional coup de etat.”

Significantly, the top brass of the Venezuelan armed forces announced their support for the official results. The military’s press conference included General Wilmer Barrientos – the man charged with ensuring the transparency and fairness of the election process – celebrating Maduro’s win.

Friday, April 5, 2013

Asian Globalization and Latin America


In the late 1990s and early 2000s, I collaborated with Steve Heine at Florida International University on a project called “Asian Globalization and Latin America.”  Funded by a U. S. Department of Education Title VI-D grant and sponsored by FIU’s Latin American and Caribbean Center (http://lacc.fiu.edu/), our grant spawned research in Pacific Rim studies and the forerunners of BRICS (the association of the emerging economies of Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa). The focus of that early research and dissemination was the multi-level relationships between the established and emerging economies of East Asia and those of Latin America. A large amount of our work dealt with the Japan-Brazil connections, beginning with the arrival at the port of Santos of the Kasato Maru in 1908, and continuing up to the so-called “return immigration” of Nikkei-Brazilian workers to Japan in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Ironically, the beginning of Japanese immigration into Brazil was motivated by two contrary perceptions of Japanese racial identity: the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907 between the U.S. and Japan designed to curtail the immigration of Japanese manual labor into California in part as a response to anti-Japanese public opinion, and the re-marketing of Japanese identity as “white Asians” in order to promote immigration as laborers for Brazil’s booming coffee plantations at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. For a detailed discussion of Japanese immigration as part of the “whitening” of Brazil see Jeffrey Lesser’s Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil; also see Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism (Lesser, ed.)

At the same time that we began work on the grant, the second stage of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms started opening doors for foreign direct investment in the People’s Republic of China. The Asian globalization issues that developed from this policy revolved around the balancing of opportunities present in the pent-up commercial demands of a country with about a billion inhabitants, against the risks intrinsic in foreign enterprise coupled with at times contradictory stances from a government not accustomed to free-market practices. As we progressed into the first decade of the new millennium, the Chinese economy loomed immense in the world commercial outlook. The economic advantages of large numbers of very low-paid workers, and of minimal workplace regulations in terms of working conditions and salaries, combined to enable a flood of low-cost Chinese goods. The market realities led to China being able to undercut similar goods from Latin American producers even as many of the region’s economies strived to attain more stable and developed economies. Chinese made “knock-off” goods also led to conflicts of international intellectual property rights, a problem that had previous existed in Latin American economies during the periods of import substitution models in the 1970s and 1980s. The 2010s have seen a new role for Chinese products: a move toward not merely “Made in China” but rather “Created and Made in China.” As a Brazilian engineer put it after a 2012 trade show in Europe, in the past we would see armies of Chinese engineers roving the stands taking notes, and four to six months later the Chinese imitation products would hit the world markets. Now it’s the Chinese who have mounted their own stands with original products, especially high-end, luxury designs. In other words, the Chinese have leap-frogged over much of the Latin American industrial production while maintaining their output of lower-end, mass productions. This is viewed by many as an economic threat to the relative stability that the economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico have experienced since the beginning of the recession that struck the U.S. and the Euro Zone.

As I write these words, Kim Jong-un’s saber rattling dominates global concerns regarding Asia. Headlines in Latin America’s major newspapers, such as the Jornal do Brasil and Argentina’s Clarín, share the concerns expressed in all major world media. As North Korean missiles stand poised for launch, international and regional interactions with Japan, China, and other East Asian countries – especially South Korean – also face the threat of disruption and potential global economic impact.

Friday, March 22, 2013

¿Chavismo sin Chávez?: The possibilities for regional realignment


The hemisphere is facing an impending realignment as a result of Hugo Chávez’s death. For years Chávez has been the center of gravity for the left-leaning governments that emerged in Latin America’s post-privatization world of the 21st Century. When many of the promises of 1990s failed to bring the lasting socio-economic improvements expected from neo-liberal economics and hemispheric integration, countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and, of course, Venezuela reacted against many of the political parties that had promoted the economic policies. These electorates brought into office leftist leaders such as Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, and Hugo Chávez. Of these, the latter is clearly the most similar to charismatic leaders of other eras, recalling Perón or maybe Vargas.

In Brazil, while Lula had a long track record as leader of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), after several frustrated attempts to get himself elected President he finally won the majority in 2002 on a platform that basically maintained Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. As his hand-picked successor, Dilma Roussef’s economic policy for the most part follows the trail blazed by Lula. This policy has either contributed to a significant period of economic growth in the country, or is the beneficiary of that growth (most likely some of both). However, the grass-roots supporters of the PT to a large extend felt alienated by Lula’s – and now Dilma’s – apparent abandonment of traditional party lines, together with increasing accusations of corruption.

Cristina Kirchner took office as President of Argentina in 2007, in essence a re-election of her husband Néstor. She also maintained a pre-existing economic policy that attempted to marry social reforms with the economic growth that developed under Néstor. More recently, however, Cristina has reverted to older, protectionist economic models, straining relations with some trading partners. Like Dilma in Brazil, Cristina seems to be trying to balance her political ideology with the management of an economy that resisted the downturns of the 2000s better than most G20 nations, even though there are warning signs in both countries.

In contrast to the balancing acts in Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s Evo Morales has defined his seven years in office along more traditional Latin American leftist terms, adopting an attitude of resistance of the United States’ foreign policy and the role of multinational or transnational business interests. Nevertheless, likely due to the limited size and scope of Bolivia’s economy, Morales has not occupied the international stage in the manner of Chávez. Like Chávez, Morales frequently has honored Fidel Castro as the patriarch of the Latin American Left and he has maintained an “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, although his domestic policies have been erratic.

What made Hugo Chávez such a presence in the hemisphere was his vocal anti-Americanism financed by Venezuela’s oil production. Like the autocratic Latin American rulers of the 20th Century, Chávez managed to leverage populism to inculcate a lack of pluralism into the Venezuelan political reality. He fuelled the masses with apparent social welfare programs while limiting the political discourse. And as with similar regimes, Chavismo could count on much popular support. As Eric Farnsworth indicated:

“Even his opponents took pains before the last presidential election, on October 7, 2012 to convince voters that if opposition candidate Henrique Capriles had been elected, he would have respected the gains of the Bolivarian revolution.”  Eric Farnsworth (01/11/13 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-can%E2%80%99t-stay-quiet-over-ch%C3%A1vez-absence)

The question now is who, if anyone, may fill the void left by Chávez. Dilma Roussef and perhaps to a lesser extent Cristina Kirchner would shun the role of anti-American firebrand, preferring to try to manage their countries’ economic growth while resisting both American and Chinese commercial pressures. Evo Morales cannot muster the populational and economic clout. Raúl Castro is really a transitional place-holder. Most likely, Chavismo, unlike Peronismo I Argentina, will not have the long-reaching implications in the Venezuelan national political arena.

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Grêmio x Caracas


Caracas Fútbol Club is the unexpected collateral beneficiary from the death of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. In national mourning all soccer games were cancelled for this past week, allowing Caracas FC to rest up for tonight’s decisive Libertadores match against Grêmio FC of Porto Alegre, Brazil. It also gave the grounds keepers at the Estadio Olímpico of the Universidad Central de Venezuela, where the match is to be played, time to plug some sod into holes in the field and paint the dead grass green: http://videos.clicrbs.com.br/rs/zerohora/video/zhesportes/2013/03/confira-condicoes-gramado-que-gremio-jogara-caracas/14873/

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Petrobras and the Pasadena Refinery


According to an op-ed piece published by Humberto Viana Guimarães on 02/26/13 in the Jornal do Brasil (http://www.jb.com.br), the Belgian company Astra Oil Trading purchased the idle Pasadena Refining System, Inc. (PRSI) in Pasadena, TX, for US$ 42.5 million in January 2005. In November of that year, the Brazilian national petroleum company, Petrobras, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Astra for the acquisition of a 50% interest in the Pasadena Refinery, a sale which was completed in September of 2006 for US$360 million, as reported by Jim Molony of the Pasadena Citizen. That’s an 850% increase in value over a period of 21 months. Guimarães emphasizes that it was a healthy return for Astra.

In June 2008, Petrobras initiated arbitrage proceedings against Astra alleging failure to fulfill its obligations as 50% co-owner of the PRSI. Astra responded in July 2008 with litigation to exercise several put-options that required Petrobras to purchase the remaining 50% of PRSI. When the legal battle finally settled, Petrobras had to pay US$ 830.5 million in July 2012. All told, Petrobras paid a total of almost US$ 1.2 billion in 2012 for a refinery that Astra bought for US$ 42.5 million seven years earlier. By November 2012, the Energy Business Review (http://refiningandpetrochemicals.energy-business-review.com/) reported that Petrobras was trying to sell PRSI to invest the proceeds in off-shore drilling. The pertinent details also can be found on the PRSI webpage: http://www.pasadenarefining.com/en/News.aspx.

The op-ed penned by Guimarães alleged misuse of funds and incompetence in the entire transaction. He clamors for a response from various political, judicial and trade entities, including Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. Other critics have suggested that monies were siphoned from this and other transactions by powerful members of the government and industrial sectors, as part of the scheme that involved senators Renan Calheiros and José Sarney. The 02/26/13 op-ed provoked an immediate response the next day from the Association of Engineers of Petrobras (Associação dos Engenheiros da Petrobras – AEPET), one of the entities that Guimarães accused of keeping silent about the “scandal.” The AEPET affirmed that it is actively involved in on-going investigations including a public hearing in the Brazilian National Congress and the Brazilian Attorney General’s office.


UP-DATE 03/12/13: Both the original op-ed piece by Guimarães and the response from AEPET no longer appear in the archives of the Jornal do Brasil, but are available at: http://www.brasilnews.com.br/

Sunday, January 27, 2013

2666

The most interesting book that I read in 2012 was 2666 published posthumously by the Chilean author Roberto Bolaño. Debuted in 2004 by Editorial Anagrama (Barcelona), this 1,000-page novel presents an intricate structure of numerous, seemingly unrelated narrative lines that eventually intersect in the Chihuahua desert of northern Mexico. In some ways reminiscent of Brazilian Ivan Ângelo’s A Festa that focuses on corruption and oppression in a “read-between-the-lines” narrative, 2666 is ultimately a denunciation not only of the violence against women occurring along the US-Mexican border, but also of the de facto governmental complicity in the crimes. The unstated perpetrators of the heinous violence are the savage drug cartels; the implicit target of Bolaño’s harshest criticism is the government that only pays lip service to enforcement and on many levels indirectly and directly abets the illicit cash flow with its ensuing atrocities. This view eventually emerges from a five-part structure that encompasses the arcane world of scholars of obscure European literature, a New York sportswriter, the German army at the Eastern front during World War II, and most importantly the fictitious town of Santa Teresa standing in for Ciudad Juárez. Although he wrote it as a single work, just before his death Bolaño instructed that 2666 be published as five separate novels in order to ensure the patrimony he left for his family. Indeed, each section could conceivably stand alone, while sharing some characters and themes with the others. However, Bolaño’s heirs decided to come out with the novel as a single tome, and the impact of the work gains from this integration. In the end, Roberto Bolaño constructed a narrative as disturbing and desolate as the countryside that he depicted.